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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
 
 
 
FLEXIBLE LIMINALITY AMONG THE TIBETAN DIASPORA:  
TIBETAN EXILES ADJUSTING CULTURAL PRACTICES IN DHARAMSALA, INDIA 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate the characteristics and quality of liminality among the 
Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala, India, and the United States. I argue that the quality of 
their liminality defines this exile community’s ability to maneuver and voice their influence to 
geo-political community of states that surround them, all while within their liminal condition. The 
Tibetan exile people live as stateless foreigners in India but have a better standard of living and 
better opportunities to acquire transnational resources than their surrounding host community. In 
the U.S., Tibetan diaspora people live as asylum-seekers and naturalized Tibetan-Americans but 
have established a popular political campaign (which enjoys the support of considerably many 
Americans) addressing the plight of Tibetans imposed by China. I argue that the Tibetan diaspora 
have achieved this unique social and political success as a marginalized community by adopting a 
cultural practice that I call “flexible liminality.” Flexible liminality is a Tibetan cultural practice 
that helps transient people adjust to any situation, people, and geo-politics circumstance.  
Flexible liminality relies on two factors: first, political interest from various nation-states; 
second, a group’s ability to adjust their cultural practices to match external influences. In the case 
of the Tibetan exile community, it is important to note that they are excluded by multiple nation-
states (China, India, the Western countries) in different ways simultaneously. Therefore, the 
world collective of Tibetan refugees are not fixed in one state of liminality but experience a 
variety of liminalities in relation to different nation-states. Second, the Tibetan exile community 
has adjusted their cultural practices to assimilate with host communities in whichever countries 
their exile-hood has landed them. Since Tibetans cannot acquire Indian citizenship, the Tibetan 
exile community uses India as a space to promote their political activism against China, and form 
better relationship with Western foreigners. In Dharamsala, the Tibetan community has organized 
institutions that guides Tibetan individuals to form relationships with foreign tourists, and acquire 
skills (i.e. language, behavior, education, philosophy) that would help them assimilate better 
when resettling in Western host countries. In both, Dharamsala and the U.S., the Tibetan diaspora 
have a cultivated cultural practice to advocate Tibetan political plight against China, and to 
communicate Tibetan religio-socio traditions with the foreign host community. As a result, 
Tibetans are able to achieve political popularity, and to socially draw empathy from foreign 
communities that aids in producing a space for Tibetan cultural preservation in exile.  
The case study on Tibetan exile community sheds a new light on the study of 
marginality/liminality. This dissertation showcases that there can be a spectrum for the quality of 
liminality that goes from flexible at one end to inflexible at the other end. Not all exile groups 
have the same condition of liminality, being an exile community can be beneficial or crippling 
somewhere in the spectrum. Tibetan exile community has achieved a flexible end of liminality in 
exile but there are other exile groups who may not have the same maneuvering ability as the 
Tibetan exile community. This theory of flexible liminality can be used to better understand the 
lives of exiles by characterizing and measuring the quality of their liminality.  
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Liminality 
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Chapter 1: Flexible Liminality of Tibetan Exiles from Dharamsala, India to the United States  
 
Introduction 
This dissertation’s journey draws on fieldwork with four communities – first, the Tibetan 
community living in India; second, the Tibetan community surrounding a Buddhist monastery in 
Louisville, Kentucky (United States); third, contact from a distance with members of the Tibetan 
community living in the United States, India, and Nepal; and fourth, the American host 
community surrounding a refugee resettlement agency in Louisville, Kentucky. I have conducted 
traditional ethnographic fieldwork and digital ethnography from 2014-2018 to analyze the type of 
exile-hood experienced by the Tibetan exile community living in India, and the U.S. The Tibetan 
community I am speaking about in this dissertation are people who are affected by geo-political 
exclusions from China, India, and the West; consequently, these Tibetans are people who claim 
origins from Tibetan geographic area but are living outside their home country as stateless exiles. 
In India1, the Tibetans that I am speaking of are living as prolonged foreign guests without 
citizenship to any country; and in the United States, the Tibetans that I am speaking of are 
immigrants (including offspring born to immigrants), who already are or aim to become 
naturalized U.S. citizens, and claim to have Tibetan heritage. I will address each group 
individually in later chapters. 
 
Project Aims 
In this dissertation, I explore a theoretical concept describing the quality of liminality 
experienced by any excluded group; especially what I will call ‘flexible liminality’. Flexible 
liminality, as I have been using it, has two meanings: first, it is a cultural practice; and second, it 
is a condition or form of liminality. I will analyze the cultural practice of ‘flexible liminality’ 
used by the Tibetan exile community. At the same time, I will also argue that the ideology of 
																																																								
1 Tibetan exiles have also fled to other surrounding countries like Bhutan, and Nepal. However, 
for my research I mostly interacted with Tibetan exiles living in North India, and some from 
South India and Nepal via virtual social media.   
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flexible liminality can be analyzed as a condition that can be more or less flexible. My intention is 
to provide an additional characteristic for the condition of liminality for further theoretical 
understanding. In this dissertation, however, I focus largely on analyzing the practice of flexible 
liminality by ethnographically presenting the case of a Tibetan exile community, surrounded by 
multiple nation-state structures creating different exclusions for Tibetan exiles, that has created a 
cultural practice that allows them to respond differently to different nation-states to acquire better 
life chances. Still, I will be using both meanings of liminality in this dissertation, but these two 
meanings of flexible liminality should not be confused as one in the following chapters.  
In this dissertation, I aim to show the workings of macro forces (e.g. nation-states, geo-
politics, and popularity of Western liberalism) alongside the micro agents (e.g. individual 
relationship of Tibetans with Westerners and Indians, and re-making Tibetan identity in exile). In 
viewing both the macro and micro agents, I aim to present a holistic perspective that will help us 
understand the social, economic, political, and legal conditions of the Tibetan exile community. 
This dissertation will produce snapshots not only of the larger geo-political forces influencing the 
everyday lives of Tibetan exiles but also of the Tibetan exile community’s strategic responses and 
adjustments to each of these geo-political forces. 
The three main inquiries that frame my dissertation are as follows:  
1. I seek to understand how the Tibetan exiles are performing their agency under the external 
influence of multiple vectored geo-politics. In conducting fieldwork in two sites, India and 
the U.S., I have noticed that Tibetan exiles are taking different opportunities granted in 
different countries to push for better life chances, and to propagate Tibetan identity, Tibetan 
nationalism, and so on. Thus, Tibetan exiles are tactically adapting their cultural practices 
according to the different types of exclusions they face in various geo-political environments. 
Their different cultural adaptations in two sites will be visible by the end of this dissertation.  
2. I will analyze in what ways the Tibetan diaspora actively transforms the different geo-politics 
influencing them. Rather than passively receiving exclusions from various geo-politics, I will 
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show that Tibetan exiles are actively partaking in transforming the very agents (institutes, 
government policies, individuals) that are influencing them. In looking at individual 
expressions of Tibetan identity, Tibetan non-profits, Tibetan community centers in the West, 
Tibetan nationalist duties, and so on, we can see that the Tibetan diaspora is interacting and 
transforming various geo-politics.  
3. I will characterize the quality of Tibetan exile’s flexible liminality. This will be a different 
procedure from counting the degree of liminality, in the sense of determining just how jurally 
and socially excluded a group might be, because Tibetan exiles have already been 
conditioned to liminality. Flexible liminality attempts to examine how “flexible” their 
situation is; that is, how much Tibetan exiles can maneuver within their liminal conditions. I 
will be exploring the quality of the Tibetan exile’s flexible liminality through various aspects 
of their exile life like their political activism, nationalist identity, social assimilation in 
Dharamsala (India) and Louisville (KY), Tibetan Buddhism in the West, and so on. I plan to 
use the idea of flexible liminality to provide a window into the world of Tibetan exiles, and 
where and how they way are creating and participating in their shifting cultural landscapes.    
 
Positionality and Methodology  
In this section, I will describe my positionality in two different field sites and the 
methodologies I adapted according to my roles in those field sites. I first started my research in 
Dharamsala in 2014, and added the U.S. field site later in 2016. I will be talking about my 
position in those field sites and the type of role I held in those communities. I will also describe 
the other people surrounding me during my research because their presence influenced the way 
my interlocutors in Dharamsala, and Louisville (KY) viewed me.  
I arrived in Dharamsala in 2014 with my (now) husband, Simon, and met my parents who 
had flown straight there from Nepal. Dharamsala is the maternal home of my father; however, he 
had not visited Dharamsala in a long time so my research fieldwork gave him an opportunity to 
	 4	
visit his family members. I only learned of my father’s family relations in my field site after I had 
started my proposal writing for my doctoral research. I was pleasantly surprised to learn that my 
extended family members were eager to help me with my research work. My second cousin gave 
us a tour of the Tibetan boarding school, the surrounding hills where young couples go on dates, 
and the abandoned huts in the woods where the first generation of Tibetan exiles had lived. My 
aunt-uncle took me on a formal city site-seeing tour to see the Kangra fort and Dharamsala’s 
popular Hindu temples, during which I learned about Indian social etiquette and expected 
behaviors for guests and hosts in private versus public spaces in Dharamsala. My cousins also 
educated me about how Tibetans in Dharamsala live differently (have a different social etiquette) 
than Indians so I could behave in respectful manner when I visited Tibetans in their homes or 
offices.  
My parents and I “look Nepali” and blended in with the ethnically (Nepali) Gorkhali 
community in Dharamsala, but my husband Simon is a tall, white American so he stood out as 
foreign tourist. For most of my Tibetan-related research work, Simon accompanied me to all my 
interviews, social gatherings, and participant observations. Casually, Simon and I were able to 
make a lot of young (ages 16-30) Tibetan friends very easily. Most of the young Tibetans were 
college students on summer and winter breaks visiting family in Dharamsala. Later I would learn 
that this was a unique social opportunity that I was able to gain through my husband’s presence as 
the foreign tourist. The ability to make friends with young Tibetans opened my eyes to how, and 
in what spaces, Tibetans in Dharamsala were making friends with foreign tourists. When I was 
alone for fieldwork, Tibetan people often asked I if I was Tibetan, and when I said answered, “no 
I am Nepali”, most of their responses were delightful remarks like, “Oh I went to school with a 
Nepali person” or “Nepali people are so much like Tibetans”, etc. As a result, when alone, my 
ethnic identity, and phenomenological look, helped me have access to social conversations with 
the Tibetan community in another mode. In other words, I was treated as a native anthropologist 
in Dharamsala because of my Nepali ethnic identity and Tibetan-like physical features. This was 
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another factor that led me to experience and understand components of ethnic identity and ethnic 
differences in the Dharamsala community.  
My methodology for my Dharamsala fieldwork involved mostly using traditional 
ethnographic methods of interview and participant observation. I also attempted to use social 
network analysis, using ego-network analysis for UCINET software, to better understand the 
Tibetan social groups and their relationship with foreigners. While I received good responses for 
formal, informal, and semi-structured interviews and participant observations, the ego-network 
analysis data collection did not go so well. I felt unwelcomed when I asked social network related 
questions. I was sometimes asked to come back another time, told to go away, told ‘no’ with hand 
gestures from the front door, and so on. These social network questions were changing my 
perspective of the Tibetan Dharamsala community because once friendly people were getting 
annoyed in my presence. I started to notice those signs on the office doors stating, “No 
researchers allowed” or “Need one-week notice for interviews.” When I asked about this to my 
Tibetan friends, they pointed out (what I had overlooked in my first visit) that Dharamsala is 
oversaturated with researchers, journalists, students, and activists, all going around town asking 
for interviews with Tibetans. Since my transition from simply having conversations to getting 
ego-network analysis data, which involved using a formal, structured, listing questionnaire of 
Tibetan and foreigner social groups, I was discouraged by closed doors and cold responses in 
Dharamsala.  After that I decided to abandon using ego-network analysis for my research work on 
this dissertation. Although it may be useful in other research with the Tibetan diaspora, I 
observed that all my Tibetan interlocutors become uncomfortable with network questions. I was 
only able to figure out why this was so, as will be discussed later, when I came to understand the 
importance making and maintaining transnational connections, and maintaining a certain kind of 
public image,  has for Tibetans in diaspora; and the extent to which those tasks opens them up to 
public exposure in ways that are both beneficial and, to them, exhausting. In any case, at this 
point I decided to move my research to the U.S. where I thought I could get a fresh start using 
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traditional and digital ethnography methods.  Nonetheless, attempting to do ego-network analysis 
in Dharamsala was important because it demonstrated to me that the Tibetan Dharamsala 
community felt over-researched; and that drew me to look at how the work of publicly 
performing Tibetan-ness and hiding community differences were central to the Tibetan 
experience of liminality and refugee-hood.  
  After coming back to the U.S. from Dharamsala, I started my digital ethnography by 
contacting U.S. based Tibetan activists via social media and phone; thereafter, I carried out 
traditional ethnography. For this I mostly relied on semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation, including physical and online interview venues (via Facebook live, Whatsapp chats, 
organization web-pages, etc). The positive feedback from the U.S. based Tibetan community 
gave me a boost of confidence in my research that I desperately needed after observing the over-
researched and exhausted Dharamsala Tibetan community. I realized that my Tibetan 
interlocutors in the U.S. were willing to open up about their political views easily, and they only 
needed my university credentials to know I was a real researcher. This opened my eyes to the 
different type of lives Tibetans live in the U.S. in comparison to Dharamsala. Additionally, I 
noticed that while carrying out digital ethnography in the U.S., I was able to hide my physical 
appearance and ethnic identity; I did not have to represent any ethnic community but rather I 
simply could be a face-less university student. Similarly, my Tibetan interlocutors had the option 
of hiding the physical appearance of their Tibetan-regional identity during digital ethnography, 
and I observed that this anonymity allowed my interlocutors to more freely express themselves. I 
also reached out to Tibetan community in Nepal and India via social media from the U.S., and, 
interestingly, this time, most people were willing to participant in the interviews without evident 
discomfort or irritation.  
At the same time, I started participant observation at a refugee resettlement agency based 
in Louisville, KY to understand the U.S. government’s refugee policies. I experienced a drastic 
difference in positionality when I approached people a staff member representing a refugee 
7	
resettlement NGO from when I approached people as a researcher. Unlike in Dharamsala, where 
my interactions with people were relatively free and open (except when doing network analysis), 
as a staff member I found myself more constrained.  I had to carefully choose how I talked with 
refugees about the U.S. government; I had to decline taking food/drinks in refugee houses; and I 
had to set a formal tone with refugees even when talking about personal topics like, income, 
health, and hygiene.  
Coincidentally, my employment with the U.S. refugee resettlement agency came to an 
end during the U.S. Presidential election, after which the United States soon began adopting anti-
immigration policies, which gave me another opportunity to understand the relative inflexibility 
of US racial discrimination (especially for Spanish and Arabic speaking populations), and to 
compare that with the Tibetan migrant’s flexible liminality in the U.S. Soon after, I also started 
participant observation and in-person interviews with the Tibetan community in the larger tri-
state area of Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. For those interviews my positionality changed again, 
from a refugee resettlement staff member carrying out policy to a university student interested in 
the Tibetan diaspora. I found it much easier to talk to Tibetan and American community members 
as a student because I did not have to juggle any other professional roles; I could simply ask 
questions as a researcher. Additionally, during this time, I did not experience any special 
acceptance or rejection because of my physical appearance or ethnic identity; rather, my 
credentials from a reputable university were good enough for Tibetan and American community 
members to participate in the research. I started carrying my business card from the university in 
order to prove my credentials, and I found that my interlocutors appreciated that extra bit of trust 
from the business cards.  
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The Tibetan government in exile states that the political boundaries of Tibet, the whole of 
Tibet or Cholkha-Sum, covers three regions in the Himalayan plateau; namely, U-Tsang, Amdo, 
and Kham (See Fig 1) (CTA 2018).  However, historians and Tibetologists argue that the Tibetan 
central government had direct control over the U-Tsang region but not over Amdo and Kham 
(Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). I found geographic origins to be an important aspect of their 
heritage for Tibetans in exile. For example, the Tibetan government in exile’s parliamentary 
representation and general body elections takes place according to these three regions where a 
few members from each region (U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham) run against each other. I will 
explain the ethnic diversity of Tibetan exile community, and the lack of recognition of their 
diversity, in a later chapter.  
Figure 1.1: Cholkha-Sum: U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham 
In order to understand why China does not want Tibetans to have their own governance, 
let me briefly explain the history of the Tibetan state. Scholars do not know when the Tibetan 
state came into existence; however, we have records of Tibet from the historical accounts of its 
neighboring states, China, India, and Nepal (Goldstein 1978, 1987, 1991, 2007; Childs 2003; 
Schaik 2010). From these historical records we know that the Tibetan state was held as a 
patriarchal monarchy from the early 7th-11th century (Schaik 2010). The ruling monarch of the 
Tibetan empire held the central power, and under him were regional imperial authorities, or, 
chiefdoms. However, these regional chiefs were constantly at war with each other, and 
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eventually, a group of them contested the authority of the monarchy, which led to the demise of 
the Tibetan empire in the 11th century (Laird 2007;van Schaik and Galambos 2011; Schaik 2010).  
During the 11th century, the era of changes in political power, the School of Sakya 
Buddhism was gaining popularity (Choedon and Norbu 1998, Davidson 2002, Thurman 1998). 
The Sakya School of Buddhism was a form of Vajrayana (Tantric) Buddhism2 that was spread in 
Tibet from India and Nepal in early 11th century (Choedon and Norbu 1998, Davidson 2002, 
Thurman 1998, Thurman 2008). The Vajrayana school of Buddhism is one that puts its emphasis 
on “path and result” (lam ‘bras) as a system for meditation in which each stage of religious 
development requires mastery of the one before it before proceeding to the next step (Huber 
2008; Keown and Prebish 2013). By the early 13th century Vajrayana was hegemonic in Tibet. At 
the same time, however, noticing a power vacancy in central Tibet, the Mongols invaded, 
conquered, and would rule Tibet with a puppet Monastic administration of the Sakya School from 
the early 13th Century till the mid-14th Century (Laird 2007; Schaik 2010). During this peaceful 
time, though, several different forms of Buddhism arose in the Tibetan region, including the 
future power-holder, the Gelugpa School of Buddhism (Laird 2007; Schaik 2010). 
In the mid-14th century, Je Tsongkhapa, a Tibetan Buddhist scholar and religious leader, 
founded the Gelugpa (or Gelug) School of Tibetan Buddhism (Jinpa 2008). He was highly 
influenced by the Kadam school of Buddhism that holds that an individual practitioner may 
perceive all of the doctrines of the Sutras and Tantras as complimentary methods to achieve 
enlightenment; this is commonly known as ‘The Four Divinities and Three Dharmas’ (Jinpa 
2008). The Gelug School was founded to combine the dharma teaching from the Kadam School 
																																																								
2 Vajrayana Buddhism is a form of Mahayana Buddhism that uses tantric ritual as a faster vehicle 
to achieve liberation. The religious practice involves using mantras (prayer chants), dharanis 
(incantation and recitation), mudras (bodily gestures used to seal spiritual energy), and mandalas 
(diagram or geometric pattern representing Buddhist cosmos), and the visualization of deities and 
Buddhas. For more information see Ronald Davidson (2002) Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social 
History of the Tantric Movement.  
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with the Nagarjuna’s philosophy of Madhyamaka (middle way) and Sunyata (emptiness)3. The 
Gelugpa School founded three sub-divisions of monastic colleges in Tibet; namely, the Ganden, 
Drepung Gomang, and Sera monasteries (Choedon and Norbu 1998, Davidson 2002, Thurman 
1998).  
The Ganden monastery gained the state political power after the third incarnation of the 
leading teacher, Sonam Gyatso, formed an alliance of patron-client relationship with the Mongol 
leader, Altan Khan (Laird 2007; Lopez 2001; Schaik 2010). The word ‘Dalai’ is a Mongolian 
name for Gyatso that means ocean in Tibetan language; and the word ‘lama’ means wise teacher 
in Tibetan (Lopez 2001). This alliance made the Gelug School the most powerful institution in 
Tibet and the dominant sect of Tibetan Buddhism (Laird 2007; Lopez 2001; Schaik 2010). The 
relationship with Mongols provided the military protection and political support to Tibet from 
16th cent-18th cent; thereafter, the Mongol-Tibet alliance broke because of disagreements over the 
reincarnated 7th Dalai Lama (Laird 2007; Lopez 2001; Schaik 2010). During an invasion by the 
Mongols to decide the future Tibetan leader, the Manchu-led Qing dynasty protected Tibetan 
interests and the Gelug School’s chosen 7th Dalai Lama (Schaik 2010). An alliance was formed 
between Tibet and Qing dynasty until the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1912 (Schaik 2010).  
Overtime, the Central Tibet or U-Tsang became the space of power for Tibetan 
governance headed by a religious leader, the Dalai Lama (Choedon and Norbu 1998). Today, the 
Dalai Lama we recognize is the 14th in power for the Tibetan leadership. On a communal level, 
the general structure of pre-colonialized Tibet was similar to a medieval European feudalistic 
hierarchy (Goldstein 2007). However, at the local level, social relations worked differently from 
medieval Europe; the religious and aristocratic family corporations owned the arable estates in 
Tibet, where the estates could range from 30-300 acres (Goldstein 2007). Each estate had a 
																																																								
3	The Madhyamaka doctrine teaches the value of taking the middle path when practicing 
Buddhism, rather than extremes, in order to achieve enlightenment. The Sunyata doctrines claim 
that all things, including all experienced phenomena, are empty of intrinsic existence because 
they do not have any permanent and eternal substance (Jinpa 2008; Lopez 2001; Thurman 1995).	
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village of serfs (mi ser), that is, literally, ‘human subjects’. I will use the English term, serf for mi 
ser because that is the closest proximity I can find in the English language. However, I should 
note some differences between Tibetan mi ser and European medieval serfs. In pre-colonized 
Tibet, each taxpaying serf family were given a certain portion of arable land to support 
themselves, and in return, serfs had to provide one family member each day to work on the estate 
of the religious or aristocratic corporate family, whose land they inhabited, as a form of tax 
payment (Goldstein 1991; 1971). The rights and ownership of these estates were hereditarily 
passed down to each generation’s male offspring, and the serf families, like aristocratic families, 
were tied to the estate in heredity perpetuity (Goldstein 1991; 1971). According to the written 
history of Tibet, the lords did not care much about the working of serfs until there was wealth 
peacefully coming from their territories (Goldstein 1991).  
The united Tibetan national identity (U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham) comes from having 
similar cultural traditions, i.e. a nomadic life, an agricultural economy, a manor-based land 
system, and Tibetan Buddhist religious belief (Schaik 2010; Goldstein 1991; Choedon and Norbu 
1998). The communal ties of people were intricately woven with Buddhist monastic institutions 
and Buddhist religious beliefs. Tibetan Buddhism is a form of Mahayana Buddhism (Schaik 
2010; Goldstein 1991; Choedon and Norbu 1998; Huber 2008). At that time in Tibet, monasteries 
were the most powerful institutions in the society—the monasteries were the largest landholders, 
were important to commoners who wanted to escape the agricultural life, were the only source of 
scholarship and education for Tibetans, and the local community surrounding the monastery had 
the option to benefit from prayers to ward off illness or gain good karmic values (Nowak 1984; 
Schaik 2010). Even today, Tibetan exiles I interacted with spoke of differences of each three 
regions but strive to come together in exile for the Tibetan identity. I observed that sharing a 
Tibetan Buddhist tradition is a major turning factor for most Tibetans in realizing the obstruction 
of a traditional lifestyle caused by Chinese occupation. Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP), was a firm believer that religion was the root of all things evil in a 
society, so he already had plans to eradicate the religious leadership in Tibet (Schaik 2010).  
In the late 1940s, the young (17 year-old) 14th Dalai Lama was invited by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to modernize Tibet’s social structure and learn of the communist 
changes made in mainland China (Schaik 2010; Goldstein 1991; Choedon and Norbu 1998). 
Despite Tibetan elites’ and Western allies’ (United States and Britain standing against Chinese 
communist values) urged that he stand strictly against the CCP, in 1954 the 14th Dalai Lama spent 
a year in China learning about Mao’s Marxist reforms in China (DIIR 2001; Schaik 2010). When 
he got back from the trip, the Dalai Lama was unwillingly accompanied to Lhasa by a large 
Chinese army and was forced to admit that Tibet needed a social reform and they needed help 
from outside. It should be noted that the Dalai Lama was actually in favor of Marxist reforms 
(Schaik 2010). To this day, he still calls himself a Marxist Buddhist—meaning, socio-
economically, he would like to see a decrease in the gap between the rich and the poor, and for 
everybody to have an equal playing field (The Dalai Lama 2011; 2017). The Tibetan community 
think the 14th Dalai Lama has strived to achieve his goal by creating a Tibetan government in 
exile4 (Bod mi’i sgirg ‘dzugs), introducing democracy to the exile community, and actively 
establishing institutions (public old age home, hospitals, schools, etc.) that could help improve the 
lives of Tibetans living in exile (H.H. The14th Dalai Lama of Tibet 2018).  
In the 1950s, the Dalai Lama lacked the foreign allies, domestic military power, and 
international political experience to assert his true desire to change the old Tibetan feudal system 
(Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). Moreover, he had did not have enough experience to know with 
what to replace the old system. Thus, after a failed attempt to negotiate with China, and, given the 
likelihood of Tibetan military defeat, the Dalai Lama agreed to sign a 17-point agreement with 
China to let the Chinese government develop Tibet while still allowing Tibetans to govern their 
																																																								
4 The Tibetan government in exile is officially called the Central Tibetan Administration and is 
logged as a non-profit organization under the India government.  
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own region (DIIR 2001; Hasmath and Hsu 2007; McGranahan 2007; Goldstein 2007; Schaik 
2010). During this period, there was a great divide between Tibetans who thought Tibet could 
bring reform under China, and the other Tibetans who thought Tibetans should rule Tibet by 
themselves; the aristocratic reformists, who could afford to transfer their wealth, saw their cause 
dying and left Tibet to resettle in Northwest India (Schaik 2010).  
It was during the ‘great leap forward’ (1958-1962) period that the full purpose of CCP’s 
invasion was realized. Great leap forward was and economic and social campaign started by the 
CCP’s chairman Mao Zedong to rapidly industrialize and transform the country (Goldstein 2007; 
Schaik 2010). In Tibetan region, the CCP forcefully pushed out the large monasteries in Amdo 
and Kham, the strain of land reform to forcefully industrialize the region pushed people to take 
refuge in central Tibet (Schaik 2010).  For the CCP these civil uproars in Tibetan regions (U-
Tsang, Kham, and Amdo) were unexpected and threatening, which is why the CCP decided to 
swiftly silence the growing civil uprising with Chinese military force (Schaik 2010).  During this 
period, Tibetan-organized large civil protests in the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, mostly composed of 
commoners or the serf class (Schaik 2010).  Meanwhile, the residents from Kham and Amdo 
were leading their own rebellion against the CCP in Lhasa as well (Schaik 2010). This civil 
protest was later named the Tibetan People’s Association. This was the first public political 
outcry led by commoners in Tibet, including the first public all-women’s protest (TWA 2016; 
Goldstein 2007; DIIR 2001). Before this event, there had never been such a large number of 
demonstrations by the serf class, nor one that included women (TWA 2016; Goldstein 2007; 
DIIR 2001).  
Ironically, the CCP thought of themselves as revolutionaries bringing liberation to the 
‘poor’ Tibetans (Schaik 2010). This Chinese ‘liberation’ met with little resistance from ill-
equipped and poorly trained Tibetan forces. Soon after, Chinese troops forcibly occupied Tibet, 
killing, detaining and arresting thousands of Tibetans citizens (Schaik 2010). However, the 
Chinese military had plans to annex the Tibetan state, and so the military set up a plot to murder 
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the head of the Tibetan state, the 14th Dalai Lama (Hasmath and Hsu 2007; McGranahan 2007; 
Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). Fortunately, the plan leaked, and in 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama was 
able to escape by fleeing the country to India (Hasmath and Hsu 2007; McGranahan 2007; 
Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). More than 80,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama to India, and 
since then there have been many more who have fled the country (CTA 2018; Nowak 1984; 
Davis 2007). As a newly independent country India sympathized with the Tibetan’s political 
flight and accepted the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan refugees (Hasmath and Hsu 2007; 
McGranahan 2007; Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). India has allowed more Tibetans to enter the 
country for asylum since 1959 – the total number of Tibetan refugees living in India today is 
approximated between 94,000- 120,000 (CTA 2009; TJC 2011).  
In short, since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in early 1920s, with 
its goal of uniting the surrounding states with  ‘motherland’ China, the Tibetan State has been in 
turmoil (TJC 2011; Hasmath and Hsu 2007; McGranahan 2007; Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). 
The CCP’s goal of forceful unification required China to claim that Tibet never existed as an 
independent state (TJC 2011; Hasmath and Hsu 2007; McGranahan 2007; Goldstein 2007; Schaik 
2010). I will argue later in a chapter that China’s narrative that Tibet never existed as an 
independent state shapes how Tibetan exile community express their nationalist values. 
Nonetheless, something that started as mild political propaganda in Tibet changed into a violent 
occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama fled 
Tibet to escape the CCP’s plot to murder him, and soon after, thousands more Tibetans fled to 
neighboring countries out of the fear of prosecution and to escape cultural genocide (TJC 2011; 
Hasmath and Hsu 2007; Davis 2007). Today, China calls the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 
as part of the Chinese nation-state’s territory but the Tibetan exile community claims that the 
Chinese government is occupying their Tibetan state and that Tibetans are hence victims of 
cultural genocide (TJC 2011; Hasmath and Hsu 2007; Davis 2007). It is this facet of the Tibetan 
exile community that I am inquiring about: their exile-hood and experiences of liminality.  
	 15	
Tibetans in Exile and Central Tibetan Administration (Bod mi’i sgirg ‘dzugs) 
The 14th Dalai Lama first established the Tibetan government in exile in 1959 to better 
oversee the Tibetan exile population (CTA 2018). The Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE) is 
not an internationally recognized entity but it functions as a pseudo-government by providing 
public service to the Tibetan exile community and by collecting voluntary donations (Chatrel) 
from the Tibetan exiles (CTA 2018). Inspired by the democratic institutions of the U.S. and India, 
the Central Tibetan Administration has evolved into a stable form of governance with an elected 
parliament, a constitution, and three bodies of the government: a judiciary, a legislature and an 
executive (called the Kashag) (CTA 2018). Thus, the official name of the exile government is the 
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), which is registered as a non-profit in India. In this 
dissertation, I will use the term CTA and TGiE both because this is what the Tibetan community 
does, and using the Tibetan Government in Exile also helps to better recognize the community 
services and authority wielded by the institution of the Central Tibetan Administration.   
Tibetan exiles have spread to various different parts of the world, like Switzerland, 
France, Australia, South Korea, Canada, U.S.A, U.K. etc. (CTA 2018). In order to better serve the 
Tibetan exile community all around the world, the TGiE also has opened various branch 
headquarter around the world (in the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Switzerland, Nepal, etc.) 
but the headquarter of the TGiE is in Dharamsala, India (CTA 2018). Tibetans in exile call their 
own exile government, a ‘model government’, speaking of it as an experimental model that could 
be transferred to govern the geo-political Tibetan region in the future, if Tibet were to gain 
independence from China (Interview 2016). This model exile government provides necessary 
community services to the Tibetan refugees, as mentioned above. The Tibetan government in 
exile has become an intricate and expansive web of power with the purpose of serving the needs 
of exiled Tibetans, and although not officially recognized by the international community, it is 
acquiring international recognition of its effort to win back the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 
China (Nowak 1984; Mishra 2015; McGranahan 2013; McConnell 2011; Hess 2009). The model 
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Tibetan government in exile does not have military power, geographical territory or international 
economic relationships to substantiate its governance but its legitimacy rests on the services it 
provides to its exiled people (Mishra 2015; McGranahan 2013; McConnell 2011; Hess 2009). 
Thus, the Tibetan government in exile has spent all of its energy on public services in order to 
make organized citizens out of the Tibetan exiles.  
A recent survey by the Tibetan exile government from 2009 reported that there were 
approximately 127,935 Tibetans outside of Tibet (CTA Planning Commission 2009, TJC 2011). 
This demographic survey reported that about 74 percent of their population currently resides in 
India (CTA Planning Commission 2009, TJC 2011). Recently arrived Tibetan refugees are 
allowed to stay in the residential institutions run by the Tibetan government in exile (CTA 2018). 
The Tibetan government has made a big impact on the settlement of the Tibetan refugees outside 
of Tibet. Tibetans have been living in India since 1959, but the Indian government still treats 
them under the foreigner act of 1946 so Tibetans are not legally considered refugees in order to 
avoid Indo-Sino relationship problems (Artiles 2009; Mishra 2015; McGranahan 2013; 
McConnell 2009). However, since Indian government officials I have talked to refer to them as, 
and Tibetan exiles conversationally call themselves, a ‘refugee’ population, so I will sometimes 
do the same, though I will mostly use the term ‘exile’ since it better represents the situation of 
Tibetans in India. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that sensitivity to the reactions of the 
Chinese government have insured that Tibetans are not, anywhere, refugees in the legal sense. In 
India, for example, Tibetans are legally classified as foreigners and also call them foreign guests 
(HRLN 2007; Artiles 2009). Hence, for their stay in India Tibetans carry two legal documents: — 
a Registration certificate and an Identification certificate (Artiles 2009; CTA 2018). Despite the 
legal restrictions, India has allowed Tibetans to work and travel within the country, to run non-
profits and small businesses, and to operate their Tibetan government in exile (CTA 2018).  
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Theoretical Framing of Dissertation 
Flexible Liminality 
My first week in Dharamsala, India, I was in complete awe of the fashion statement made 
by Tibetan exiles. I am usually not a person to care much for fashion myself but I could not help 
but notice Air Jordans on young-adult monks, the shiny motorbikes of teenaged Tibetan men, the 
American pop music playing on their cell phones, their dreadlocks, beats headphones, and 
Michael Kors purses. All these accessories that I was used to seeing on my undergraduate 
students at the University of Kentucky back in the U.S., I was seeing on a marginalized 
population in India.  
I remember one particular time when I was sitting at a café just watching the market 
crowd starting to stir in the morning. Vendors were setting up their items for sale by the sidewalk, 
and the early morning vegetable markets, chai-shops, and breakfast parathas [flat bread] were 
slowly winding down their businesses. Then, I saw a Tibetan man, probably in his late 20s, 
walking up the hill on the market road that was yet to be cleaned of the garbage thrown from the 
days before. The Tibetan man had my attention due to his bright pink plaid shirt, bowtie, dyed 
blond hair, khaki shorts, and boat shoes. There were a few Indian women covering their hair with 
shawls walking past him, and a few other Indian men in faded shirts and pants walking by to start 
their day. He walked into the same café that I was sitting in, greeted the barista behind the counter 
and ordered his Americano. At this point, I knew I had to include this Tibetan man’s 
cosmopolitan lifestyle in my research. I immediately walked up to the Tibetan man, Phurbu 
(pseudonym), introduced myself and asked if I could interview him. Today, I know this man, 
Phurbu, as a good friend and a kind human being, who has helped me immensely with my 
research work. I will mention Phurbu throughout the dissertation so I have anonymized his name 
to protect his identity. As a side note, all the participant’s names in this dissertation have been 
anonymized for their privacy, instead, I have used pseudonyms for all of the participants. I have 
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tried to maintain the ethnic identity of each participant by using Tibetan pseudonym for Tibetan 
participants, and western pseudonym for western participants and so on.  
Phurbu told me the first day I met him that he deliberately dresses ‘nicely’ every day 
because he wants to distance himself from the old image of ‘refugees’ as dirty and barbaric 
people. The idea of Tibetans as refugees is an integral aspect of Tibetan exile community, and in 
later chapters, I will explain why the symbolic idea of the refugee is important for Tibetans in 
exile. Regardless, Phurbu’s cosmopolitan fashion and attitude spoke loudly to me about the 
position that Tibetans have in the town of Dharamsala. Dharamsala is an active place for Tibetan 
politics, social activities, cultural preservation, and is also a main tourist spot for Western and 
Asian tourists interested in learning about Tibetan exiles. I found the town of Dharamsala abuzz 
with events and activities related to Tibetan journalism, political activism, workshops, concerts, 
and so on. This also meant that the tourists, journalists, students, and researchers like me were 
closely observing the Tibetan population in Dharamsala. Which is why Tibetans like Phurbu 
always feel they have an audience before them to which they can make statements on behalf of 
the Tibetan exile community. I also noticed that the cosmopolitan image that Tibetans portrayed 
naturally pushed them closer to Western and Asian tourists. It also helped that most Tibetans I 
met spoke English very well – I never felt the need to hire a translator in Dharamsala because I 
could speak with Indians in Hindi or Nepali, and I could speak with Tibetans in English. Even 
with elderly Tibetans there was always someone else around who would offer Tibetan-English 
translation.  
There are 46 Tibetan exile settlements spread across India, Nepal, and Bhutan (CTA 
2018). From my observations, though Dharamsala is unique among them in being the only 
Tibetan settlement where the town is set up to lend itself so definitely towards the Tibetan exile 
community’s political, socio-cultural activities, and where foreign tourists solely visit for chance 
to meet the Tibetan exile population. In other words, the other Tibetan settlements do not 
experience the same volume of tourist traffic, or attraction, as does the Tibetan exile population 
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of Dharamsala. However, Dharamsala’s unique situation helped me notice a Tibetan cultural 
practice, cultivated in exile,  that has spread to other places where Tibetan exiles reside. I call this 
Tibetan cultural practice “flexible liminality”. I have used two different lineages of social theory 
to put together my theory of “flexible liminality.” First, I have used Victor Turner’s term, 
“liminality,” which he explains as a phase in the lives of individuals who are pushed beyond the 
boundaries of the social system (Turner 1969). Second, I have borrowed the term, “flexible”, 
from Aihwa Ong’s theoretical modeling of ‘flexible citizenship.’ Ong’s notion of ‘flexible 
citizenship’ arose out of her ethnographic description of Hong Kong elites who strategically used 
multiple citizenships, and the image of Chinese humanistic capitalism, to thrive in a global 
neoliberal environment (Ong 1999). 
Flexible liminality arises in circumstance where the Tibetan exile community has to use 
their liminality to achieve better life chances. The flexible liminality of the Tibetan diaspora can 
be characterized as their ability to adjust to any situation, people, and geo-politics. Their flexible 
liminality relies on two factors: first, interest from various nation-states; and second, the group’s 
ability to adjust their cultural practices to match their external influences. In the case of the 
Tibetan exile community, it is important to note that Tibetans are excluded from multiple nation-
states, including, China, India (Nepal & Bhutan), and Western countries, in different ways 
simultaneously. Therefore, Tibetan refugees are not fixed in one state of liminality but experience 
a variety of liminalities in relation to different nation-states. Second, Tibetan exile community has 
adopted a Western humanist philosophy. I describe Western liberal humanism as the emphasis on 
United Nation’s model of human rights combined with the values of Western Buddhism that 
draws on the ideals of compassion, mindfulness, and multiculturalism. The adoption of Western 
liberal humanist values has brought the Tibetan exiles and Western liberals closer to each other in 
terms of moral and ethical values. As a result, a rich transnational social network for the Tibetan 
exile community has been produced. Tibetan refugees, being a marginalized group, have been put 
under politico-legal-socio constraints; however, in a globalized world their fragmented exclusions 
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and advanced transnational network and cosmopolitan abilities provides Tibetan refugees with 
varied choices from different sources despite their constrained positions.  
 
Life Chances 
Although, in many ways, and considered in solely financial terms, Tibetans and the 
Indian host community that they live within share a roughly similar, modest, rural Indian 
condition, Tibetan exiles nevertheless have better life chances. That is, in concrete terms, 
Tibetans have more access to international sources of support and influence, and are better able to 
move across the globe than their Indian co-residents. This can be seen from census reports: the 
average literacy rate for Tibetans is 82%, whereas, for Indians it is 74% (CTA Planning 
Commission, 2009; Census Bureau of India, 2011; CDC 2008). Moreover, even without the help 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the Tibetans refuges 
have managed to acquire asylum status and citizenship in the West. The Tibetan exile community 
have self-promoted themselves for asylum grant in the Western countries and has managed to 
have 22.903% (23% or possibly more) of their diaspora securely resettled in the Western nation-
states (U.S. Census Bureau 2013; CTA 2009, 2008, 1998; Canada Census Bureau 2011; 
Australian Census Bureau 2006; New Zealand Census Bureau 2006). I argue that the Tibetan 
exile community has better ‘life chances’ because they have more cultural and social capital, and 
this can be measured by computing their cultural and social capital with standard Human 
Development Index (HDI).   
I define ‘life chances’ here as cultural and social forms of capital that affect a person’s 
ability to achieve socio-economic success. It is a concept similar to the Human Development 
Index (HDI) but my concept of life chances would complement the HDI’s factors of living 
conditions, health, and education, by adding in Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of cultural, and social 
capital. When I described my first encounter with Phurbu (the Tibetan man with pink shirt and 
bow-tie), my colleagues in the Anthropology department immediately mentioned Arjun 
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Appadurai’s theory of ‘global scapes,’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital. In 
Anthropology, we generally broaden the term capital from its financial or economic meaning to 
include also social, symbolic, and cultural resources. We understand that people can acquire 
transnational cultural knowledge (from watching foreign movies, learning foreign language), 
which can be transferred into making foreign friends (social capital) that constitute what we call 
transnational networks. However, for people unfamiliar with the work of Appadurai or Bourdeiu, 
it is hard to measure individual success using the language of Human Development Index (HDI) 
alone. Hence, it was often difficult to define what I meant by ‘life chances’ to my research 
participants.  
When I told my Tibetan participants that I thought they had better life chances than 
Gaddis and the local Indian population, they disagreed and said, “but we live with the Gaddis and 
eat the same dal-bhat [Indian staple food of lentil soup and rice] that they do.” This is definitely 
true in that Tibetans and Gaddis have almost similar HDI conditions, i.e., living standards, health, 
and education, which are the reasons why I needed more than standard HDI measures and now 
use Bourdeiu’s expanded concept of capital to better capture the realities of Tibetan exile lives. 
The concept of “life chances” helped me add to those HDI-neglected factors, such as Tibetan 
foreign cultural knowledge, language skills, and similar interest and ethical values to foreign 
tourists, that help them make foreign friends and maintain those friendships across nation-state 
boundaries. The same Tibetan transnational social network again enriches their social and cultural 
capital, and gives them access to a valuable cosmopolitan life – a life different from Indians in 
Dharamsala. It is this network that helps many later migrate and assimilate more easily to 
Western countries.  
 However, it should be noted that the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles does not 
distribute uniform success to all Tibetans. I met several Tibetans in Dharamsala who had 
effective English language skills, a wide range of foreign social contacts, and considerable 
cultural knowledge of cosmopolitan life, but they had not found a way to make their legal lives 
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better. All Tibetan exiles must engage in tremendous bureaucratic work to annually renew their 
RCs and ICs,5 and newly arrived Tibetan exiles that do not have RCs and ICs are often treated 
poorly businesses (including banks and renters) that do not trust their identity. I will explain this 
in more detail in the chapters to come.  
There are various factors contributing to flexible liminality, from macro events to micro 
events to individual personal intentions. By describing ethnographic accounts of the various 
journeys of Tibetan refugees, I will be able to unravel different aspects of flexible liminality at 
each stage. From the beginning of a Tibetan refugee’s exiled life, some aspects of flexible 
liminality begin to take shape. The logic of “flexible liminality” is not just a theoretical effect; it 
is very much a de-facto, grounded reality for the Tibetan refugee community. While the Tibetan 
exile’s liminality can be used as a tool for socio-political success, not everybody has or wants 
access to this opportunity. Unfortunately, the path to success is messy, chaotic, and not 
universally available. Moreover, flexible liminality attracts attention from Western countries, the 
global liberal media, and other sources of social support. This aspect of their lives has also caused 
sometimes unwanted research attention to be focused on Tibetans in Dharamsala, even though 
Tibetans know that their Tibetan-ness is on display, and that they need to offer and maintain a 
certain image of Tibetan-ness for the world to see. Tibetans in Western countries feel the need to 
prove their Tibetan-ness by helping family and friends in South Asia, taking part in Tibetan 
political activities, and striving to maintain Tibetan culture in the West. Some young Tibetan-
Americans disclosed that it was too hard to keep pace with the expectations of their community 
and the Tibetan exile government while already struggling to fit in with their American peers.  
 
 
																																																								
5 Registration Certificate and Identification Certificates are legal documents solely created for the 
Tibetan exile that are provided by the host country in South Asia (India, Nepal and Bhutan) 
denoting the temporary residency allowance of Tibetan exiles in the host country.  
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Theoretical Inspirations 
I must give complete credit to Victor Turner (1969) and Aihwa Ong (1999) for inspiring 
the theoretical idea of “flexible liminality.” However, I would like to highlight four studies (from 
among many others) that have helped shape my ideas on the Tibetan exile community. I read 
“Prisoners of Shangri-la”(1998) by Donald Lopez Jr. for a graduate seminar course. This is the 
first book that educated me about Western imaginaries regarding oriental others, and it depicted 
how oriental subjects can become voiceless when colonial rule has stated a fixed image that goes 
unchallenged throughout the years. The Tibetan myth of lamaism, shangri-la, and esoteric monks 
still influence the way non-Tibetans perceive Tibetans in exile. The most pertinent example I 
found in my research is the large number of admirers of Tibetan Buddhism in the West who have 
helped change the religion into something having a more Western individualistic favor, and to 
such an extent that scholars today call the result, “Western Buddhism” (Dapsance 2017; 
Goldstein 2007; Franklin 2008; Coleman 1999). In later chapters I will argue against Lopez 
(1998) stating that the Tibetan exiles are tactically using the reconstructed image of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the West to assimilate themselves in the Western communities, therefore, actively 
using the Western imaginaries as a tool rather than letting it sway the image of the Tibetan 
community.  
Another book important to this study is one by Ann Frechette, “Tibetans in Nepal” 
(2002), as this also significantly influenced my thinking about the Tibetan exile community. This 
book describes how humanitarian aid for the Tibetan exiles has occurred as a linear progression, a 
point I will come back to a little later in this chapter. Beyond this, Frechette’s ethnographic 
description of Tibetan exiles in Nepal shows that the foreign sponsorship still influences the 
behaviors of Tibetan exiles in such a way so as to make them attractive to foreign sponsors. This 
book gave me the initial evidence of a flexible tendency in the Tibetan exile community Frechette 
was studying, which, I argue, has, over time, simply been adapted as a cultural practice for the 
Tibetan exiles as a whole. I read the next book, “Echoes from Dharamsala” (2002) by Keila Diehl 
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after my first fieldwork experience in Dharamsala to see if my observations from the field were at 
all valid. I found Diehl’s ethnographic encounters with jazz and rock musicians, and her argument 
for renewed debate on Tibetan-ness that is a cultural hybrid form of ‘foreign’ rock music played 
with Tibetan musicians used to convey real refugee experience of Tibetans living in Dharamsala. 
I follow Diehl’s theoretical path of navigating the realities of cultural hybridity, and her 
examination of transnational resources as a form of capital, which I later argue can shape a 
Tibetan individual’s life chances.  
A Tibetan colleague recommended the book, “Immigrant Ambassador” (2009) by Julia 
Hess. I had already decided to shift my field site to the U.S. when I started reading this book, and 
I was further inspired by Hess’ explanation of the need for multi-sited research for her research 
on Tibetan nationalist identity. Hess’s ethnographic description of how the first 1990s wave of 
Tibetan migrants in New Mexico experienced a second exile, and her nuanced perspective on the 
citizenship and loyalty of the Tibetan diaspora living in India and New Mexico, enlightened my 
own approach to the multi-sited project. While Hess presented a nuanced portrait of the Tibetan 
diaspora’s approach to citizenship and loyalty in multiple states by using the theoretical tool of 
Aihwa Ong’s transnational flexible citizenship, I use the same tool to further the discussion of the 
Tibetan diasporic effort to belong to multiple nation-states. There has not been a Tibetan-focused 
migration bill passed by the U.S. government since the first one in 1990 but Tibetan exiles have 
steadily made their way into the country and have found a way to assimilate in the American 
community. According to the 2009 Tibetan exile government survey, there are about 10,000 
people in the U.S. who claim to have Tibetan heritage (CTA 2009). My own theoretical tool of 
flexible liminality speaks to the cultural practice crafted by the Tibetan exiles for use in adapting 
to any peoples, events, or things; plus, it also opens a conversation about the pros/cons for 
Tibetan exiles of being legally recognized as refugees. Finally, I will add to this discussion of 
flexible citizen discussion by asking, “is there such a thing as being ‘too flexible?’” 
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Refugee Studies: ‘Refugeeness’ 
“Refugeeness” is a term used to define the conditions of being a refugee (Lee and 
Brotman 2011; Szczepaikova 2010; Hyunh 2010; Schrijvers 1999). It is a notion that attempts to 
capture the experience of a refugee’s life but avoids the strict legal definitions of the term 
‘refugee’ offered by international laws, human rights laws, and refugee laws. While the modern 
state’s definitions of and laws for refugees are one of the key aspects of Refugeeness, at the same 
time, ‘refugee’, as a global socio-political category, was only created after World War II for the 
better control of residents in the interest of maintaining nation-state sovereignty (Puscas 2009; 
Keely 1996; Malkki 1995; Tölölyan 1991; Gallagher 1989). Yet the condition of being a stateless 
person forced by circumstances to seek refuge in another country existed before World War Two 
despite their being no specific international legal term to attach to this state of affairs; and, of 
course, this dire form of life continues to exist for many people after World War Two who, for 
one reason or another, fail to meet the legal criteria used to determine who is and is not a 
‘refugee’.  That is, you can experience refugeeness even outside the legal status of being a 
refugee. In the case of Tibetan exiles, those who are not legally defined as refugees for complex 
geopolitical reasons, for example, refugeeness can better describe their exile experience than 
recourse to more torturous neologisms. Thus, refugeeness is more often recognized within 
Refugee studies in Anthropology as a better avenue to understand the holistic experiences of 
refugees.  
My dissertation will contribute to the literature on the strategies used in Refugeeness 
when refugee conditions are shaped by geopolitical powers. For a long time, refugee studies have 
argued that refugees are a geopolitical product of the nation-states’ persistent efforts to gain more 
control of their resident populations through the inclusion and exclusion of individuals within 
them (Novak 2013; Puscas 2009; Agier 2002; Chimni 2000; Gallagher 1996; Keely 1996; Malkki 
1995). Scholars of Refugee studies have revealed the geopolitical complexities of the experience 
of Refugeeness through case studies of nation-state’s politicized refugee-related legal provisions 
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(Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson 2012; Chimni 1998; Steedly 1999), and through forced refugee 
assimilation and resettlement programs (Marfleet 2007; Cernea 2000; Mortland 1987; Chambers 
1986), and international law granting dominion to nation-states than support refugees (Turner 
2010; Szczepaikova 2010; Skran and Daughtry 2007; Feldman 2007; Chimni 2000; Gallaher 
1998; Malkki 1995; Harrell-Bond 1992). Other scholars have shifted their focus towards the 
refugee’s own outlook on belonging, since in most cases, refugees feel like they belong to places 
other than their current residence (Brun 2001; Gamlen 2008; Anderson 1983).  
 
Humanitarian Aid & Western Liberal Humanism 
Historical records reveal that there have been at least three distinct periods of Tibetan 
refugees orientated organized humanitarian aid funding. I agree with Frechette, here, that these 
funding organizations promote the Tibetan cause and an activist political culture, which has 
transformed the way Tibetan exiles define themselves, and discuss their political cause (Frechette 
2004). In any case, the first phase of funding for Tibetan refugees was generated for the first 
wave of Tibetan refugees in the 1950s and 1960s. The organizers of this fund-raising were 
travelers, explorers, and imperial officials who had, at various times, either lived in Tibet or 
among exiled Tibetans. This group of fund-raising leaders initiated assistance relationships with 
Tibetan exiles and their cause in the West (Frechette 2004). The second phase of promotion 
occurred in 1960s and 1970s in the West. These funders were involved due to their interest in 
Western Buddhism. Frechette characterizes this group as “…members of the hippie, free love, 
and new age countercultures who helped support Tibetan Buddhism, along with Zen Buddhism” 
(Frechette 2004: 100).  
This group of fund-raising leaders changed the way Westerners viewed Tibetan 
Buddhism. The religion was no longer about being born for enlightenment, or the veneration of 
the teaching, the Buddhist Monastic tradition, and the Buddha; rather, it shifted towards what 
Western practitioners thought would enrich themselves as individuals. For many Westerners, 
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Tibetan Buddhism became a ‘DIY’ do-it-yourself religion rather than a matter of supporting 
monks and nuns to achieve their merits (karma). I would agree with Obeyesekere and Gombrich 
argument that the Buddha’s teaching in the West was reinterpreted along individualistic, 
humanist, egalitarian and rationalist lines, all of which appealed to a Western audience 
(Obeyesekere and Gombrich 1990). Seen this way, Buddhism is an appealing religious 
philosophy to Westerners because of its similarity to Christianity. Buddhism offered a missionary 
form of salvation for the self and this was appealing to orientalist Westerners seeking ancient 
mystic wisdom from Asian religions (Obeyesekere and Gombrich 1990; Lopez 2001).   
The third phase of humanitarian funding started in the early 1980s when the Tibetan 
government in exile and the office of Dalai Lama were able to organize and attract funding on 
their own. The Tibetan exile leaders self-consciously associated themselves with Tibetan 
Buddhism with a liberal humanist worldview to appeal to the West and generate humanitarian 
sponsorships (Frechette 2004; Huber 1995). The intellectuals and the leaders of the Tibetan exile 
community have intentionally re-constructed their Tibetan identity to suit the global popularity of 
Western liberal values (Huber 1995; Pederson 1995). Since then, Tibetan scholars, leaders, and 
elites have frequently claimed that Tibetan culture (complete with its Buddhist values) has always 
been an environmental consensus. This new Tibetan image was spread widely via magazines, 
conference participation, media speech, and even World Wildlife Federation (WWF)-endorsed 
research on Buddhist philosophy about ecological conservation (Huber 1995). Huber calls this 
new generation of environmentally conscious Tibetan diaspora  “Green Tibetans” for linking 
ecological conservation with their Tibetan cultural identity. At the same time, around the late 
1980s, the Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA, the largest Tibetan women’s movement in exile) 
were seeking recognition and endorsement from the global media6 and they followed the same 
path as the Tibetan environmental movement.  
																																																								
6 Before the CCP’s colonization, women did not have much voice in public Tibetan society. But 
in exile a political organization was deemed necessary for women and children who were 
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I agree with Huber that this was an important strategy applied by Tibetans: to present 
themselves as members of a ”unique culture” that, out of natural cultural sympathy, advocated for 
environmentalism, animal rights, women’s rights, and human rights. This was part of a larger 
political strategy by Tibetans to portray themselves to the world as wiser and better governors of 
Tibet than the Chinese. Thus supported by Western-friendly attributes, the Tibetan exile 
community’s claim that Tibetans were and could be the better governors of Tibet looked an even 
more reasonable argument. It should be noted, however, that the Tibetan exile community is not 
only making these claims, but it is also practicing a new identity by operating as advocates of 
Western-style, liberal-human rights. This is a general initiative taken up by the Tibetan exile 
community as a whole to assert cultural creativity in a new global context (McConnell 2011; 
McGranahan 2010; Schaik 2010; Frechette 2004; Bleiker 2001; Huber 1995). Moreover, this re-
creation of Tibetan identity also becomes largely advantageous for the survival of Tibetan 
refugees in the globalized world. This effort of Tibetans to present Tibetan culture as aligned with 
Western liberal values makes them likeable and less threatening in the West. For example, 
Canada and Switzerland were the first to take in Tibetan refugees starting in the 1960s, and 
thereafter, the U.S. and Europe started taking in Tibetan asylees starting in the 1990s (Buchser 
2010, Phayul 2009; Howe 1991, Tibetan Review 2016). Eventually, many Western nation-states 
were willing to accept Tibetan ‘refugees’, regardless of their own nation-state’s relations with the 
China, or whether the Tibetan refugees they accepted were ‘refugees’ in any legal sense.7 
																																																																																																																																																																					
separated from their larger families. Moreover, the Dalai Lama and his team suggested that their 
TWA organization be patterned after already successful environmental movement organizations 
to gain recognition among the Tibetan community as well as in the global media.  
7 The Dalai Lama was invited to the White house to visit President Obama. The Chinese response 
to this meeting came via China’s Vice-Foreign Minister Zahng Yesui who summoned U.S. 
charge d’affaires Daniel Kritenbrink and publically announced that ‘The Tibetan issue is the 
domestic affair of China, and the United States bears no right to interfere. Such a move will 
gravely sabotage China-US cooperation and relations, and will definitely undermine its own 
interests’. The U.S. National Security Council spokeswoman responded to mitigate this tension 
with China stating, ‘Mr Obama met the Dalai Lama in his capacity as an internationally respected 
religious and cultural leader. We do not support Tibetan independence’ (BBC 2011).  
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The major Anthropological critiques of development work come from two theoretical 
schools of thoughts: Marxist, and Foucauldian. The Marxist neoliberal critique relates to political 
economy, where the grievance is with the way development aid covertly erodes the social welfare 
state and encourages the privatization of public services and goods. The Foucauldian neoliberal 
critique focuses on how development inspired governmentality produces subjects who have been 
refashioned to align with values of individualism, entrepreneurialism, and market competition. 
The new wave of postmodernist scholarship highly criticized the competitive, economic, market 
oriented, business-like models of NGOs (Escobar 1991; Arnould 1989; Arellano-Lopez and 
Petras 1994; Maternowska 2006). In South Asia, NGOs and Non-Profits started as self-help 
groups and Community Development (CD) programs whose objective was to get individuals to 
actively participate in the country’s progress. (Fernandez 2001). The newly independent India had 
already adapted the CD model for NGOs and Non-Profits, which allowed the Tibetan exile 
community to build their exile government and hundreds of other Tibetan non-profits on the same 
CD-model in India. Hence, the rather more positive use the Tibetan community has been able to 
make of NGOs. 
Indeed, the way the Tibetan exile community has strategically used the CD development 
model to run their exile governance, as well as, to leverage the spread-out diaspora into a united 
Tibetan community via participation in various Non-Profits and NGOs could change the way we 
look at development work. After all, development organizations only began initially to fulfill the 
public needs not met by government services; the Tibetan model of development uses the Non-
Profit and NGO model to give power back to the (exile) government for better public services, as 
well as to the other NGOs to democratically represent the spread of the Tibetan diaspora. Since 
Tibetan exiles have received most of their socio-economic-political support from the Western 
nation-states, Tibetan exiles overtime have adapted to Western liberal humanist values. I describe 
Western liberal humanism as the basic social notion of human rights, combined with the values of 
Western Buddhism that draws on ideals of compassion, mindfulness and multiculturalism that 
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have been larded with notions of individualism. The practice of flexible liminality has enabled 
Tibetans to enjoy closer relationships with foreign tourist supporters, which consequently, also 
places them in the likely position to gain transnational resources8 from this wider social circle. 
Tracing the use and application of western liberal humanist values in Tibetan diasporic practice 
will be central to my dissertation since it is evidence of the kind of new-identity-making in exile 
that has placed Tibetans in closer position to transnational resources and increased their 
likelihood of successful life chances.  
 
Dissertation Research Field Sites  
This project has two field-sites, Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh (India), and Louisville, 
KY (U.S.) because I wanted to show the journey of resettlement that Tibetan exiles take to find 
better life chances in their exile hood. I carried out my ethnographic research via traditional 
fieldwork and digital ethnography methods between May 2014 and August 2018. In Dharamsala, 
I had many meaningful conversations over glasses of chai (sweet milk tea) and momos (Tibetan 
dumplings) at cafes overlooking the Dhauladhar Range; and catching up with Tibetan friends in 
dimly lighted private homes used as office space during daytime. Even after I had left India, I was 
in contact with Tibetan, Western, and Indian friends via social media and conducted interviews 
with them online. Similarly, in the U.S., I conducted several interviews via phone and social 
media since many Tibetans are spread all around the country. But I also had lively conversations 
with Tibetan friends over Tibetan karaoke singing in community centers, and talking about 
Tibetan politics while babysitting a five-year old who mumbled sentences constructed from both 
Tibetan and English words. Additionally, I followed Tibetan organizations’ social activities via 
their social media accounts, attended online meetings, and observed online communal events. My 
motive in having multiple field-sites was to better understand the cultural practice of flexible 
																																																								
8 Transnational resources are items that transcend the nation-state that Tibetans reside in. I use the 
concept formed by Arjun Appadurai, “scapes” (1990), to understand the use of transnational 
resources use by Tibetans in Dharamsala.  
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liminality of the Tibetan diaspora. If flexible liminality as a cultural practice exists, I reasoned, 
then I should be able to find it among Tibetan diaspora living elsewhere. Thus, I decided to 
follow where most of the Tibetan exiles from India were going or aspiring to go: to the United 
States.  
 After visiting Dharamsala in 2014 and 2016, I found that the main conversation among 
Tibetan youths was about how to go abroad. I was surprised that almost everyone I talked to had 
family and/or friends living in (or getting ready to leave for) Western countries. In 2016, I arrived 
in Dharamsala during Tibetan New Years, Lhosar. I was able to stay at a guesthouse of a Tibetan 
family for a few days and witness the large number of Tibetan friends and family visiting from 
abroad. There also was a sense of pride among the Tibetans living in Dharamsala to state that 
they have friends and/or family abroad. Additionally, I observed many people speaking with 
pride about how much of their sponsorship-leadership support for Tibetan organizations in India 
come from Tibetans living elsewhere abroad.  
I had two larger goals in staging my field-sites in India and the U.S. First, I could clearly 
see that flexible liminality was a cultural practice among the Tibetans living in Dharamsala, and 
the important role that Tibetans settled in Western countries played in supporting this cultural 
practice. Second, in following Tibetan exiles to the Western countries they aspired to, I could 
better understand the characteristics of Tibetan cultural practice of flexible liminality and how it 
influenced Tibetans resettling to a new country.   
 
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is structured in chronological order to elaborate on the theoretical 
concept of “flexible liminality.” The second chapter will describe the “flexible liminality” of 
Tibetan exiles; the third chapter will apply the concept of “flexible liminality” to different ethnic 
groups in Dharamsala to show why the practice favors Tibetan exiles; the fourth and fifth 
chapters will give two different examples of Tibetan exiles’ “flexible liminality” to show how 
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flexible liminality functions on ground; the sixth and seventh chapters show how the “flexible 
liminality” of Tibetan exiles influences the Tibetan diaspora living in the U.S.  
This dissertation is also divided into two major themes: pre-arrival and post-arrival. This 
reflects the terms commonly used by refugee resettlement agencies when talking about the linear 
progress of refugees’ legal and social identity from before to after resettlement within in a host 
country. However, there is no such clear distinction of before and after resettlement to host 
country for Tibetan exiles because even after their resettlement in the West, they still aspire to go 
back to India, and Tibet to visit their ‘home’ despite being American (or other resettled western 
country’s) citizens; in fact, I found that one of the main motivations for Tibetan exiles to acquire 
stable citizenship in the U.S. was so that they could travel to India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet 
(Protected Chinese Territory) easily with a U.S. passport. My purpose of using pre-post 
resettlement ideology is to ironically show that the Tibetan exile’s journey continues even after 
resettlement, unlike the presupposed idea that a migrant’s final destination is the country that 
grants them stable citizenship.  
The second, third, and fourth chapters are ethnographic accounts of Tibetans in 
Dharamsala, India. The fifth chapter is a place of transition, where I purposely speak about 
Tibetan diaspora in both India, and the U.S. Thereafter, the sixth and seventh chapters are 
ethnographic accounts of Tibetans living in the U.S., with specific focus on Louisville, Kentucky. 
In the second chapter, “No Parking”- Multiple Exclusions of Tibetan Exiles, I will 
explain the concept of “flexible liminality” in more detail. I will discuss the different geo-political 
exclusions faced by Tibetan refugees and the strategic response devised by the Tibetan refugees 
to better their lives. I will explain how I see “flexible liminality” working within the Dharamsala 
Tibetan community. In the third chapter, Dharamsala- The Place and Its People is about the town 
of Dharamsala. In this chapter, I will provide an ethnographic description of the town, 
Dharamsala, to show the unique historical events of the place that has allowed for a politically 
marginalized population of Tibetan exiles to thrive and better their life chances. My goal in this 
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chapter is to show how the unique socio-historical condition of the town has allowed for the 
“flexible liminality” to thrive within Tibetan community while not work the same way for other 
ethnic communities in Dharamsala. 
The fourth chapter, Flexibility in the Infrastructure of Hanging-Out returns the focus to 
the nature of “flexible liminality” for Tibetan exiles in Dharamsala. This chapter reflects on the 
close relationship of the Tibetan community with the foreign tourists and its estranged 
relationship with the Indian host community to show the result of the “flexible liminality” on 
Tibetan exile’s relationships with non-Tibetans. The fifth chapter is Flexibility of the ‘Free Tibet’ 
Campaign. Here I explain how the Tibetan cultural practice of flexibility has been infused in their 
political campaign of “Free Tibet”. I use the symbolic and political social theory to show the way 
the political campaigns can appear to be homogenous and unified despite the conflicting points of 
view within. I use this example of the “Free Tibet” campaign to show a real-world example of 
how “flexible liminality” works for Tibetan exiles. 
The sixth chapter, “Tibetanness:” Tibetan Exile’s Journey to the West, will initiate the 
second part of the dissertation, “Post-Arrival in the U.S.” In this chapter, using data collected 
during fieldwork in the U.S at a refugee resettlement NGO, I will talk about the ways Tibetans 
migrate to the U.S. and compare their experience to that of legally recognized refugees resettled 
in the U.S. I will be describing the refugee resettlement process and compare it to resettlement 
process for Tibetan exiles. I will argue, again, that exiled Tibetan’s multiple geo-political 
exclusions keep them from receiving services available to legally recognized refugees but also, 
paradoxically, are partly responsible for the flexibility of their liminality. At the same time, I will 
show that these, multiple geo-political exclusions also play a big role in Tibetan-American’s lives 
and in the way Tibetan-Americans create their transnational identity in the U.S.  
In the seventh chapter, The U.S. Anti-Immigrant Strom: Tibetan Diaspora’s Story, I will 
focus on the assimilation process for immigrants in the U.S. by giving an ethnographic account of 
the city of Louisville, Kentucky. I will compare the acceptance and assimilation process of 
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Tibetan diaspora there to other foreign immigrant communities. I will argue that Tibetan diaspora 
are better accepted within the city of Louisville because of the popular status of the Dalai Lama, 
and due to the way the Tibetan monastic community continually invites local Americans to learn 
about Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism.  
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Chapter 2: “No Parking”- Multiple Exclusions of Tibetan Exiles 
On February 13th, 2016, Students for a Free Tibet in Dharamsala, India organized a 
Tibetan Independence Day Concert. Inside the auditorium of a monastery, I had to search to find 
seating but there were no empty seats. I had to squeeze my way through the crowd to find the 
midway part of the seating where I could slide on the concrete floor to watch the announcers 
introduce the event. After a couple of traditional Tibetan performances, the announcers 
introduced a dance group called “No Parking.” The crowd went wild even before the announcers 
were finished with the introduction. The announcers had to pause and let the crowd finish 
cheering. They said the dance members were the youngest performers at the event, and continued,  
“These young Tibetans from Dharamsala have felt neglected and displaced, and do not 
feel like they belong anywhere. Even at such a young age, they have found a way to 
express their exclusion through dance. Please welcome ‘No Parking’!”  
 
A shy group of teenaged boys and girls, dressed in white t-shirts, jeans, and sneakers, came out to 
loud cheers from the audience and started to perform their choreographed dance to the American 
pop song “Hotline Bling” by Drake. The song repeated, “She used to be call me on my 
cellphone/Late night when you need my love/ Call me on my cellphone/Late night when you need 
my love/ And I know when that hotline bling.” This scenario took me aback because the hip-hop 
dance choreography had no direct connection to the Tibetan political cause. What could this 
possibly mean? 
 
Introduction 
Why the name “No Parking” for a teenage dance group? And what does the marginalized 
position of Tibetan exiles have to do with this Tibetan teenager’s dance group? This 
entertainment event was reminiscent of the 2008 worldwide Tibetan independence movement. I 
will describe the Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) organization and the entertainment event 
mentioned above in more detail in a later chapter. However, for this chapter, I solely will focus on 
the name of the Tibetan dance group, “No Parking” and unpack the term “exclusion” that is 
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frequently used for Tibetans in India. The name of the dance group itself is important for this 
chapter because it conveys the key problem for the Tibetan diaspora, which is that the group does 
not have a place of belonging. Thus, the name “No Parking” signifies the situational essence of 
the Tibetan exile community’s experience of placeless-ness, or not belonging anywhere, as 
mentioned above by the announcers at the SFT concert. The play on the traffic phrase “No 
Parking” signifies to the audience that the dance group is speaking about not being allowed to 
stay or settle in certain places. The traffic metaphor also speaks to the police or government’s 
power to confine an individual’s existence in a certain place. “No Parking” is showing the 
connection between the traffic police’s control over which vehicles can be in certain areas just as 
a non-Tibetan nation-state’s government controls where Tibetans are allowed. The dance group is 
speaking, thus, of the nation-states of China and India, but this metaphor could also be extended 
towards Western countries since many Tibetans aim to gain permanent citizenship somewhere in 
the West. This metaphor of “No Parking” expressed rhetorically by the dance group is the actual 
empirical condition of exclusion all diaspora Tibetans find themselves in.   
Thus, in this chapter, I will identify the multiple exclusions faced by Tibetans from 
China, India, and the West to explicate the Tibetan diaspora’s plight and their role within the geo-
politics of the global stage on which they act.  More specifically, I will explain the territorial 
exclusion faced by Tibetans from China and, ethnographically, describe the response of Tibetan 
exiles to this Chinese exclusion; then, I will explain the legal and social exclusions faced by 
Tibetans from India and the West, followed by the adjustments Tibetan exiles have made to these 
legal and social exclusions. Next, I will use the fact of these multiple exclusions as a foundation 
for a theoretical description of my notion of flexible liminality. Lastly, I will show how flexible 
liminality plays an important role in the lives of the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala by 
ethnographically describing three instances where I saw flexible liminality at work; instances that 
revealed its inner workings.   
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Multiple Exclusions- China  
Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) occupation of Tibet in the 1950s, Tibetans 
have been legally part of China (Schaik 2010; Childs 2003; Goldstein 1991). The Chinese 
government insists on erasing the unique politico-history of Tibet based on the claim that since 
Tibet was run by plutocrats, as a feudal state its ‘uniqueness’ was not worth preserving (Schaik 
2010; Childs 2003; Goldstein 1991). This is why the Chinese government also claims to have 
freed Tibet from suppressive rulers (White Paper 1992). Since the occupation of Tibet, Tibetans 
living in Tibet have been treated as a minority ethnic group within China, and Tibetans are said to 
be part of the larger Chinese motherland (White Paper 1992). The CCP’s occupation of Tibet 
included the aggressive elimination of the Tibetan religion, language, and culture by punishing 
any participating Tibetans, and destroying elements, like Tibetan language, religious institutions, 
educational institutions etc., related to Tibetan traditions (Mishra 2014; Brauen 2011; Schaik 
2010; Goldstein 2007; Vahali 2009; Childs 1963). The exclusion of Tibetans from China has 
been specifically designed to strip them of their unique Tibetan culture. Tibetans have been 
forced to become a minority ethnic group in China, and Tibetans have been forced to learn the 
Chinese language, Chinese cultural values, and live within a Chinese governmental structure. 
Hence, though Tibetans in Tibet, legally speaking, live within China, many Tibetans feel Chinese 
policy has effectively excluded them from doing so as Tibetans (Mishra 2014; Brauen 2011; 
Schaik 2010; Goldstein 2007; Vahali 2009; Childs 1963; TJC 2011; Shakya 1991). This 
exclusion is, of course, also doubly the case for those Tibetans who have followed the example of 
the Dalai Lama and fled. On numerous occasions my participants told me that while they could 
find a good life in India or Nepal, they would not risk going back to Tibet because they Chinese 
authorities would punish them for initially leaving the country without government permission.    
While the Chinese government often proclaims that all Tibetans (including the exiles) are 
part of China, Tibetans in exile have actively rejected the government’s assimilation project. 
Many Tibetans since the Chinese occupation have risked their lives by illegally leaving Tibet and 
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seeking refuge in India and Nepal (Schaik 2010; Goldstein 2007; TJC 2011; Indian Census 2012). 
Nearly all of the Tibetans that I spoke with in Dharamsala, both children and adults, told me sad 
stories of leaving Tibet to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Since the exile of Tibetans began 
in 1957, there has been a constant stream of Tibetans escaping Tibet. A recent census count of 
Tibetans in exile roughly estimated their number as over 150,000 (CTA 2009).  
During my fieldwork, I found that Tibetans in exile were actively rejecting the Chinese 
government’s narrative assertion that Tibet is part of a larger China, and that Tibetans are thus a 
minority ethnic group under Chinese governance. The Tibetan exile community, in response, is 
diligently trying to preserve Tibetan culture and recreate a different Tibetan identity in exile, 
especially one that is different from Chinese identity. I would even argue that Tibetans are not 
just passively reproducing Tibetan identity from Tibet; rather, they are actively re-creating 
Tibetan identity, and re-defining who will be part of the Tibetan community and who will be 
outside.  
 
Tibetan Identity in Norbulingka 
An encounter during my fieldwork visit to the Norbulingka institute in Dharamsala 
seamlessly captured how Tibetans there engage in the reconstruction of Tibetan identity. During 
my fieldwork in Dharamsala, I went to Norbulingka, a Tibetan cultural institute. It is in a village 
an hour’s bus-ride from the main market area of Dharamsala. After the bus dropped me off, I had 
to walk 20 minutes through residential village streets to get to the Norbulingka institute. The 
villages were like any other South Asian Himalayan valley villages I had seen in Nepal and India; 
small, one-story houses connected by small alleys and surrounded by large fields containing 
randomly roaming domestic animals. I came upon the large compound of a Tibetan nunnery (a 
residence for female Tibetan Buddhist monks) standing, with awesome majesty, in the midst of 
agricultural fields. Signs on the compound’s large brick walls identified it as the Norbulingka 
institute. Following guidance from several local vendors, I walked in front of the beautiful 
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entrance to Norbulingka9. I crossed a small bridge that went over a man-made spring and 
approached a traditional Tibetan entrance that was decorated with beautiful climbing plants. 
When I entered the gate, I was told to purchase a ticket according to my nationality. The cashier 
explained that they charge the most to Western tourists (Rs.100), less for a South Asian tourists 
(Rs.50), even less for Indians (Rs.40), and none for Tibetans. I was intrigued by this system and 
asked the cashier if their system was according to legal citizenship or national identity. He 
seemed confused so I reiterated, “What I should pay since I have Indian heritage but I am a 
Nepali citizen?”  
The cashier then asked, “Are you Nepali?” After I said yes, he said, “You can just pay 
Rs.40. If you need a tour guide just wait here,” and gave me my entrance ticket. I understood this 
as a system of national identity rather than a legal citizenship system, since I was taken as a 
Gorkhali (a Nepali ethnic group in Dharamsala) rather than as a Nepali citizen. I informed the 
cashier that I would walk by myself but, if I had questions, I would come back here. He nodded 
and let me in, and then went back to chatting with another cashier sitting with him.  
After visiting several traditional art classes, I came across a Thangka painting10 class and 
decided to walk in and watch the painters do their work. Here I met two painters to whom I 
asked, “Where are you from?” Both men said Manali in Himachal Pradesh. I asked again, “No, 
no, I mean in Tibet, where in Tibet are you from?”  
One of the men said, “We are not Tibetans, we are Himali boys,” and after I asked further 
questions, both the men kept proudly repeating, “I already told you, we are not Tibetans, we are 
Himali boys.”  
																																																								
9 Norbulingka Institute is a Tibetan cultural and arts institute that preserves and teaches new 
generation of Tibetans about Tibetan historical arts and artifacts.  
10 A Thangka is a Tibetan scroll-banner painting, which is hung in a monastery or a family altar 
and carried by lamas in ceremonial processions. Thangka is a unique art form that belongs to 
Tibetan culture. In Tibetan, the word 'than' means Flat and the suffix 'ka' stands for Painting 
(Rawat and Kapoor 2016) 
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They were indicating, in this way, their ethnic identity’s connection  to Himachal Pradesh 
where they are a Tibetan-looking ethnic group, but Indian citizens, who trace their ancestry to 
northern parts of the state, close by Chinese border, like Ladakh, Manali etc. At the thangka class, 
I dropped this topic, sensing a defensive tone, and asked instead about the painting itself. But this 
interaction had confused me, so, later, I asked a tour guide why Himali people were being 
accepted to Norbulingka, when they were not Tibetans but legally considered Indian citizens. He 
smiled slowly and said,  
“That is because they are [of] Tibetan descent.” He shook his head at my confused face 
and kept explaining, “In [the] 12th Century, the Tibetan kingdom11 covered today’s North 
India but later lost the kingdom. However, there are still populations who follow Tibetan 
Buddhism and very few who speak [the] Tibetan language, so all those who follow 
Tibetan Buddhism fall under the category of Tibetan for the Norbulingka institute.”  
 
Then, he asked, “You look Tibetan. Where are you from?”  
 “Nepal,” I answered.  
He then nodded and explained that if my ancestors were from northern Nepal, which used 
to be part of the Tibetan kingdom, and if I follow Tibetan Buddhism or can speak the Tibetan 
language, then I too could be part of the Tibetan exile community, and could apply to 
Norbulingka. After some other small talk, I left Norbulingka, still very surprised at the tour 
guide’s explanation. I had never thought of myself as Tibetan, but was told that I could 
potentially be part of the Tibetan exile community and gain access to their traditional art and 
cultural knowledge.  
This event entirely captured the on-going identity negotiations between the Tibetan exile 
community and other ethnic groups in India and South Asia. I argue that this is one of the ways 
that Tibetans in exile are defying the China’s narrative that Tibetan state never existed; that is, by 
striving to create a larger and distinct Tibetan identity in exile. By making the requirements for 
membership in the Tibetan diaspora more flexible, the Tibetan exile community is actively 
																																																								
11 The Tibetan empire existed from roughly 6th-11th Century; it covered most of today’s China, 
north India, and North Nepal (Richardson 1965; Beckwith 1987; Huber 2008; Schaik 2010)   
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negotiating who may be part of the Tibetan diaspora community in a way advantageous to them. 
Beyond this, the community has marked the boundaries of its Tibetan identity via arguments 
about ancestral blood lineage, the geographical borders of 6th -11th century Tibet, fluency in the 
Tibetan language, a devotion to Tibetan Buddhism, and overall cultural compatibility. I argue that 
these, too, were ways that Tibetans in exile were making their claim to a unique Tibetan identity, 
in an attempt to differentiate themselves from the Chinese. It would be naïve to assume that the 
Tibetan exile community, here, was merely reproducing a pre-colonial Tibetan identity where 
everybody had a fixed hometown in the geographical territory of the Tibetan region. Instead, as 
seen in the ethnographic details above, the Tibetan community is actively negotiating their 
Tibetan exile identity, and they are constantly making decisions on who gets to be on the inside 
and who will be outsider. I am making a similar argument to Fredrick Barth in his book, Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries (1969), where he argues that ethnic identities are constantly changing 
and manifested out of the social process of exclusion and incorporation (Barth 1969:9). Similar to 
Barth, I also argue the Tibetan community in exile is trying to establish a new identity that is 
different from the, for them, impossible identity defined by the Chinese government. Thus, the 
Tibetan identity in exile is changing but the change is occurring with the conscious effort to 
differentiate themselves from having Chinese identity.   
 
Multiple Exclusions: India 
 The second exclusion faced by Tibetans in exile is from the Indian government. Despite 
the Tibetan community’s long stay in India, Tibetans in India have to maintain their exile status 
by initially creating, and annually renewing, a Registration Certificate. Moreover, India is not a 
signed member of the UNHCR 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol12. Therefore, India 
perceives all Tibetan exiles as foreigners and administers exiles under the Foreigners Act of 1946 
																																																								
12 The Convention is the key legal document defining ‘exiles,’ their rights, and the legal 
obligations of states; and the Protocol is an additional agreement for states to remove 
geographical and temporal restrictions conveyed by the Convention (UNHCR). 
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and the Citizenship Act of 1955 (HRLN 2007). As foreigners, exiles are not allowed to 
participate in any type of group protest, vote in government elections, buy assets, or easily enter 
the country without legal paperwork. Moreover, India stopped providing humanitarian aid and 
identification certificates to Tibetan exiles after 1979 (TJC 2011). Then, in 1988, Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi created a Joint Working Group committee with China to form a better 
commercial relationship (Jain 1989). As the Indo-Sino relationship has improved, India’s 
willingness to provide humanitarian services to Tibetan exiles has decreased (TJC 2011). Hence, 
current Tibetan exiles are allowed to stay in their Indian settlement areas only as prolonged guests 
(or foreigners) and do not receive any aid or military support from India for any kind of endeavor 
in behalf of the exiles (TJC 2011; McConnell 2009).  
 Were Tibetan exiles to become Indian citizens, their bureaucratic burden to India and 
their own legal insecurity would be immediately lessoned; but this only rarely happens 13. Indeed, 
Tibetans in Dharamsala informed me that there have only been a handful of Tibetans who have 
become Indian citizens. At the same time, I also noticed that the Tibetan exile community 
informally discourages each other from taking up Indian citizenship. I had several encounter with 
Tibetans in Dharamsala who criticized the entire idea of getting Indian citizenship as traitor to the 
Tibetan exile community. The Tibetan exile members themselves also ask other Tibetans to 
refuse Indian citizenship (Tibetan Journal 2017).  
 Given this constraint, many Tibetan exiles in India have embraced their marginalized 
position to further Tibetan nationalism and Tibetan cultural-religious practices. I observed that 
the marginalized condition of Tibetans in India, while disadvantageous to legal security, was 
advantageous to the popularity of the Tibetan nationalist cause. That is, when Tibetans refuse 
Indian citizenship, it tends to encourage them to stay more dedicated to the Tibetan nationalist 
																																																								
13 Since the mid 2000s, the Indian government has only allowed Tibetan individuals who entered 
India before 1967 to apply to become Indian citizens. But only a handful of Tibetans have 
become Indian citizens because of the bureaucratic and monetary burdens that come with going 
through the process of becoming Indian citizens.  
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cause. This is evident in the stories of two Tibetans I will tell below:  Pemba, who refused Indian 
citizenship because he is satisfied with the government-like services provided by the Tibetan 
government in exile, and Lhakpa, who is passionate enough about the Tibetan nationalist cause to 
want to remain marginalized in India.  
 
Indian Citizenship vs. Tibetan Nationalism 
 I arrived at a restaurant recommended to me by a local Tibetan man. The inside of the 
restaurant was sparsely furnished with four picnic tables and benches in a small room, so I 
decided to sit out on the balcony that had one outdoor table and four chairs. The owner of the 
restaurant came over and introduced himself as Pemba. He seemed like a friendly middle-aged 
man who looked athletically fit and tall for a Tibetan person. His spoken English was very good, 
so we started making small talk. His wife was running the kitchen and brought out more rounds 
of tea for all. He started reminiscing about his times in the Tibetan army.  He explained that he 
was on duty for four years and for part of that time, he was stationed in Kashmir (located in North 
India bordering with China and Pakistan). Pemba explained that the Indian army has often hired 
soldiers suited for the high altitude of the Kashmir area, so a lot of Gorkha (a Nepali ethnic 
group) regiments and Tibetan regiments get sent there.  
 I realized that he was willing to share all these personal details because I had shared that 
my father’s family were all in the Gorkha army. Pemba said that he had formed very close bonds 
with the other men in the Gorkha army and he was curious to know the regiments and ranks of 
my uncles, and granduncles. I asked him (since he had served the Indian government through the 
Tibetan army) if he could not apply to be an Indian citizen? He answered,  
“I have good benefits from the Tibetan [exile] government, I don’t need to become an 
Indian citizen. The Tibetan [exile] government paid for my education, sent me to [the] 
army when I couldn’t do college, they take care of us. I don't have to become Indian… 
Also, I am very proud to have served my [Tibetan exile] government through army 
service; I want to stay Tibetan [laughs]. This way I can also take part in [the] Tibetan 
[exile] government election. [Pointing to a wall poster] this is my school-friend who is 
running for McLeod Ganj Mayor’s election. He has become a big man now, he had 
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nothing before but now he does honest work for [the Tibetan] people, he never lets 
anyone down. He may even come here for tea today. I want to help him become mayor. If 
I become [an] Indian citizen, I cannot participate like now, so I choose to stay as 
Tibetan.”   
 
For Pemba, taking up Indian citizenship would be a matter of giving up membership in the 
Tibetan exile community and exile government participation. During his time in the army, he 
recognized that he was fighting for the Indian government, but he was proud to have been 
classified as a member of Tibetan army. Moreover, he was very satisfied with his situation in 
India, and did not seem to have any problem being a ‘foreigner’ exile or non-citizen of India. In 
fact, he would rather be part of the Tibet exile community and participate in the exile government 
than acquire legal stability in India. From what Pemba said, it is clear that he had great trust in the 
Tibetan exile government to take care of himself and other Tibetan exiles in India. The Tibetan 
exile government had taken care of him in the past and he trusted that it would do so for future 
generations as well. Therefore, given his trust in the Tibetan exile government and its ability to 
take care of social security for Tibetans (and his own desire to continue being part of the Tibetan 
community), Pemba had determined to not take up Indian citizenship.   
 At another time, I met with a female youth activist who said she did not want Indian 
citizenship for a different reason. I met Lhakpa at a café in the main market of McLeod Ganj. 
Her spoken English was excellent, so I asked her for an interview and she agreed to help me 
out. Lhakpa was in her mid 20s, from Ladakh, and visiting a friend in town. She said she liked 
being active in Tibetan politics as much as she could because she believed she had a duty to 
fulfill. I asked her if she ever thought of getting Indian citizenship for legal issues. Lhakpa 
said, “it is difficult to get Indian citizenship for us…but it would also mean that we have given 
up hope for Tibet’s independence.”  
“What about the Tibetans who are getting citizenship in the U.S. or France and 
Australia?” I asked. Lhakpa replied,  
“If they [Tibetans] want to get their citizenship individually that is no problem, but here 
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[in India], it is a group citizenship [a large number of Tibetans who arrived by a certain 
year attaining Indian citizenship] that we would be getting. And that is terrible for 
Tibetan independence; I would never take up Indian citizenship because it is the matter 
of moral obligation.”  
 
I asked her what she thought of Tibetan leaders who were actively telling Tibetans not to take  
up Indian citizenship as well. Lhakpa said,  
 
“India is the hub for [the] freedom movement so if Tibetan government did not tell 
people anything [i.e. prevent Tibetans from getting Indian citizenship], it would be the 
Indian government’s organized trick for citizenship [in order to get political advantage 
with China].”  
 
For Lhakpa, India was important geo-political ground for the Tibetan political cause. India was 
not just a place for refuge, but also a place where they could carry out Tibetan political activities 
and display Tibetan nationalism. Even though Tibetans living in other Western countries also 
carry out Tibetan activism, they don’t feel they must display Tibetan nationalism as much as do 
Tibetans living in India. The Tibetan diaspora has made India, as Lhakpa puts it, into a ‘hub’ of 
Tibetan independence. In order to demand Tibetan independence from China, the Tibetan exile 
government also wants to display its acts of good governance of the Tibetan diaspora, and in 
return, the Tibetan exile community shows their commitment to Tibetan freedom through protest 
and activism. Interestingly though, the Tibetan exile community can also show their patriotism 
and nationalist emotions by not taking up Indian citizenship. According to Lhakpa’s explanation, 
any other country’s citizenship would not hinder their patriotic display, but Indian citizenship 
would devalue the Tibetan’s contribution towards the Tibetan nationalist agenda.  
 During my fieldwork, I heard several casual conversations around the town between 
Tibetans warning each other not to take up Indian citizenship because of the need to assert their 
difference from Indians. It should be noted, on the other hand, that I never heard any Tibetans 
complain when Tibetans took up citizenship in Western countries. In fact, many Tibetans did 
aspire to gain permanent residency and legal security in Western countries. At first glance, it may 
seem like Western countries are seen as a desirable places and South Asian countries (especially 
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India) are seen as undesirable places. But I would argue that this is not the case.  Rather, the 
Tibetan exile community has decided to create India as the staging ground for their political cause 
because of the social and legal leeway Tibetans gain in India.  
 In other words, Tibetan exiles in India are marginalized, but have some advantageous 
conditions there in that they are able to form their own Tibetan governance, political leadership, 
community participation, and public interest for the Tibetan political cause. Thus, the tactic of 
rejecting Indian citizenship and maintaining marginalized status works for the Tibetan political 
cause.  Tibetans in exile are told that, as an exile population, they have a nationalist responsibility 
to forward the Tibetan political cause, take part in political activism, gain attention from the 
global media, and promote Tibetan nationalism. In the end, Tibetans in India feel discouraged 
from taking up Indian citizenship for two key reasons: first, the Tibetan leadership provides 
enough services to their own community that the Tibetan individuals do not feel the need for 
Indian government services in day-to-day life; and, second, they fear Indian citizenship will take 
away their ability to participate politically in the Tibetan exile community. But more than this, 
they recognize that by staying marginalized the Tibetan nationalist cause is better able to gain 
extra attention from the global media. Hence, I argue that the reason Tibetans are actively 
rejecting Indian citizenship begins with the type of exclusion they face from the Indian 
government.  
 
Multiple Exclusions: The West  
On the other hand, Western countries are seen as desirable places for Tibetans to acquire 
citizenship. Since exiled Tibetans are a politically marginalized group caught between the 
increasingly competitive geo-political concerns of China and India, their position has attracted 
foreign sympathy from powerful Western countries like the U.S.A, France, Spain, Australia, 
Switzerland, Norway, and Denmark (McGranahan 2010; Schaik 2010; Frechette 2004; Bleiker 
2001; Shakya 2000). From my interactions with Tibetan exiles, I found that these are also 
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countries sought after by Tibetans for political freedom, economic success and legal stability. I 
argue that this distinction between Western citizenship and Indian citizenship is because of the 
different type of exclusion the Tibetan exile community faces in Western countries. However, 
first it is important to understand why various Western countries become interested in Tibet and 
Tibetans in exile.  
In the early 1900s, Tibetan political sovereignty was not very active (Goldstein 1991; 
Schaik 2010; Huber 2007). Tibetan leadership under the Dalai Lama had very little interest or 
effect on international relations, and, at the same time, little direct internal control over all the 
regions of the Tibetan state (Goldstein 1991; 1987, 2007; Schaik 2010; Huber 2007). However, I 
would argue that it would be untrue to say Tibetan leaders did not have any interest in their own 
state’s affairs. The 13th Dalai Lama, the current Dalai Lama’s predecessor, had a plan to 
modernize Tibet and establish a centralized hold on its territory (Goldstein 1991; 1987, 2007; 
Schaik 2010; Huber 2007). From 1900 to 1930, the 13th Dalai Lama spent his time, first, fighting 
off the British Empire and Tibetan politicians who supported foreign allies, and, then, Chinese 
troops who were constantly trying to occupy the Tibetan state (Schaik 2010). Tibet’s first direct 
alliance with a Western country was established during the 1950s, when the United States’ CIA 
helped train the Tibetan army to fight the Chinese communist occupation (McGranahan 2010, 
Schaik 2010, Goldstein 2007). It would be 20 years after the U.S.’s CIA training before Tibet 
again received any attention from the U.S. government. The next time Tibet and the U.S. showed 
their alliance together was in September 1987 when the 14th Dalai Lama travelled to Washington 
D.C. to speak about Tibet and the Chinese occupation at a human rights caucus (Schaik 2010). 
Soon after, he gave multiple speeches around U.S. and Europe about global human rights issues, 
finally bringing the international media’s attention to Tibetan cause. In 1989, the 14th Dalai Lama 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, establishing both his own and that of the Tibetan political 
cause in the world media.   
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Besides geo-political allies, there have been various individual Western supporters and 
sympathizers who have come to help the Tibetan exiles. Since 1993, the Indian government has 
been slowly withdrawing its humanitarian aid and complete legal protection from the Tibetan 
exiles in India. Thus, Tibetans have increasingly had to rely on foreign support through formal 
institutions such as NGOs, non-profit organizations, and informal personal connections (De Voe 
1981; Frechette 2004; Prost 2006; TJC 2011). With respect to the latter, due to the increasing 
popularity of Buddhist ideals in the West, the Tibetan political cause was first able to reach many 
Western people through their interest in Buddhism and liberal humanism14 (Frechette 2004).  
Given the success of the Dalai Lama’s speeches on human rights issues, starting in the 
early 1970s, I was told the Dalai Lama’s administration has encouraged the Tibetan diaspora and 
its administrative officers to take advantage of the global human rights and environmental 
activism movements (also, coincidentally, aligned with liberal humanism) to promote the Tibetan 
cause to free the Tibetan state from Chinese governance (Frechette 2004). Thus, the Western 
organizations and individuals assisting Tibetan exiles are mostly working from similar principles 
such as universal human rights, liberal humanism, and so on. Lastly, Tibetan Buddhism has been 
frequently been popularly misunderstood by Westerners as a solely mystical and magical religion, 
which has to do with orientalist misconception about Tibet that were wide-spread during the early 
20th century and distributed through early new-age cult enthusiasts who were seeking spiritual 
enlightenment through eastern religions (Lopez 1999, Shakya 1991, Frechette 2004, Prost 2006). 
These orientalist misconceptions have led some Westerners seeking personal enlightenment 
towards the Tibetan exile community. I will speak more about how Orientalism ironically made it 
easier for Westerns to approach Tibetans – via the Shangri-La affect, Lamaism, and Western 
Buddhism – in future chapters (See Chap 7).  
																																																								
14 Ann Frechette in her book, Tibetans in Nepal (2002) defines liberal humanism as “set of beliefs 
that emphasizes the individual as the most basic social unit, with the right to live a life of his or 
her own choosing” 
 
	 49	
Western supporters of the Tibetan exile community come from an array of different 
philosophical ideals and political intentions. I argue that despite the abundance of Western 
interest in Tibet, Tibetan exiles are not seen as the same as other Western individuals.  There is an 
oriental lens being used in viewing Tibetans – whether by Western political allies, global human 
rights supporters, or Tibetan Buddhism followers – that causes Tibetans to be viewed, however 
favorably, as the “orientalist other.”15 I argue that Tibetan exiles are excluded from the West 
because even their Western supporters have a certain picture of Tibet that portrays them as 
completely different from Westerners.  As a result of this stereotypical vision, Westerners are 
unable to see the true Tibet, which includes Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan identity.  
Interestingly, the Tibetan exile community has responded tactfully to the stereotypical, 
and sometimes bizarre, Western image of themselves as wise-saints, mystical beings, or exotic 
people from Shangri-La (magical land) since these are, at least, favorable forms of misrecognition 
(Anand 2007, Lopez 1999, Shakya 1991). Despite the peculiar initial interests of Western 
audiences in Tibetan exiles, I argue that the Tibetan diaspora has found it more beneficial to be 
sympathized with by the West than understood, and thus, has been able to grow close ties to 
many Western individuals. Legally, Tibetan exiles are not considered refugees under the UNHCR 
definition.  But despite their lack of “refugee” status, they have managed to resettle themselves in 
Western countries due to the sympathetic views of the Western audience. This can be seen from 
the Tibetan exile community’s effort in creating space in the West via a selective number of visas 
for displaced people, refugees, and asylum-seekers, special scholarships for Tibetan exiles, and 
sponsorships from established Buddhist institutes in the West. It should be noted that UNHCR-
defined refugees (like the Congolese, the Bhutanese, Syrian refugees, etc.) do not go through the 
same type of “special” entry visas and sponsorships for displaced people that Tibetans do for 
resettlement in the West (See Chapter 6). 
																																																								
15 For more information see Dibyesh Anand (2007), Donald Lopez (1998), Tsering Sakya (1991) 
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 Moreover, the Tibetan exile community has slowly changed their own values in exile to 
align with liberal humanist values.16 Since Tibetan exiles are receiving most of their socio-
economic-political support from the Western nation-states, they have, over time, adapted to 
Western liberal humanist values. By liberal humanism I mean the conventional Western belief in 
universal human rights combined with a set of notions, also found in Westernized Buddhism,  
that draws in the ideals of compassion, mindfulness and multiculturalism. The practice of flexible 
liminality has enabled Tibetans to enjoy closer relationships with foreign tourist supporters, 
which consequently, also place them in a more likely position to gain transnational resources17 
from their widened social circle. Western liberal humanist values will be a guiding light in my 
dissertation since it is the activity of new-identity-making in exile, done with a weather eye 
toward just those values, that has placed so many Tibetans closer to transnational resources and 
that has increased the likelihood of them having successful life chances.  
I argue that there has been a cultural shift in the Tibetan diaspora that allows Tibetans to 
more easily befriend Western individuals and adopt Western cultural notions and liberal values. 
This change therefore makes it easier for Tibetans to have close ties with Western people. Since 
settling in the West has proven beneficial for the individual socio-economic success of Tibetans, 
gaining citizenship in the West is considered an admirable action among Tibetans. I met several 
Tibetans in Dharamsala who wanted to go abroad to Western countries rather than stay in India. 
One of these interviews captured the popular thoughts passed among young Tibetans in 
Dharamsala.  
																																																								
16 This trend toward adopting liberal humanist values started with a new type of humanitarian 
funding proposal by the Tibetan government in exile and the office of Dalai Lama. The Tibetan 
exile leader self-consciously associated Tibetan Buddhism with a liberal humanist worldview to 
appeal to the West and generate humanitarian sponsorships (Frechette 2004; Huber 1995). The 
intellectuals and the leaders of the Tibetan exile community have intentionally re-constructed 
their Tibetan identity to suit the global popularity of Western liberal values like environmental 
activism, animal rights, gender equality etc. (Huber 1995; Pederson 1995). 
17 Transnational resources are items that stretch beyond the nation-states that Tibetans reside in. 
As I said earlier, I use the concept formed by Arjun Appadurai, “scapes” (1990), to understand 
the use of transnational resources use by Tibetans in Dharamsala.  
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A dream to go abroad 
During my fieldwork in India, I was partnered up with a middle-aged monk from South 
India for daily Tibetan-English language lessons in Dharamsala. We would meet at a café every 
day where I would teach the monk English and he would teach me the Tibetan. At our last 
meeting, I asked him to describe his dream in English because by then he was able to speak 
slowly but fluently in English. The monk started to describe,  
“My dream is to go start a Sera Buddhist school branch abroad. Ah… maybe Chicago, 
maybe, Australia. [Pause] In Chicago, I have two followers who want to invite me to 
teach them Buddhism – maybe I will go there and start a school. Otherwise, I will go to 
Australia – [smiling] my family is there, my sister and her children. I will live with them 
and slowly…slowly start a Buddhist school.”   
I was very proud of him for making such good sentences, but I was also surprised that my 
language partner had such good connections in the Western countries. I asked him how he came 
to have such friends in Chicago and Australia? He said,  
“Oh, the followers from Chicago came to my monastery in South India that is how... ah... 
and my sister’s husband got some visa for Australia. [Laughing] they are lucky… I am also 
lucky.” 
A few weeks after, I met two men in their late 20s at a coffee shop. I had observed a 
group of them playing soccer at an open parking lot, and had asked the players sitting on the 
bench if they would be willing to do an interview. Only two people agreed to meet me later. We 
started out the interview talking about their hometowns in Tibet and how they left Tibet. They 
both mentioned that they missed their families back in Tibet because life is hard being on their 
own. So, I asked them, “Why did you leave Tibet?” One of the men said,  
“In Tibet, I would have no problem getting agriculture type work but that is not what I 
want to do… So, I left home for [a] better life. [Pause] um… Just saying frankly, I am not 
very educated, I did not like school, but in both Nepal and India I don't find good jobs 
with no degree. Here I am nothing, I am doing nothing, this small job that small job, I 
want a good job [he laughed] maybe just a job that earns good. So my hope is to go to the 
U.S. and live with my cousin and earn money like he is doing.” 
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These stories of the monk and young men from the Tibetan community shed a light on 
the type of lives Tibetan exiles are facing in the globalized world. All of my interlocutors, 
including the monk and the young men, told me how they had risked their lives escaping from 
Tibet to India in search of better lives and careers. In their own ways, they were realizing that 
they would not be able to live a “full” life (have complete citizenship rights) and, thus, have good 
careers in India. Rather, these Tibetans were hoping to make a better life elsewhere in the 
Western world. Over time, they had developed meaningful relationships with Western people via 
values shared with their Tibetan family traditions,18 Buddhism, or political activism. Despite the 
Tibetan community’s legal ability to work in India, the increasing job competition in India was a 
sad reality, and unemployment for Tibetans with high education was a sore topic in the 
Dharamsala community. So many Tibetans aspired to achieve their dreams of finding better lives 
in Western countries with thoughts of better career opportunities and the rights of citizenship.  
Moreover, these stories also convey that there is an economically and geographically 
limited situation for Tibetans in India. This is not just the story for these young Tibetans but for a 
lot of other Tibetans as well. Tibetans who are finding access to political refuge in India are still 
lacking economic and social-legal stability. This is why many in the Tibetan diaspora opt to go to 
Western countries where they might be accepted as immigrants or displaced people (apply for 
asylum/refugee status) and eventually, citizens. Moreover, citizenship in the West is a powerful 
vehicle that allows Tibetans to travel around the world without fear of being persecuted. This is 
an important factor for Tibetan exiles that are usually landlocked in India (Nepal and Bhutan) and 
have to continually renew their residency permits in these countries. On the other hand, if a 
Tibetan exile can receive a special entry visa to Western countries, they can apply for 
asylum/refugee status and potentially receive a chance for citizenship, and even have an 
opportunity to make a good career. 
																																																								
18 My Tibetan interlocutors told me that Tibetans usually have a large extended family. Even a distant 
cousin falls under the extended family circle. Usually, the same family obligation of social and financial 
assistance extends to all family members.  
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Multiple Exclusions- Analysis 
 So the Tibetan diaspora faces different types of exclusion from different nation-states but 
have found ways to make use of these multiple exclusions in ways that benefit themselves. First, 
the Tibetan diaspora faces exclusion from China because the Chinese government wants to force 
Tibetans to abandon their identity and into becoming part of the Chinese nation-state. Tibetans 
have responded to what they regard as oppression and occupation of Tibet by escaping their 
homeland and securing their Tibetan identity in exile. In addition, their Tibetan identity is 
constantly being re-examined and reproduced in exile by the Tibetan community. Second, 
Tibetan exiles face exclusion from India because while the Indian government sympathizes with 
the Tibetan exile population, India has not allowed most Tibetan exiles to acquire the same legal 
rights as other Indian citizens.  Rather, over time, India has removed its humanitarian support 
towards Tibetans. In response, the Tibetan exiles have accepted this exclusion, and, in turn, have 
made India into an organizing ground for Tibetan nationalist activities. Despite a small 
opportunity for Tibetans to gain Indian citizenship, Tibetans are actively rejecting the Indian 
citizenship to present a patriotic image of the Tibetan exile community.  
Lastly, the Tibetan diaspora faces exclusion from the West because of orientalist 
preconceptions about Tibetans that distorts the reality of Tibetans, and perceptions colored by the 
mystic and Shangri-La view of Tibetans. I contend that the Western audience has long been 
fascinated with Tibet, and, since the occupation of the Tibetan state, we can see the proof of this 
in the generous humanitarian aid flowing from the West to Tibetan exiles and the creation of 
special visas for the resettlement of Tibetans in Western countries (Hess 2009; Frechette 2004). 
This, in turn, has motivated the Tibetan exile community to align their values with liberal 
humanist ideals, which, in a feedback loop, has helped them gain even better support from the 
international media and Western countries. Tibetans in exile are nurtured in cultural values that 
place them closer to Western liberal ones, which is why I observed many Tibetans in India easily 
befriending Western foreigners and tourists.  
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Theoretical Analysis – Flexible Liminality 
The multiple exclusions of Tibetan exiles from China, India, and the West, mentioned 
above provide a foundation for understanding the different geo-political forces influencing the 
Tibetan exile community. This is the message that “No Parking,” the Tibetan teenage dance 
group, was trying to send to their audience. Their sense of not belonging, of being told “No 
Parking,” says to their audience that we, as Tibetans, feel the restrictions and regulations of the 
multiple nations that we are all actively involved with.  
At the same time, the Tibetan exile community has also found ways to adjust their 
cultural practice to best suit external influences. This is the very foundation of my theory of 
flexible liminality. The flexible liminality of the Tibetan diaspora can be characterized as their 
ability to adjust to any situation, people, or geo-politics. Thus, I define the flexible liminality of 
the Tibetan diaspora as a practice that consists of two variants — one, the external geo-political 
influence, and two, the internal socio-cultural practices of the group to adjust to the external 
influences. It should be noted that my theory of flexible liminality is simply a practice that can be 
applied to any ethnic group and is based on that particular ethnic group. Any ethnic group, that ay 
ethnic group can engage in flexible liminality, but how they do that will vary from circumstance 
to circumstance resulting in high or low degree of flexible liminality. My key argument for this 
dissertation is that the Tibetan diaspora has a highly flexible liminality.  
I have used two different lineages of social theory to assemble my theory of flexible 
liminality.  First, I have used Victor Turner’s notion of  ‘liminality’ that Turner explains as a 
phase in the life of individuals who are pushed beyond the boundaries of their social system. 
These marginalized beings are not completely out of the social system, but they are also not 
inside standard society (Turner 1969). The notion of liminality comes out of the Durkheimian and 
British Social Anthropological schools of thought. These schools were fascinated by the idea of 
marginalization, which for them was a fixed place outside of the stable social structure. Thus, 
liminality is a systematic state, or social status, that people can get in and out of. In terms of 
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liminality with regards to nation-state citizenship, this would mean exclusion from socially stable 
legal-political boundaries. This points towards Giorgio Agamben’s definition of ‘bare-life,’ which 
he uses to describe prisoners in concentration camps during World War II. ‘Bare life’ is the 
reduction of human beings into bio-political beings, where they are outside the boundaries of 
humanity, moral values, agency, citizenship, and judicial laws (Agamben 1995).  
Second, I have borrowed the term ‘flexible’ from Aihwa Ong’s theoretical model of 
‘flexible citizenship.’ Ong’s notion of ‘flexible citizenship’ arose out of her ethnographic 
description of how Hong Kong elites strategically use their multiple citizenships and the image of 
Chinese humanistic capitalist to thrive in a global neoliberal environment (Ong 1999). Aihwa 
Ong comes from a post-modern school of thought and presents a nuanced point of view of 
citizenship in the globalized world. Ong challenges the fixed and stable notion of citizenship by 
contending that when there are multiple nation-state structures surrounding an individual, it 
undermines the value of one nation-state’s citizenship. My use of ‘flexible liminality’ denotes a 
similar but opposite strategy used in the case of Tibetan exiles that derives from being 
specifically excluded from multiple geo-political nation-states. In this dissertation, I will be using 
the theory of ‘flexible liminality’ to bring nuance to the stable idea of ‘liminality’ and further 
extend Ong’s theory of globalization and the effect of multiple social structures to describe the 
condition of Tibetan exiles.  
Flexible liminality arises when the Tibetan exile community strategically uses their 
liminality to advance their own socio-economic position. A marginalized group like the Tibetan 
exile community is able to do so because of the multiple nation-states excluding their 
marginalized community in different ways. Therefore, Tibetan exiles are not fixed in one state of 
liminality but experience a variety of liminalities from different nation-states, which allows them 
to play one form of liminality off against the other. Flexible Liminality is an active practice that is 
taking place within the Tibetan diaspora with actual consequences and repercussion that affect the 
lives of Tibetans in exile. From my observations, the on-ground process of flexible liminality on 
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Tibetans in Dharamsala can be seen in three ways, which for now I will call proofs of flexible 
liminality in exile.  
 
Flexible Liminality: Dhasa of Tibetan exiles  
The first expression of flexible liminality I noticed in Dharamsala was the ability of 
Tibetan exiles to maintain and reinvent their Tibetan nationalist identity in India. This showed me 
that India is, indeed, the staging ground where the Tibetan exile community has been able to carry 
out their political agenda. In Dharamsala the Tibetan exile community has been able to saturate 
the town into with a remarkable concentration of Tibetan socio-politico activities. Indeed, its 
residents commonly know the town as ‘Dhasa,’ thus equating Dharamsala’s with the capital city 
of Tibet, Lhasa. 
This became apparent when I first met my field assistant, Phurbu (same Tibetan man I 
discussed in Chapter 1) in Dharamsala.  I told him about my interest in learning more about 
Tibetan non-profit organizations and how they function in the community. Phurbu casually 
looked at me and said, “there are over 300 Tibetan non-profits in Dharamsala… [Pointing nearby] 
you can just go to anyone and start your research.” I was so surprised by this information I asked 
him if what he said was true. “Yes,” he said, “there are many non-profits [and] NGOs, some 
might be closed down but there are so many. I will give you some important ones that you can 
start from.” Then, off the top of his head, he listed six nationalist NGOs that produced Tibetan 
political propaganda, and various other interest groups such as women’s organizations, youth 
organizations, environmental service groups, educational groups etc.  
Similarly, in Dharamsala, there were always several Tibetan politico-cultural events 
taking place on a daily basis. The events differed depending on which organization was holding 
them, obviously, for they were catered to their members and audiences. For example, there was a 
public talk held by the Tibetan Youth Congress with a panel of scholars, activists, and Tibetan 
government while I was doing fieldwork in Dharamsala. The Tibetan Youth Congress is a well-
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known radical, political activist group, and their audience, consequently, was mostly Tibetans in 
20s and a few foreigners invested in the Tibetan cause. Another kind of event, a traditional 
Tibetan instrument concert held to benefit a nunnery, was organized by the Tibetan women’s 
association, a group known to hold events to support Tibetan women. The audiences for this 
event were entirely different:  mostly adult Tibetan women and a few men and women foreigners. 
Yet another non-profit would hold free language classes, where they would provide a classroom 
for foreign volunteers to teach English to Tibetan students, and where, in return, Tibetans would 
teach the foreigners Tibetan.  Here, most of the Tibetans attending were young teenagers, older 
monks, and young adults. In a way, there are events and activities relevant to almost all Tibetan 
agendas in Dharamsala. I will describe the town of Dharamsala, and how the use of it by Tibetan 
exiles there confronts the differing agendas of the towns various Indian communities, in future 
chapters in more detail.   
 As I have mentioned above, Tibetan exiles have been using Indian as a hub for Tibetan 
nationalist activities. This is an important example of their flexible liminality showing how 
Tibetans, though a marginalized and ‘foreign’ community in India, have been able to propagate 
nonetheless their political activities in a systemic form. I contend that the Tibetan exile 
community in India would not have been successful in organizing a systematic political activities 
were it not for their geo-political understanding of their position in India, and their ability to 
strategically accept their marginalized position while also taking advantage of its accidental 
benefits. Tibetan exiles are already aware that the Indian government will not easily allow them 
to access citizenship in India; hence, Tibetans know they have to live as exiles who must annually 
renew their Registration Certificates in order to stay in India.  
However, Tibetans represent important geo-political and ideological aims for the Indian 
government, as they pursue their own international relations strategy with China, and seek to 
acquire humanitarian service fame from Western sympathizers of Tibetan exile community. As a 
result, India has granted Tibetans better legal benefits than other exile/refugee community in 
 
	 58	
India, including freedom of employment, education, travel etc. Tibetan exiles, for their part, have 
used this mix of marginality and liberty to organize a Tibetan nationalist political hub in India. 
From my observations in Dharamsala, thus, I could see how Tibetan exile’s flexible liminality has 
actualized the massive concentration of Tibetan political organization in Dharamsala, and situated 
conversations about citizenship with India and the West.  
 
 Flexible Liminality: Socio-economic success of Tibetan exiles 
The second place where I observed flexible liminality was in the relatively high socio-
economic standing of the Tibetan exile community in India. Given that Tibetan exiles are 
commonly referred to as ‘refugees’ in India, I was taken aback by the difference in observable 
socio-economic status between Tibetans and the other Indian communities in Dharamsala. With 
their more urban and westernized style of address and associations, Tibetans make themselves 
visibly separate from the local Indian hosts. How is this so? It is because the transnational 
resources and Western networks available to Tibetans in India have socially and economically 
marked them as being on a different level from local Indians.  
For example, despite living in the same town, there was a stark difference between the 
Gaddis (an Indian ethnic group in Dharamsala) and Tibetan exiles in a number of attributes: in 
educational attainment, in ability to travel abroad, in sartorial fashion, and in ability to achieve 
close personal relationships with foreigners. One day, while I was speaking with my host mother, 
a Gaddi woman, outside my apartment in Dharamsala, she told me that her oldest son got a phone 
call from Chandigardh University in Punjab asking to apply for their engineering program. She 
had caught me as I was leaving for the market that morning and asked if this was a good sign for 
his getting in the college program. I could tell she was very excited about this news, and I 
confirmed to her that this was a very good sign for her son to get into their program. Then, she 
said,  
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“Many people from our village don't go for higher education, it [the Gaddi community] is 
still backwards in that sense. Many years ago, there was one man who became a high-
class officer in the foz [Indian army] and everybody came out to greet this man. We just 
have not seen many successful people, and there are barely any [paused] I can’t think of 
anybody, who have are college pass [graduates], at least not from outside university. Did 
you say this was a big university? Have you heard of it? Chandigardh, yes, I know it is a 
big city, but I don't know anything about the college there.”   
I answered that Chandigardh University is a good university and she should be very 
happy that she had such a hardworking son who was talented enough to be recognized by an out-
of-state university. She was very happy to hear this and we chatted more about how she and her 
husband had received this phone call. By contrast I had met a number of Tibetans during my time 
in Dharamsala who had friends or family members in Universities in Western countries and other 
Indian states. I knew from an interview with a member of the staff at the Education Department in 
the Tibetan exile government that each high school graduate in the Tibetan school is granted a 
scholarship for college or enrolled in a vocational program for job skills. Moreover, Tibetan 
students also have many opportunities for affordable education in Western countries via private 
and organizational sponsorship. Although I could get any detailed information from the Tibetan 
organizations in India about sponsorship, I was casually informed that about half of the funding 
for Tibetan schools in India was supported by private or organizational sponsorship (including, 
donations, charity, grants etc.) 
I argue that the Tibetans have built a nurturing system for their younger generation that 
grants members of that generation easy access to Western cultural knowledge, and opportunities 
to travel to the West. As I mentioned above, since the early 1980s, the Tibetan diaspora have 
received humanitarian resources from a sympathetic West. Several individuals and organizations 
from the West have sponsored Tibetans through programs like the Tibetan Scholarship Program 
(TSP), and the Tibetan U.S. Resettlement Program (TUSRP), providing opportunities for 
Tibetans to travel to Western countries. At the same time, the humanitarian resources given to 
Tibetans from India and Nepal have changed from economic-financial ones to legal benefits that 
allow them easy access to residency as foreigners in South Asia. As a result, all young diapora 
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Tibetans in India have been nurtured in schools and the community via Western sponsorships, 
which, in turn, have provided them with valuable cultural knowledge of the West.  
Additionally, the Tibetan community’s economic success was visible through the foreign 
material goods Tibetans wore or carried. Tibetan youths could be seen on the street frequently 
outfitted in Western fashion style boat shoes, bow ties, college emblem, and carrying iPads, and 
Beats headphones. Such Western transnational resources like foreign university scholarships, 
English language skills, and personal contact with people residing in the West were only 
available to such an extent to the Tibetan community. The same resources were not available to 
people in the Indian host community because they go to different schools (Indian private or 
government schools) and don’t have access to the transnational resources from the West. I argue 
that this differential access is due to the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles. That is, I think 
Tibetans enjoy this greater access to international resources because their flexible liminality has 
put them in a position to acquire cultural and social capital unavailable to the other residents of 
the Dharamsala area. I will come back to this point below. For now it is enough to say that 
because many individual Tibetans have been able to benefit from aid obtained from the West, that 
benefit, in turn, has been able to spread throughout the Tibetan diaspora.  
 
Flexible Liminality: Too much attention  
The third aspect of flexible liminality I noticed in Dharamsala was the large amount of 
global attention paid to the Tibetan exile community. Dharamsala is the unofficial capital for 
Tibetan exiles and India is the hub of Tibetan nationalism; this has attracted much attention from 
curious scholars, journalists, travelers, and foreigners. The resulting large influx of tourists has 
been useful to promoting the Tibetan political agenda, but it has also placed a burden of 
responsibility on every Tibetan in Dharamsala to keep up the image of Tibetans in the eyes of the 
rest of the world. Many Tibetans I spoke with had at least one curious foreigner asking them for 
an interview, or even asking their opinion of the political agenda of the Tibetan exile government.  
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From my observation, I have noticed that individual Tibetans are well aware of this 
responsibility; consequently, Tibetans try to either do their best in interacting with foreigners or 
stay away from them completely.  Hence, many times, during attempts to approach Tibetans for 
interviews, I was immediately shunned and denied even the most basic small talk. In two Tibetan 
non-profits that I visited, I saw a printed sign on the wall written in English stating, “No 
researchers allowed without prior appointment,” and “Need one-week advance notice for 
interviews.”   
Tibetans who were willing to be interviewed, of the other hand, admitted that this wasn’t 
their first time speaking with researchers or journalists. I was taken aback when Phurbu once 
recited popular research topics about Tibetan exiles that he had heard about from the too 
numerous Ph.D. students he had met. Phurbu said, “I have done so many interviews on identity 
[grunting showing displeasure]. Then about religion, government, gender, but please no questions 
about identity. I am so tired of it.” I was eventually able to convince him to talk with me only 
because my research topic was different from the ones he had heard of before. Another time, I 
heard high school girls at an English practice class that I regularly attended shyly but adamantly 
say to new foreign volunteers, “Please, no questions about politics.” 
Thus, I would argue that the downside of the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles’ lives is 
the large amount of attention they must endure from non-Tibetans because of it, as well as the 
deep sense of responsibility felt by many Tibetans in diaspora feel to speak to those same, 
annoying foreigners about their community and cause in order to keep up that global image. That 
is, while the Tibetan exile community has succeeded in achieving the global attention they need 
for their political aims, this has also attracted too much intrusive foreign attention towards 
Tibetans in Dharamsala. Hence, I frequently observed that Tibetans in Dharamsala felt obligated 
to attend to curious foreigners even as they also complained about too much foreign attention 
solely focused on Tibetan exile politics and identity.  
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Most Tibetans in Dharamsala had experiences with curious researchers, journalists, and 
tourists – so everyone from middle-aged men to even high-school girls had learned to warn 
foreigners not to ask them about political matters. Ultimately, while the Tibetan exile community 
has garnered a sterling reputation for being champions of human rights, peaceful living, religious 
tolerance, etc. – all to their benefit with respect to gaining access to Western knowledge and 
influence – this very reputation has put them uncomfortably at the center of a stage where the 
Tibetan community in Dharamsala are also unwilling stars.  
 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter by describing a popular Tibetan teenage dance group strangely 
named “No Parking.” While their dance performances do not depict anything political, their 
dance group’s name certainly does by highlighting Tibetan’s perpetually marginalized existence. 
In this chapter, hence, I have argued that the Tibetan exile community is excluded from China, 
India, and the West, but in different ways. This is the exact message of not belonging that the 
dance group “No Parking” is trying to convey to their audience. But Tibetan exiles understand 
their various geo-political exclusions and have, I would argue, tactfully responded to their 
different exclusions in ways that better their exile community. China is aggressively set on 
keeping the Tibetan geographical region and determined to show that Tibet never existed 
independently at all. The Tibetan diaspora has been rejecting China’s assimilation project by 
making an even stronger Tibetan identity construction project in exile. 
 At the same time, by rejecting Indian citizenship, Tibetan exiles are using their 
marginalized status in India to promote Tibetan nationalism and to create an even stronger 
Tibetan nationalist population that is, simultaneously, appealing to the international political and 
cultural concerns of Western governments people. Hence, many Western countries have provided 
a special space for Tibetan exiles to occupy in diaspora despite their lack of UNHCR refugee 
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status. For this reason Tibetan exiles are using the Western countries as a ground for Tibetan 
individual legal stability and economic success.  
Applying the theory of flexible liminality, which describes how a group can manipulate 
influences vectoring in from multiple geo-political entities through carefully aimed cultural 
adjustments, it can be seen that Tibetan exiles exhibit a high degree of flexible liminality. In 
Dharamsala, I saw three aspects of the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles  – in the 
transformation of the town of Dharamsala into a Tibetan nationalist ground, in the socio-
economic success of Tibetan exiles compared to the Indian host community, and in the large 
amount of attention from foreigners towards Tibetans.  
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Chapter 3: Dharamsala – The Place and Its People 
The Tibetan exile community’s socio-political success is rooted in the valleys of Dharamsala, 
India – but what is it about the town that has created such fertile ground for the Tibetan exile 
community’s success? In this chapter, I will ethnographically describe Dharamasala, the place 
and the people who reside there; in order to unravel the unspoken support Tibetan exiles have 
received from the town and their host communities. My goal in this chapter is to show that the 
Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala has thrived in carrying out their cultural practice of 
flexible liminality (practice that already shows high degree of flexibility within their liminal 
conditions) because of the two factors in Dharamsala, the town and its people. In this chapter, I 
have intentionally avoided speaking too much about the Tibetan community in order to highlight 
the historical events and social niche of the Indian Dharamsala community that surrounds the 
Tibetan community.  
First, I will ethnographically describe the town of Dharamsala – its geographical and 
historical details. Thereafter, I will introduce the majority populations within the Indian host 
community – namely, the Gaddi and Gorkhali groups that are both marginalized populations in 
different ways. I will ethnographically describe each ethnic group by elaborating on their 
ancestral history, kinship, religion, livelihood, political interest and living conditions. In doing so, 
I aim to show that the historical value of Dharamsala and the marginalized position of these 
Indian host communities provided a fertile ground for the Tibetan community’s flexible 
liminality. Lastly, I will apply my theory of flexible liminality (measure the condition of 
liminality that would test for high or low degree of flexibility) to both the Gaddi and Gorkhali 
communities to show why these communities could not achieve the same high degree of flexible 
liminality as Tibetan exiles in spite of sharing the same social environment and, to a certain 
extent, marginalization. I will argue that the reason for Tibetan exile community’s socio-
economic success compared to that of their host community is due to their higher flexible 
liminality.  
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A Journey to Dharamsala  
After the first Tibetan exile group followed the 14th Dalai Lama to India in 1959, the 
main priority for Tibetan leaders was to keep the Tibetan community together and maintain 
Tibetan traditions (The Office of HH Dalai Lama 2018). At the request of the Dalai Lama, the 
Tibetan community was settled in the cool area of the Himalayan range, and the Indian 
government allowed the Tibetan community to resettle 10 km away from an old British colonial 
hill town, McLeod Ganj (Deihl 2002, Vahali 2009). After a major earthquake in 1905, 
Dharamsala was abandoned by British troops and most trade-businesses were halted after many 
properties were destroyed (Wagner 2013; Goldstein 2007; Deihl 2002; Vahali 2009). So when the 
Indian government decided to allot the McLeod Ganj area to Tibetans, it was with the hope that 
the impoverished Tibetans could take up some unskilled employment such as road and building 
construction (Deihl 2002; Vahali 2009; Brauen 2011). The first generation of Tibetan exiles had 
to live in makeshift tents and could only rely on hard-labor construction jobs for income.19  
McLeod Ganj is one of the most popular suburbs of Dharamsala for tourists and is still 
the main settlement area for the Tibetan community. Unlike in the first generation, most of the 
Tibetan exile community’s economic activities in Dharamsala now are in the realms of arts and 
crafts, retail trade, and the hospitality business (CTA 2009). Today, Dharamsala is a thriving 
tourist hill station with the Dalai Lama Temple and HPC Cricket Stadium being the major 
attractions (HP Tourism 2018). Tibetan exiles have spread throughout the world but several 
interlocutors have told me that Dharamsala is still considered the capital of Tibetan exiles and the 
main political source of Tibetan exile governance. Thus, it is important to learn how Tibetan 
exiles first gained access to form such a strong socio-culture and political governance. I argue that 
it is the town of Dharamsala and its people that provides fertile ground for the Tibetan exile 
																																																								
19 For more information about the living conditions of first-generation Tibetan exiles, see Honey 
Vahali (2009); Mallica Mishra (2014); Yangzom Brauen (2011) 
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community’s success because both the place and people in Dharamsala have accepted the 
Tibetans in Dharamsala and allowed them to expand their economic-cultural-social activities.  
Dharamsala is a hill town station spread over 11.39 square miles situated in the Kangra 
district within the state of Himachal Pradesh in North India20. The Kangra district lies in the 
Siwalik Himalayan zone and its topography is well defined by a series of almost parallel 
Dhauladhar mountain ranges that rise in height towards the northeast (HP State Govt. 2018). 
According to the Indian census of 2001, the total population of the Kangra district was 14,00,000 
of which 12,89,399 reported their mother tongue as Hindi, 23,738 as Punjabi, 8,767 as Tibetan, 
and 8108 as Nepali (Census of India 2001). This shows the distribution of the population of 
ethnic groups in Kangra, where local Himachali communities21 largely speak Hindi, and are the 
majority population, followed by groups that have migrated from the state of Punjab, Tibetan 
refugees, and lastly, the Gorkhali Nepali community (Census of India 2011).    
While in Delhi, I called my Nepali relatives in Dharamsala on the phone to ask them 
where I should settle to learn about the Tibetan refugee community. For now, my uncle simply 
said to get off at the McLeod Ganj bus station and he would come pick me up. So, after an all-
night bus ride on winding roads, I arrived in McLeod Ganj. This was the last stop for all buses 
travelling to the area. The bus station seemed like an open-air underground parking lot built on 
the slope of a hill that faced out towards the valley. We passengers had to gather our belongings 
and climb two flights of stairs to get to the main road. McLeod Ganj was located in a town atop a 
sloping hill surrounded by mountains. It exuded a sense of peace and I gave a sigh of relief at 
																																																								
20 The locally regarded geographical area of metropolitan Dharamsala has eleven suburbs. The 
suburbs on the upper Dharamsala are McLeod Ganj, Bhagsunath, Dharamkot, and Naddi. The 
suburbs on the lower Dharamsala are Forsyth Ganj, Kotwali Bazzar, Kaccheri Adda, Dari, 
Ramnagar, Sidhpur, and Sidhbari (HP State Govt. 2018).  
21 The three recognized Himachali tribes of Kangra districts are Gaddis, Gujjars, and Bhot or Bot, 
but there may be other minor tribes that are not mentioned in the census. The majority of the 
tribal populations in Dharamsala are Gaddis, then Gujjar, and lastly other tribes. About 84,565 
people (61.9 % percent) of Dharamsala population identified as part of a local Himachali tribe in 
the 2011 Indian census (Census of India 2011).  
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having escaped from the noise of Delhi’s many motorists. I sat by the taxi stand, where there 
were rows of metal benches. From there I could see the valley and the bus station below where 
my bus from Delhi was parked. There were at least 10 teashops starting to open in front of the 
taxi stands so I got some chai (spiced-sweet milk tea) and waited for my uncle to pick me up.  
 
Figure 3.1: Map of McLeodGanj © Dharamsala International Film Festival, 2017 
 
I noted that I was standing in the middle of the main market of McLeod Ganj (as seen on 
the smaller map on the left-side above). The market had a large, circular, and empty road space 
for traffic; this was called the chowk (a Hindi word used to describe the middle of market area or 
traffic roundabout). From the chowk there were roads branching out to surrounding suburbs. To 
the north were the road to Dal Lake, and a few other small roads that lead to the upper residences 
– the basti, of McLeod. On the west were Dharamkot road, and Bhagsu road (Bhagsu road also 
led to a Gaddi village). To the east were roads to Lower Dharamsala, Jogiwara, and the Dalai 
Lama Temple. The heart of McLeod was the Jogiwara road and the Dalai Lama Temple road. 
This is where all the Tibetan restaurants, coffee shops, NGOs, and other trade businesses are 
located. There were a few other Tibetan businesses scattered around along other roads but most of 
their businesses could be found on these two roads.  
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While one could easily find their way around the small cluster of shops in the market 
area, a non-resident would have a harder time finding the private spaces of local residents. I 
learned after living in McLeod Ganj that people’s actual homes were located behind these busy 
roads. One would have to take a smaller road off of the main roads to get to the cluster of 
neighborhoods (see map above). The same style of neighborhood was common for all the upper 
Dharamsala suburbs (Dal, Bhagsu, Gaddi village), each branching off of the McLeod Ganj 
chowk. Each neighborhood in upper Dharamsala had a unique style of clustering, so a new person 
could not easily go for a walk around these places without getting absolutely confused and lost.  
I argue that it is within the private spaces of these neighborhoods that we can see the 
Tibetan community living congruously with various Indian host communities. I observed that the 
ground for success of the Tibetan exile community lay within the neighborly activities, and 
friendly gestures, they shared with the Indian host communities who have tolerated them and 
allowed them, for the most part, to freely carry on their own social-economic-cultural activities. It 
is the unique, all-accommodating, town of Dharamsala, and the social communities that have 
adjusted to the Tibetans residing among them in the their hometown, that have helped Tibetan 
exiles thrive politically and socio-economically. I am making a similar argument to Laura Ring 
(2006) where Ring argues from the ethnographic account from people living in Karachi 
apartment building that people of multiple, normally hostile, ethnicities have been living 
peacefully together because of the little reciprocities they share as neighbors. In addition to 
Ring’s argument, in case of Dharamsala community, I would argue that the town and the people 
of Dharamsala were prepared to tolerate and make a space for foreign communities because of 
the history of constant change and foreign political control of the area.  
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Historic Background of the Kangra District 
Since the early 17th century, many different groups of people have migrated to occupy the 
leadership positions in the scenic hill town of Dharamsala and to reside in the politically powerful 
Kangra fort (James 1997). One can still see reminders of the many groups who have come, 
attracted to the scenic beauty and political power of Kangra. From St. John’s Church, lost in the 
wilderness (a relic left over from the British colonial era), to the Gorkhalis (a Nepali ethnic 
group) employed by the British military, to the Katoch Dynasty, this area holds the history of 
different political powers attempting to control and occupy Kangra. The constant changes in 
political power and the migrations of foreign populations into Kangra have made the area 
accommodating to yet another foreign settler community – that of the Tibetan exiles.  
My Nepali relatives in Dharamsala were offspring of the military population employed 
by the British colonials to conduct high altitude military training (something I will speak more 
about in my coverage of Gorkhali history later in the chapter). I asked my Nepali relatives to 
show me the main sites in Dharamsala so that I could become familiar with the place. Early one 
morning, I met up with my aunty at the same taxi stand in McLeod Ganj here my uncle picked me 
up. We rode a bus from McLeod Ganj to the lower main market in Dharamsala, and then a second 
bus from lower Dharamsala to the old Kangra city. During the bus ride to lower Dharamsala, we 
passed an old Christian cemetery next to an equally old Catholic Church. Aunty tapped my 
shoulder and pointed at the Church saying, “old Church from British times. Some Christian 
people still use it I think.” The St. John’s Church was a beautiful brick building built in 1852, 
soon after the British colonials22 annexed the Kangra district from the Sikh Empire23 in 1848. On 
this day, it looked like an abandoned area surrounded by large pine trees with weeds overgrowing 
																																																								
22 The British first entered India as a trading company called the East India Trade Company in 
early 1750s, and slowly encroached on India as a colonizing empire in by 1850s. India finally 
received complete independence from the British colonization in 1947. See, (James 1997). 
23 Sikh empire was a monarchy reign in late 18th century that ruled over the northwest part of 
India (including today’s Punjab and Haryana state) formed under the leadership of Ranjit Singh.  
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the building and cemetery area. One could still recognize the magnificent European architecture 
of the Church despite the years of neglect.  
During the British Raj24 many British elites moved their residences from capital cities 
such as Delhi, Calcutta, and Mumbai to hill stations in order to escape the summer heat (Hunter 
1903). After annexing the Kangra district, the British used the area mainly to station military 
troops, and this area was also used as a military garrison where the first generation of British 
Gorkha regiments was trained (Hunter 1903). In 1860, the first British Gorkha regiment called the 
1st Gorkha Rifles or the 66th Gorkha Light Infantry was stationed to the Bakloh military 
cantonment (Parker 2005). The British favored Dharamsala because of its picturesque beauty – it 
being located between the foothills of the Mt. Dhauladhar range with a rich fertile valley irrigated 
by Beas River and Ravi River (Hunter 1903). Initially, Dharamsala was going to be the summer 
capital of the British raj; however, after the large destruction of infrastructure by an earthquake in 
1905, the British decided to move their summer capital to Shimla, another Himachal city about 
200km southeast of Dharamsala (Hunter 1903). Regardless, the reign of British raj in Dharamsala 
is still visible today in the form of abandoned architecture and the military community it formed.  
Aunty and I reached the old capital of the district where the Kangra fort was located. We 
could see the towering castle structure far away from where we were standing. The large majestic 
fort stood on the hilltop surrounded by hollow valleys. The fort was surrounded by approximately 
four kilometers of a long and large stonewall. We bought entrance tickets for the fort and were 
handed an audio tour guide. The voice on the audio tour guide belonged to Tikaraj Aishwarya 
Katoch, a descendent of the Katoch dynasty. He shared his knowledge of his family’s 
involvement with the fort25, passed down by his forefathers, for the price of an entrance ticket.  
																																																								
24 The British Raj is a term used by historian to describe the British colonial reign in India. For 
more information see “Raj” (1997) by Lawrence James 
25 Tikaraj Aishwarya Katoch had a lot to say about the entrances and gates because his forefathers 
had always warned them about the dangers of entering the fort. He shared tales from his 
grandfather about the potential danger of losing one’s head if they entered headfirst through any 
of the gates.  
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There are eleven entrance gates and twenty-three bastions. Only one is used as the main 
entrance today but there are several layers of entrances one would have to go through when the 
fort was in use; first the Ranjit Singh gate over the bridge, then the gate called the Andheri 
Darwaza (dark gate), which used to be the first defense gate. Next, one can choose either the 
palace gate or temple gate. The temple gate would lead to courtyard adorned with several stone 
temples of Hindu gods and goddesses. The palace gate would lead to the courtyard intended for 
guests and residence of the palace. The highest point of the fort was used as the main royal 
residence. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Kangra Fort. By, Manabi Katoch 
There was a popular saying written on the tour guide information on a plaque at the 
Kangra Fort: “He who holds the Kangra fort, holds the hills.” From the historical records of 
Mughal Empire, it is understood that there were janapada (independent political rulers), and the 
further sub-rule of hill chiefs, for each village and town. There were three major janapadas on the 
hills – Trigarta, Chamba, and Jammu (Kaushal 1965). The most powerful rulers of the Kangra 
fort allowed the janapadas to rule amongst themselves independently, although the janapadas 
owed tribute as a symbol of their allegiance to the larger state. Just as the janapadas had to 
constantly adjust themselves to foreign rule from the Kangra fort, people also learned to adjust to 
the foreign population in their area because of the change in the reign. This can be seen from the 
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way Indian tribes like the Gaddi and the Gujjar adjusted so well to the introduction of the 
Gorkhali to the Kangra district.  
In Dharamsala, I observed that Gorkhali and Gaddis often intermarry, celebrate holidays 
together, and worship the same deities. I argue that this history of constant change in foreign 
political rule over the Kangra district has paved the way for Tibetan exiles to be accommodated in 
the Kangra area. Unlike most refugee-host conflicts which are based on resource competition, 
there has been a minimal amount of friction between the Indian host community and the Tibetan 
exiles over economic resources such as agricultural land, employment, housing, food and water, 
etc. (Turner 2010, Chambers 1986, Whitaker 1999). However, Tibetan community does have 
ethnic rivalry with their host community, which I will explain in detail in the next chapter, but 
that is different from the type of refugee-host conflict that has been talked about in the refugee 
studies scholarships.  
For the most part, the Indian host community has adjusted well to the introduction of 
Tibetan exiles. It should be noted that the lack of friction from resource competition also has to 
do with the Tibetan exile’s ability to create self-sustaining economic activity using the tourism 
industry, I will explain more in detail later in chapter. However, I contend that the history of 
constant changes in foreign rulers in the Kangra district has also created an accommodating 
environment for Tibetan exiles. In other words, the political history of Kangra, which introduced 
so many foreign powers and migrant groups to the area, has prepared the Kangra region to handle 
the addition of yet another foreign population into the area. In the next chapter, I will present the 
kinds of social-racial friction that remains between Tibetans exiles and the Indian host 
community. Nevertheless, it still holds true that Tibetan exiles have had minimal friction with 
their Indian host community regarding resource competition; in fact, their neighborly 
relationships are notable.  
While both Tibetans and Indian communities have made an incredible effort to achieve 
this level of cordial relationship, the history of foreign powers changing hands over the Kangra 
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region has especially prepared the Indian community to accommodate another foreign Tibetan 
population in the area. I contend that the Tibetan exile community has been living relative 
harmoniously with their Indian host community. The gracious accommodations made by the 
Gaddi, Gorkhali, and the surrounding governance has provided the Tibetan exiles with a peaceful 
space to organize their exile government, political activism, cultural preservation, and educational 
institutions for young Tibetans. Since the first generation of Tibetan exiles arrived to Dharamsala, 
the Tibetan community has worked rapidly to create better life chances for the Tibetan diaspora 
as a whole, not just in Dharamsala, but also for Tibetan exile community living elsewhere in 
South Asia (India, Nepal, and Bhutan). 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala 
achieved better lives by adjusting their cultural practices to appeal to (and manipulate) the 
multiple geo-political entities influencing them. But the seed of progress for Tibetan exiles, 
though, is rooted in the town of Dharamsala; and it is the town and the people who live there who 
have helped provide the fertile ground for the Tibetan exile community’s success. The Gaddi and 
Gorkhali communities, of course, are also marginalized communities within India, so why have 
they not used their own marginalized conditions vis-à-vis the Indian state as Tibetans have to 
achieve better lives? In trying to understand why flexible liminality is possible for one ethnic 
community and not possible for another in Dharamsala, I aim to unpack other characteristics of 
Tibetan flexible liminality. I will apply flexible liminality theory to the two majority Indian host 
communities, the Gaddi and the Gorkhali, to test if these communities could or could not have 
flexible liminality. But first, I let me briefly introduce each of these communities and their 
communal lives in Dharamsala, and describe their socio-political standing in India.  
 
Gaddis 
The Gaddis are the majority ethnic group-tribe in the Chamba and Kangra districts 
(Verma 1996; Axelby 2007). Gaddis are also the majority of the population in Dharamsala and 
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thus are an important component in the social lives of Tibetan exiles. Gaddis have their own rural 
and tribal political-social status in Indian society that marks them as a marginalized group, 
schedule caste, and other backward caste which is a ‘depressed caste’ category first created by the 
British colonials in India to provide special opportunities to social outcastes in India (Lawrence 
1997; Wagner 2013; Axelby 2007). I will argue that the marginalized status of Gaddis allows 
them to view Tibetan exiles with sympathy and become accommodating to the Tibetan 
population. I will briefly introduce the Gaddi’s social-religious-political lives in Kangra, and use 
this information to apply the theoretical framework of flexible liminality.  
The Gaddi’s estimated population today is over half million, spread between Kangra and 
Chamba (Census of India 2009). Today, most Gaddis live alongside other Pahari tribes like the 
Gujjars and Kolis. Gaddis claim that the land between the foothills of the Dhauladhar range and 
the Kangra belt is their land, also named Gadaren (Sheep country) (Verma 1996; Axelby 2007). 
The Gaddi are a transhumant pastoralist group who changed their homesteads seasonally for 
grazing grassland better suited for their cattle (Wagner 2013). Historically, my interlocutors have 
told me that the Gaddis used the Kangra district as their winter ground and the Chamba district 
(lying north of Kangra) as their summer residence. Regardless, today, people with Gaddi heritage 
claim that their ancestral homeland is the Bharmaur town of Chamba (Wagner 2013, Parry 1979, 
Verma1996). Most Gaddis are Hindus and are known to be endogamous with other Hindu Pahari 
groups as well; however, their are preferences for marrying from the same, or higher, caste level 
than oneself whether in intra or interethnic group marriage (Wagner 2013, Parry 1979, 
Verma1996). Gaddis differentiate themselves from other Pahari groups by citing their ancestral 
homeland, pastoralist group occupation, and language (H.P. government, 2017). Today, however, 
I have been told the rules for marriages between castes and tribes have fewer restrictions but are 
still considered an important aspect of marriage.  
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Sociologists studying Gaddis say that the social component of Gaddis is best described as 
a blend of caste and tribe26 (Newell 1961, Verma 1996). Early sociologists found that Gaddis 
acted like a tribe because Gaddis had hill chiefs in their towns, mostly had a semi-nomadic mode 
of livelihood, identified with a common ancestral hometown, and seemed to have a unified 
identity as Gadheran (Newell 1961, Verma 1996). At the same time, Gaddis also created a caste 
hierarchy among themselves, where there are high and low castes within the Gaddi community. 
Gaddi’s high castes consist of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and the lower castes consist of 
Sudras and untouchables27 (Newell 1961). The mid-level castes, those that have the last names 
(indicating sub-caste) of Rajputs, Thakurs, Rana, Khatri, and Dhangar are all seen to be of equal 
caste. In fact, Newell argues that the middle-level castes have formed a dominant allied caste 
group, where members of the caste inter-marry between each other, and, in some places, are 
commonly called ‘Gaddis.’ This is a point of confusion that arises when using the term ‘Gaddi’ – 
the question is whether to use it as a caste group name or use it to designate the whole tribe. I 
agree with sociologist V. Verma (1996) who says to think of the Gaddis in a continuum of caste 
and tribe, where from some angle it may seem closer to caste, and from other angles it may seem 
closer to tribe. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use the term Gaddi to describe the whole 
tribe while also keeping in mind that the Gaddis follow caste hierarchy.   
I have noticed that caste and jati today still play a large role in Gaddi’s social and 
political lives. The larger umbrella of caste does prescribe an individual’s social standing, but, in 
																																																								
26 There is a distinct school of thought within the South Asian studies that describes tribes in India 
as identified based on the remoteness of their habitat, their cultural tradition, and the 
distinctiveness of their lifestyles. The categories of race, color, and economic life are not as 
important, to this school, in considering a group to be a tribe (Verma 1996). For more information 
see Nicholas Dirk (2001), Castes of Mind: Colonialism and Making of Modern India.   
27 Newell (1961) does note that higher castes do not have any caste specific employment role, but 
the lower castes do. For example, the Riaras are silversmiths and musicians, Sipis are 
blacksmiths, the Halis are laborers, and other castes are brass workers, basket makers, and shoe 
repairers.  
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order to uphold their social standings, an individual bears different types of social responsibility.28 
The larger category of high, mid, and low ranks are understood as ‘castes’ but the local term for 
these castes (visible from a person’s last name) is ‘jati.’ (Verma 1996). Furthermore, jatis can be 
broken down into smaller categories sub-castes, which are further sub-categorized into patrilineal 
clans called, gotra, which are yet further sub-categorized into al (Newell 1961). The purpose of 
gotra in each Gaddi community is to mark a household’s familial responsibility towards other 
households within their gotra; this is called the kwer responsibility (Newell 1961).  
Let me explain this from my ethnographic example, when a Rajput family from the 
Ayodhya gotra is building a house for their extended family, the Rana family within the Ayodhya 
gotra will have to send a family member to help build the Rajput house. During my fieldwork in 
Dharamsala, I had the opportunity to observe kwer responsibility take place between families of 
the same gotra. A neighbor of my Gaddi host family was on another floor of their family’s house, 
so the father of the Gaddi family went to help with the first few days of their building a house, 
and the next few days his son went with him to continue helping with the building. The family 
had professional builders who were doing the work but the kwer responsibility meant that the 
other gotra families also had to come and help at least to the extent of lifting building materials.  
The second purpose of gotra is to keep track of marital eligibility between families. 
While the family members of the same gotras are endogamous, the Gaddi community follows the 
little gotra, also called al, to keep track of marital eligibility. The al indicates the villages of 
origin, which are thought to be like large patrilineal extended families (Newell 1961). Therefore, 
Gaddis families within the same gotra can marry each other if they do not belong to the same al, 
or the same patrilineal extended family (Newell 1961).  
 
																																																								
28 According to V. Verma, Gaddis have three ranks of castes – Brahmins, Dominant Allied castes, 
and the Low castes, which are also called jatis. This does not mean that Gaddi communities do 
not acknowledge the regular Vedic varnas. It simply means the four varnas are somewhere 
within these larger Gaddi categories of Brahmins, Dominant Allied castes, and Low castes. 
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Indian Governance of the Caste System 
It is probably due to the blend of tribe and caste within the larger Gaddi group that 
today’s Indian government has categorized the higher caste of Gaddis as a marginalized group by 
listing them as a ‘Scheduled Tribe’ while lower caste Gaddis are simply placed in the same 
category as other marginalized, untouchables, non-Gaddis jatis by terming them a ‘Scheduled 
Caste’ (H.P. government, 2017). Scheduled tribes (STs), scheduled castes (SCs), and other 
backward class (OBC) are categories in Indian laws that attempt to regulate the political 
representation for all the diverse groups in India (H.P. government, 2017). People who are 
recognized by the Indian government to be part of these marginalized groups are given special 
seats in government offices, political representations, and public education institutes (National 
Planning Commission, India 2015). The categories of STs, SCs, and OBCs were first formed in 
the 1870s by the British colonial government in India during a countrywide census (Dirks 2001; 
James 1997). During this census, the British colonial government tried to officially collect 
information on the Indian population’s caste system based on geographical and cultural relevance 
– the groups of people who were socially and economically underprivileged in caste ranking were 
categorized as “Depressed Classes” (Cohn 1987).  The British colonial government’s 
classification system took on a legal reality after the Morley-Minto 190929 reform where Muslims 
were separated from the local caste system, and ‘untouchables,’ or the low ranked castes, were 
marked as a ‘Depressed Class’ (Cohn 1987).  
In retrospect, Indian historians have criticized the Morley-Minto 1909 reform stating it 
did damage to local Indian affair because although Hindu-Muslim sectarian violence always 
existed, it was usually limited to localized events, and with the Morley-Minto reform, the 
																																																								
29 The new caste specialized law came to exist because the British Indian Secretary of the State, 
John Morley, wanted to allow the entrance of elite Indians into the government and maintain 
limited democracy in India.  Morley also thought it was necessary to first politically equalize the 
religious-, racial-, and caste- fragmented Indian society because he did not trust the elite Indians 
to be able to make uncorrupt and unbiased policy-making decisions that would not just favor their 
own class.  
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separation of Hindus and Muslims took an institutionalized form (Cohn 1987, James 1997, Dirks 
2001). Regardless, the independent Indian state decided to keep the inherited policy of the 1909 
reform with a change in the name from “Depressed Class” to Scheduled Caste and Tribes: a full 
list of categorized Scheduled caste and tribes in India were recorded with the SC Order 1950 and 
ST Order 1950 (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, India 2018). According to these 
orders, individuals belonging to the listed ‘caste’ or ‘tribe’ could apply for certificate that proved 
their identity as a part of that group.30  
At the same time, the Indian government has been burdened with the British colonial 
government’s superficial definition of the “Caste System” that categorized every Hindu 
individual into one of the four varna rankings (Cohn 1987). The British-provisioned 1857 caste-
related census created the “Depressed Class” in the first place. The British misunderstood the 
caste system as a creation of the Hindu religion’s rather than as a regional social hierarchy system 
that is locally called jat or jati (James 1997) Therefore, the Indian Constitution still perceives the 
STs and SCs as people who only belong to the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religions; in fact, it has 
been noted that anyone who is not part of these religions has to forge certificates in order to be 
included under the ST/SC Indian Reservation Policy (The Hindu News 2018; EconomicTimes 
2017). For a long time Social Scientists have criticized British colonials in India for 
misunderstanding the caste system while still being prudent enough to institutionalize it, which 
has created a chaotic, on-the-ground reality for anybody involved in the caste system even today 
(Cohn 1987, James 1997, Dirks 2001). As a result, the Indian government still has not been able 
to remove inherited prejudices that can be traced from British colonial rule to the current political 
and legal representation of caste in Indian governance (EconomicTimes 2017).   
																																																								
30 Every new generation that wishes to be recognized, as part of the government’s category of ST 
or SC has to fill out an application and show proof of their parent’s SC/ST certificate. In the 
absence of the previous generation’s certificate, they have to acquire recognition from the town 
officiate, or tribe’s head officer, of their community’s recognition as part of the particular caste or 
tribe.  
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Anthropologically, the idea of caste and jati has been deeply investigated since the 
British raj in India and South Asia in general. In short, caste can be defined on the surface as a 
category of people ranked based on their physical and moral substance (Marriott and Inden 1985); 
jati is the local regional interpretation of caste ranking (Roberts 2007). However, the 
interpretation of jati varies for each region and even within one locality (Marriott and Inden 
1985). Caste scholars have tried to understand caste and jati by defining the socio- politico- and 
economic characteristics of caste. Scholars have showed that caste groups can move up in rank by 
adopting the mannerisms of Brahmins, a process called Sanskritization (Srinivas 1959); however, 
the jatis can only improve their position once they have acquired the political and economic 
power to force other groups to accept their Sanskritizing actions (Srinivas 1959; Subedi 2013; 
Natarajan 2005). Some have argued it is simply a way to rank people in terms of purity and 
impurity but without a fixed hierarchy (Dumont 1980). Others have argued that it was the British 
census, which tried to bring all Hindus under one religious umbrella, that broke the Hindu-
Muslim jati system, created a strict socio-economic ranking of local logics, and excluded the 
untouchables from the jati system (Dirks 2001). And still other critics have urged the need to 
focus on the bottom ranked within the caste hierarchy who are economically underprivileged and 
socially ostracized (Berreman 1971). Thus, anthropologically, I contend that one can only learn 
about one form of jati organization from a particular social community because different social 
groups have different forms of jatis. In fact, I have found that jatis can look very different for 
different ethnic groups even though jatis live in the same regional area. I will elaborate on this 
further by looking into the jatis in Gaddi and jat in Gorkha community.  
 
Gorkhali  
My Nepali relatives in Dal had invited me over for lunch in a Gorkhali neighborhood that 
was about a 20-minute taxi ride from McLeod Ganj. After lunch, my uncle’s family took me for a 
walk around the neighborhood and introduced me to my other relatives. On the way downhill, he 
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pointed to the valley in between the hills and said that is was the Gorkha army battalion 
cantonment. It was a large area with rows of one-story white and green colored houses, each 
surrounded by a brick wall topped with barbed wire. Even from this far away, I could see the 
various guard stations on each corner of the army barrack. However, it did not look intimidating, 
and with no uniformed men walking around and the outside posts, it could easily be mistaken for 
a large village school. Because this elderly gentleman was an army retiree, I asked him where the 
Gorkha army did their training. He chuckled and said,  
“You see all the hills and the forest?” pointing towards the hills across from ours with 
thick forest, surrounding the Northeast of the barrack, “that is all army property. Most of 
the training happens in the secrecy in the forest [Guerilla warfare]. That is the unique 
skill of Gorkha paltan [battalion]. In those buildings are dormitories and cafeterias for 
army men and even their families can come once a month to pick up army food ration for 
their family.”  
 
Another female relative chimed in, “oh yeah, their food rations are so inexpensive and 
good quality. It is the best.” The army retiree added that the first battalion was located in Bakloh, 
a city Northwest of Dharamsala within the Chamba district. It was only later the 4GR was moved 
to Dharamsala. In the 1850s the British colonial government moved their Gorkha battalion to 
Dharamsala when the government was considering making Dharamsala their summer capital 
(Hunter 1903).  
In the beginning of the 19th century, the Nepali army was expanding the borders of the 
Gorkha Kingdom’s to the Indian territories of the Northwest and Southwest regions (Shrestha 
2005; Hunter 1903). The British officers and the East India Trade Company were in a continuous 
fight with the Gorkha army who were defending the Indian Territory that they had conquered 
(Parker 2005). Finally, a large-scale Anglo-Nepali war broke out in 1814, wherein the British 
Army fought to take control over the Gorkha Kingdom. At the end of the war, the Treaty of 
Sugauli (officially signed in 1816) stated that Nepal would lose its surrounding territories but 
would receive independence from British colonization, and that the British army could recruit 
Gorkha soldiers (Parker 2005; Shrestha 2005). During the Anglo-Nepali war, the British officers 
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were impressed with the fighting spirit of the men in the Gorkha army, which led to the British 
wanting to end the war and have the Gorkha men fight for the British Empire (Parker 2005; 
Hunter 1903). The British government agreed to pay the Gorkha Empire a set amount as tribute 
for every Gorkha soldier recruited in the British army (Parker 2005; Hunter 1903). It have heard 
from my family members in Gorkha army that it was always a matter of pride for the Gorkha 
army to serve others because the soldiers were bringing fame and fortune to their own country. 
Even today, like my family members, men want to join the Gorkha army to serve under foreign 
countries because it is considered a point of national pride to represent Nepal abroad.  
The Gorkha army recruited for the 4 GR regiment in Dharamsala were mostly selected 
based on their so-called ‘martial’ race characteristics (James 1997). The British colonial 
government created this term during the recruitment of Gorkha soldiers where they divided their 
local or ‘native’ army population into ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’ races, a classification based on 
the Hindu Vedic Varna/ Caste system (Roberts 2008). The British assumed that those with the a 
Kshatriya varnic classification would have warrior-like personalities, while people in the other 
higher caste categories would have men built for a more sedentary lifestyle (Roberts 2008; 
MacMunn 1932). Additionally, the British wanted men from the ethnic group that they had 
stereotypically misconstrued to be to be fiercely loyal, yet, intellectually, lacking; people, that is, 
who would not revolt against the British Army later (Roberts 2008; MacMunn 1932). For the 
regiment in North Himachal Pradesh, martial races from Magar and Gurung jats were recruited 
(Interview 2017). These jats were recruited based on the British stereotype that people from hilly 
regions in Nepal would be fit when adapting to the hilly regions of India as well. As a result, 
martial races from Rai and Limbu jats were recruited on the Eastern part of Himachal Pradesh, 
(Interview 2017).  
I observed that the two jats recruited for Kangra (North Himachal Pradesh) have become 
a permanent part of the community in Dharamsala. These Magar and Gurung jats in Dharamsala 
were clustered in ways different from the four varnas. In the 19th century, Magar and Gurung jats 
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were mainly agriculturalists that had been socio-religiously influenced by Hinduism, and Bon 
Buddhism31. Similar to the Gaddis, I have been informed that Gorkhali social division was based 
on a patrilineal clan system, which could be further divided into sub-clans, then, gotra. The 
Magars originate from both the West and East of Kali Gandakai River in Northwest Nepal, and 
within these two regional groups there are seven main clans, and more than 1100 sub-clans who 
could intermarry with one another based on their family’s social standing (Hitchcock 1965; Bista 
1967). The Gurungs originate from Northwest and some from Northeast Nepal but their social 
lineages had mixtures of two different types of clan (Bista 1967). In 1974, it was noted that there 
were 1076 Gurung sub-clans, part of char jat clan (four caste clan) and 210 sub-tribe, part of 
Sorah jat clan (sixteen caste clan) (Ragsdale 1990). The Sorah jat clan is an inclusive counting of 
all Gurungs, and may even include the non-Gurung lineage, including Magar clans, who are of 
endogamous status to Gurungs (Ragsdale 1990). The various clans of Magar and Gurungs may 
even be followers of different religions; some are closer to Bon religious rituals that practice 
shamanism, and some are closer to Hindu practices (Bista 1967).  
The Gorkhali community formed in Dharamsala was a British-made settlement (Parker 
2005). As a result, the Magar and Gurung jats were stripped away from their ancestral homeland, 
and their traditional form of hierarchy. So, I found that in a smaller form of jats, these dislocated 
social groups had to cluster as one social unit and even redefine their caste from the newly 
provided occupational standing. My Gorkhali relative once told me that essentially the entire 
Gorkhali community claim they are Kshatriya varna since they are involved with the Gorkha 
Army, hence a part of a military caste. When I asked about the caste hierarchy, another 
Dharamsala Gorkhali resident said:  
“There are few Purohit and Pandit (priest/ educated in Vedas) in Army but they are from 
our jati (Magar, Gurung) because not many bahuns (Brahmin caste) join army. And there 
are everybody else, we are all of same jati, same caste…No, there are no really low caste. 
																																																								
31	Bon Dharma or Bonpo is one of the religious schools of Tibetan Buddhism categorized as 
ideologies influenced by Mahayana Buddhism and indigenous religious tradition of shamanistic 
and animistic practices performed by a priest called gshen. (Schaik 2010; Powers 1995)  
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Our Gorkhali community doesn’t have pore-chami [low caste jat names employed for 
garbage collectors, sweepers etc].”  
 
I found that the Magar and Gurung jats in Dharamsala have adapted to the unique Gorkha 
army community, different from other Nepali jats living in Nepal. The Gorkhali communities 
follows the Shivait sect of Hinduism32, are socio-culturally have similar to neighboring Punjabi 
and Gaddi groups, and are endogamous within their Gorkhali community. The Gorkha 
community’s head God is the Warrior Goddess, Durga, and all of her different forms. The main 
temple for the Gorkhali community is located 20 minutes North from McLeodGanj in Bhagsu. 
This is the Bhagsu Nag Shiva Temple where they also have Shiva’s ardhangini [body’s other 
half] Durga Devi’s shrine. Once a year, my family members explained that during the Hindu 
festival of Dashain, the Gorkha community sacrifice cattle in the temple to appease the Goddess 
Durga.  
For the Gorkhali community, I observed that their marriage and religious lives did not 
need much alteration since the Gurungs and Magars were already endogamous, and Hinduism 
was the more prevalent religion practiced among these groups. My male relatives, who regularly 
interacted with Hindu priests, told me that the importance of the clan system had to be thinned out 
because beyond the sub-caste category, no laymen kept track of their gotra, al etc. But I also 
learned that people could follow the sub-clan system because of their last name, and follow the 
entailed responsibilities accordingly. When asked about gotra, a Gorkhali interlocutor said, “we 
don’t really think of it too much, it is in everybody’s birth chart. So for marriage, we just take it 
to the purohit (astrologer/ priest) and he will tell the families if a couple can marry or what 
obstacles there are.” I was also informed that Gorkhali community has become very lenient on 
who their children want to marry in term of ethnic groups and caste. For Gorkhali men, I was told 
that parents tend to limit their marrying Nepali ethnic women because it is the daughter-in-law 
																																																								
32 Shavist sect is one the largest subset of the Hindu religion that focuses on devotion to God 
Shiva and gods/goddesses surrounding God Shiva, including Goddess Parvati and her other 
manifestations, e.g. Devi Durga.  
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would look after the aging parents. However, my interlocutors told me that if a Gorkhali woman 
wants to marry outside of Gorkha community, she is allowed to do so if the son-in-law is seen to 
be in an economically sound condition.  
Today, I observed that the Gorkhali community has assimilated well into the Indian 
population. I argue this is visible from the mixture of Indian and Nepali words in their speech, 
wearing of traditional Indian style clothing, their Indian food preferences, and their living 
conditions. The Gorkhali community has arrived at a blend of Nepali and Indian customs while 
retaining a deep identification with their history of military service. I found that many Gorkhali 
families still have at least one male member in the Indian Gorkha army. Despite their service in 
the Indian army and legal Indian citizenship, however, the Gorkhali still are not well represented 
in Indian politics, and other government institutions. I observed that many Gorkhali family 
members are stuck in the periphery in their army barracks, confined to rural areas of India. 
Similar to the Gaddis, the Gorkhali too are different from the majority of urban Indians. The 
Dharamsala Gorkhali, including several other Gorkhali communities in India, have been 
struggling for years to become part of the category “Other Backward Castes” (OBC). The 
Gorkhali hope that by becoming OBC they can at least get some political recognition as a 
marginalized group in India. Becoming OBC would give them a voice in the Indian government, 
and reserved seats at schools, colleges, hospitals and so on (NOIG 2017, Indian Gorkhas 2016, 
FirstPost 2016). It should be noted that but up till now no legal provisions have been passed to 
grant Gorkhali the “Other Backward Caste” category.  
 
Urban Indian Tourists in Dharamsala 
The unconventionality and marginality of Dharamsala’s local population comes alive 
when the population comes face to face with the Indians from large cities and other states.  I 
noticed that most Indian tourists visiting Dharamsala were upper middle class, professional, 
urbanites from the way they spoke English and Hindi language together, urban style clothing, and 
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mannerism in general. When Indians from the other states come into Dharamsala, they tend to act 
as patriarchs who are of a higher rank than Dharamsala’s residents. I observed some of this 
disrespectful attitude being expressed through small acts like loud car honking right next to street 
vendors at the market, parking cars in inconvenient locations for others, building extravagant 
hotels that take a long time for construction, being inconsiderate by taking a disproportionate 
supply of already low, local water resource. Moreover, I have heard local Dharamsala residents 
complain that Indian tourists coming in from other states carry on in ways that they would never 
do in their own hometowns. I asked a Tibetan man why Indian tourists were disliked in 
Dharamsala? He said,  
“They think they can do anything when they are away from their home. They come and 
tease our girls, here they see tourists and think they have achieved something, you know 
they act like they have never seen [an] other human.” 
 
 I observed that Dharamsala’s local residents did not like or welcome Indian tourists who 
came from urban areas. I spoke with several Gorkhali and Gaddi members who had been renting 
out their houses and asked if they ever rented to Indian tourists? The overwhelming answer was, 
“No.” The reasoning differed for each person but it was always along the lines of widespread 
stereotypical views of Indian tourists, like, “they are dirty,” “they are loud,” “they drink too much 
[alcohol],” “they use too much water.” The usual places Indian tourists stayed at were right on the 
market’s chowk where the hotels had amenities (an attached bathroom, hot water, comfortable 
beddings) like the ones found in India’s big cities. Whereas, rooms in Dharamsala’s suburbs, 
where I stayed, had frugal amenities (a common outhouse for a bathroom and only sometimes an 
attached bathroom, limited hot water, thin mattresses, cotton blankets) and felt like I was living as 
a guest at somebody’s house rather than at a hotel.  
I met with a Delhi college student, Rakhi, studying Buddhism at a nunnery in 
Dharamsala. Rakhi had spent 3 months in Dharamsala already and was friends with Indian 
tourists as well as local residents of Dharamsala so I thought she could give me some ideas about 
local people’s disdain for Indian tourists. Rakhi was probably in her early 20s, petite with a high-
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pitched voice, and was agreeable to giving me an interview. I asked her why Indians from other 
states were so disliked in Dharamsala. She explained that this was the case for all Indians from 
bigger and more represented politically cities of India. She said, 
“I am from Mysore and when I first came to Delhi, people told me ‘Now you are in real 
India’. So see, Indians don’t really think of other smaller towns as your real India. What 
you see is a classic case of [classist] discrimination. The Indians who come for vacation 
on weekends here are new middle class who have just earned their step-up in class, so all 
they care about it self-pampering, they do not care about others who are lower than them. 
They are still very new in this middle class that they are afraid to loss their status by 
mingling with low class, so what do they do, they discriminate others like they have been 
discriminated in the past. My father is the same way. He grew up without even owning a 
pair of sandals. He is now a very successful businessmen but he will never do any charity 
work or donate because he doesn’t want to come in contact with lower class. Even when 
he has to donate during Diwali and all [Hindu religious holidays], he only gives money to 
priest and the priest does the donating work for him. Now that he has made it to middle 
class, he only cares providing better luxury for himself and his family.”  
 
I understood from speaking to Rakhi that Indians from urban areas considered Gaddis 
and Gorkhalis to be of a lower social status than themselves. According to Rakhi newly rich 
middle class Indians want to distinguish themselves from what they saw as the low-standing 
social class of Indians living in Dharamsala. This could be seen as well from the way Indian 
tourists treated Dharamsala residents so poorly, which is why, in turn, Dharamsala residents did 
not have good impressions of Indian tourists. Moreover, there is some truth to Rakhi’s deduction 
about the reason Indian tourists distance themselves from Dharamsala’s residents. After all, I 
know from my own experience that Indian tourists did indeed treat Dharamsala residents poorly 
and usually avoided mingling with them; however, I also know more research needs to be done to 
understand the social discrepancy between the two groups. From my own research, I found that 
there definitely is a social class difference between the urban Indians and Dharamsala’s Indian 
residents (possibly induced by the need for tourists to enact their newly established class 
identities), and that this class differentiation was further reinforced by the old system of caste 
division, wherein even the Indian government categorized Dharamsala’s local Indian populations 
as marginalized groups.  
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An Analysis of the Indian Host Community – the Gaddi and the Gorkhali 
Gaddis are the largest ethnic population in the town of Dharamsala (Census of India 
2009). I observed that the Gaddis are different from the more politically well represented, urban-
dwelling Indian population. I also found that the urban Indians generally exclude Gaddis from 
public acknowledgement. For the Indian population, Gaddis as a minority ethnic group are an 
uncertain blend of caste and tribe. As mentioned above, Gaddis trace their ancestral homeland to 
Chamba, and have historically been a transhumant population. Today they are still living in 
Kangra and Chamba. Gaddis are also politically marginalized due to their lack of representation 
in the Indian government both because of their rurality and their official status as a scheduled 
tribe and scheduled caste. I argue that one reason for the smoothness with which Tibetan exile 
community in Dharamsala has been accommodated is because the largest Indian host 
communities, the Gaddi, are also a marginalized community. The Gaddis are themselves 
struggling to be represented by the Indian government and can only participate in politics as a 
marginalized group. Thus, I contend that the reason the Gaddis are accommodating to Tibetan 
exiles is because Gaddis can sympathize with the Tibetan’s marginalized condition. 
Gorkhali are the second largest Indian host community in Dharamsala. Similar to the 
Gaddi, I argue that the Gorkhali are also a marginalized community, equally excluded by urban 
Indians. The Gorkhali are stretched between their loyalty to their home country of Nepal and their 
military-social duties to India. Since the first Gorkha community left Nepal to serve the British 
Empire in India in 1857, the Gorkha community has been a minority ethnic group in military 
servitude in foreign countries while yet upholding the pride of Nepali state. The Gorkhali 
community live as Indian citizens but still have minimal representation in Indian political or 
government institutions, which is why the Gorkhali community has requested they be included in 
the formally marginal category “Other Backward Caste” in hopes of better opportunities and 
representation within India under the reservation system. The Gorkhali community also lives 
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harmoniously alongside the Tibetan exile community. I argue that since the Gorkhali community 
is also a marginalized community, this community too can sympathize with the Tibetan exile 
community.   
 
Applying Flexible Liminality to the Gaddi and the Gorkhali  
There are two factors that contribute to determining the quality of a group’s flexible 
liminality — external geo-political influences, and internal socio-cultural practices of the group 
that help them adjust to such external influences. Summarizing the information mentioned above 
about the Gaddis: they are a marginalized group within Northeast India; the Gaddis are only 
influenced by the Indian politics regarding marginalized tribes and castes; in terms of internal 
socio-cultural practices, Gaddis are fairly flexible in terms of acting as either a tribe or a caste in 
order to acquire the benefits of being either a schedule caste or a schedule tribe, or both; the 
Gaddis have also been adaptive with respect to their livelihood in being able to come up with 
other ways of surviving, other than their traditional transhumant pastoralism. However, the 
Gaddis are not as flexible in terms of religious practices, and marital and kinship boundaries; they 
still consider their hometown as Bharmaur in the Chamba district and go to worship at the 
temples there. There is still little evidence of Gaddi intermarriage with other ethnic groups 
outside of surrounding tribes. Moreover, having only been under one nation-state’s influence, 
India, the Gaddi have not felt the need to change too many of their socio-cultural practices. Thus, 
under only one nation-state’s concern, the Gaddi have a relatively small amount of flexibility in 
their socio-cultural practices. Compared to the Tibetan exile community, the Gaddis are not as 
marginalized, and hence, require a lower amount of flexible liminality.  
The Dharamsala Gorkha community, in addition to their past experience with British 
colonialism, has experienced a large amount influence from two geo-political entities, Nepal and 
India. Summarizing information about Gorkhali from above – Dharamsala’s Gorkha community 
has been of a peculiar concern to both Nepal and India: for Nepal, the Gorkha army represents the 
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pride of their military strength, and for India, the Gorkha army are part of the embedded history 
of the Himchali community, who nevertheless serve as a useful economic-military community. 
Internally, the Gorkha community seems open to changes and adopting a new identity in order 
gain better social and political representation. This is why the Gorkha community has attempted 
to become part of the OBC, despite their military occupation and higher caste status, in order to 
attain more opportunities from the Indian government. Socially, as well, the Gorkha community 
is flexible with regards to their kinship and marital boundaries. Religiously, the Gorkha 
community does seem to hold on to their traditional form of Hinduism, but that does not place 
them in direct conflict with either Nepali or the Indian state values since both countries have 
majority Hindu populations. Thus, the Gorkha community in Dharamsala does have a relatively 
highly flexible liminality compared to the Gaddi. However, Gorkhalis still have a less flexible 
liminality compared to the Tibetan exile community because Gorkhalis only have two geo-
political entities, Nepal and India, concerned with their community, and these two states are 
political allies so have very little international relations competition. In comparison, the Tibetan 
exile community has multiple competing geo-polities concerned with their group. Therefore, the 
Gorkha community simply lacks the crosscutting external influences and subsequent leeway to 
take advantage of their liminality in a flexible manner. Again, following my theoretical argument 
about flexible liminality, lots of groups are liminal to a greater or lesser degree. But only some 
groups, for reasons already given, have some flexibility within their liminality, which is why the 
theory of flexible liminality is useful for understanding the quality or characteristic form of a 
group’s liminality.   
 
Conclusion 
The town of Dharamsala is the capital for the Tibetan exile community – it hosts the seat of 
Tibetan exile government and numerous leading Tibetan nationalist organizations. The success of 
the Tibetan exile community starts from the fertile ground of the town of Dharamsala. In this 
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chapter, I argue that the reason for the successful beginning and continued socio-economic 
progress of the Tibetan community lies in the town and the people of Dharamsala. The Kangra 
district that Dharamsala resides in has historically been held by a succession of foreign powers. 
Since the 17th century, the Kangra fort has had a rich history of being consecutively ruled by 
Mughals, Rajputs, Sikhs, the British, and, finally, the independent Indian government (Kaushal 
1965). The landscape of Kangra was accustomed to being ruled by foreign powers and to having 
foreign migrations into the area. So, the addition of the Tibetan exiles in Dharamsala was easily 
accepted local leadership and people as yet another in a long line of foreign migrations into the 
area. Together, the local host community and Tibetan exiles have lived relatively harmoniously 
next to each other since 1959 with little friction involving competition for resources, and it should 
be noted it is the leading source of friction for any refugee-host community (Turner 2010, 
Chambers 1986, 2000, Whitaker 1999; Malkki 1995; Marfleet 2007; Cernea 2000; Mortland 
1987; Chambers 1986).   
The people of Dharamsala, consisting of the Gaddi and the Gorkhali, are also uniquely 
marginalized communities of India in their own ways. The Indian communities of Dharamsala do 
not get along with urban Indians, which can be seen from the interactions between them. I 
contend that the core reason for the unease among the local residents of Dharamsala and the 
Indian tourists is because of the class, caste, and citizenship hierarchies. Thus, given that the 
Indian communities of Dharamsala are also marginalized within India. I would argue that 
Dharamsala host community has, for the most part, graciously accommodated the Tibetan exile 
community because all of Dharamsala’s communities understand each other’s marginalized 
positions. Thus, Dharamsala is a unique town because of the social clustering of various 
marginalized or underrepresented groups who have adjusted to each other’s differences. Lastly, 
the Gaddi and the Gorkhali are also marginalized communities with at least one geo-political 
entity impacting their community. However, I argue that both the Gaddi and the Gorkhali are 
unable to achieve the same degree of flexible liminality as Tibetans do because the Gaddi and the 
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Gorkhali both are not at the center of multiple, conflicting, geo-political entities like the Tibetan 
community is; and, hence, despite their own efforts to be culturally adaptive, they do not have the 
same resources available to them as the Tibetan community does to enable as much flexibility.  
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Chapter 4: Flexibility and the Infrastructure of “Hanging-Out” 
Introduction 
What can we learn about the flexibility of Dharamsala’s Tibetan exile community33 from 
even the relatively small amount of refugee-host conflict that can be seen there? In the previous 
chapter, I have argued that the Tibetan exile community and their Indian host community have 
tolerant and relatively harmonious relationship as neighbors. In this chapter, I will be introducing 
the few ethnic disputes that have occurred between the Tibetan exile community and their Indian 
host community. As noted in previous chapter, most of the refugee-host conflict recorded has 
been related resource competition34 but that is not the case in Dharamsala. The few notable 
disputes in Dharamsala between Tibetan exile community and Indian host communities have 
occurred out of ethnic or social discrepancies. This is the reason I argue that refugee-host conflict 
in Dharamsala is a symptom of a disjointed communal relationship caused by a selective 
socializing cultural practice carried out by the Dharamsala’s Tibetan refugee community. I argue 
that this selective socializing cultural practice is part of the Tibetan community’s flexible 
liminality.  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the flexible liminality of the Tibetan diaspora can 
be characterized as the diaspora’s ability to adjust to any situation, people, and geo-political 
context. There are two factors contributing to the degree of Tibetan diaspora’s flexible liminality 
— external geo-political influences, and internal socio-cultural practices of the group that allow it 
to adjust to those external influences. However, the flexible culture practices of Tibetans have not 
been so flexible or adaptable to the local Indian communities of Gaddis and Gorkhalis. The 
inflexibility, or selective flexible cultural practices, of the Tibetan community is what I argue 
																																																								
33 Tibetan exile community is considered a foreign refugee group in Dharamsala, even though 
they are not legally refugees as recognized by the international legal designation “refugee”. The 
Tibetan diaspora and Indian ethnic groups in Dharamsala speak of, and treat, Tibetans as refugees 
so I will be treating them as refugees as well. However, I will use the term “exiles” for the 
Tibetans in Dharamsala to denote their lack of legal “refugee” status. 
34 Chambers (1986), Whitaker (1999), Jacobsen (2002), Duncan (2005), Porter et.al. (2008), 
Turner (2010), Agblorti (2011)  
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adds to the prolonged, conflicted, relationship between Tibetans and the local Indian community 
in Dharamsala. In this chapter, I will demonstrate the ways that the Tibetan community has 
adopted flexible cultural practices to socialize with different ethnic groups in Dharamsala.  
Moreover, I will argue that the Tibetan community in Dharamsala has a closer 
relationship with foreign tourists, which, as a result, places Tibetans in a likely position to gain 
transnational resources35 from their social circle. I argue that bonding between Tibetans and 
foreign tourists is made possible with the help of the creative infrastructure that Tibetans have 
laid out in town. I will, later in this chapter, introduce those institutional and spatial arrangements 
as an “infrastructure of hanging-out” to describe the way Tibetans have designed it to provide a 
socializing space for foreign tourists and Tibetans.  
During my fieldwork, I noticed that the Tibetan community and the local Indian 
community in Dharamsala usually have a tolerable neighborly relationship but sometimes-
expressed aversion of each other that sometimes borders on communal violence. This is evident 
from the numerous violent rows and discriminatory incidents that I will elaborate below. At first, 
I too was surprised to learn about the communal violence because I had only seen Tibetans and 
Indians act friendly and respectfully to each other. I contend that the reason for the tolerable 
relationship but sometimes-erratic conflict between the Tibetans and local Indians is because 
Tibetans do not have to try to appease, or be flexible with, local Indians transnational resources 
(social, cultural or financial capital). I argue that because Indian host community are not a source 
for transnational resources to Tibetans, the Tibetans don’t have to use their flexible practices with 
local Indians because they and are of no concern for the Tibetans to try to appease to. Whereas, 
since the Tibetan community has come to rely on Western foreign support (personal, institutional, 
and governmental) for their legal, political, financial, and social stability, Tibetans must try to 
appease and be flexible with foreign tourists. This is why the Tibetan flexible cultural practice of 
																																																								
35 Transnational resources are items that transcend the nation-state that Tibetans reside in. Here I 
use Arjun Appadurai’s concept of “scapes” (1990) to understand the transnational resources used 
by Tibetans in Dharamsala.  
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making themselves appealing to foreign tourists has led them to create a large infrastructure of 
hanging-out that keeps foreign tourists diverted and interested while in Dharamsala.  I argue that 
the institutions, like Tibetan non-profit organizations, cultural exchange education programs, 
cafes, other tourist businesses, that evolved to support this infrastructure of hanging-out allows 
foreign tourists to socialize with Tibetans while, at the same time, keeping local Indians from 
participating. 
 
Refugee-Host Conflict in Dharamsala 
31st May 1994, Dharamsala, H.P. India Today published a news report from Dharamsala titled, 
“Anti-Tibetan feeling may force Dalai Lama to leave Dharamsala” (India Today, 1994). The 
news report stated: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Destroyed house of Tibetans in 1994 Dharamsala Riot 
 
It was a sorry homecoming for the Dalai Lama. After being lionised in the US, he 
returned last fortnight to the sight of massive police security…Perturbed over the 
simmering resentment against the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama says he has decided 
to shift his headquarters from Dharamsala...The origins of such a serious 
development lay in a stabbing incident on April 22 in which a Gaddi youth was 
killed by a Tibetan. In the backlash a rampaging mob of locals, mostly Gaddis, 
attacked Mcleod Ganj, setting some Tibetan houses on fire. The attack was 
fuelled by old resentments. The Tibetans' comparative affluence was grudged by 
some local people. They are also peeved at the increasing pressure on civic 
amenities. Allegations of encroachment and acquisition of prime land by the 
Tibetans through benami deals have also stoked the flames. Chief Minister 
Virbhadra Singh has set up a panel to look into the grouses of the irate local 
people. But says Kishan Kapoor, the local BJP MLA: "Nothing less than the 
ouster of the Tibetans will suffice." The party, however, is trying to rein in its 
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local leaders. A former Congress (I) MP too supports the expulsion demand… 
The state too will lose out on many of the foreign tourists who come to Himachal 
Pradesh every year to see the Dalai Lama...  
 
The 1994 event was the first large-scale local communal riot between Tibetans and 
Gaddis in Dharamasala (TibetTelegraph 2014, AniNews 2015). The riot was sparked when a 
Tibetan youth killed a Gaddi youth in a dispute over either a taxi fare or an India-Pakistan cricket 
match. Different witnesses told different stories 36 to describe the initial aggression between 
Gaddi and Tibetan youths (Diehl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994). The Tibetan youth at fault for the 
crime was taken away by the Indian police and was later convicted by the Indian high court of 
first-degree murder (Diehl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994). In Dharamsala, one aftermath of the death 
of the Gaddi youth was that a mob rampaged walking around the marketplace to destroy the 
Tibetan businesses, schools, and houses in Dharamsala. It was reported that during the rampage, 
most Tibetan residents of Dharamsala stayed inside their homes and waited for the mob to calm 
down (Diehl 2002). Local Indian politicians were involved in provoking the angry mob.  As 
mentioned in the above news article, the local BJP (Bharatiya Janta Party- a national political 
party of India) and congressmen were demanding the ouster of the Tibetan refugee community 
from India. A witness to the riot described Tibetan properties being damaged everywhere, and 
shops looted and gutted. (Sodhi 1994) According to this witness, there was also an attack on the 
Tibetan school in lower Dharamsala (where Tibetan children were housed) from all directions 
(Sodhi 1994). The school’s main water supply was cut, and the mob tried to set the school on fire. 
Furthermore, according to this witness, Tibetans were then kept from purchasing basic food -- 
e.g. Rice, Milk, and Bread -- from Indian stores (Sodhi 1994).  
 Ironically, at the same time as the riot, the 14th Dalai Lama was giving a lecture at the 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor about peace and the practice of non-violence at the 
																																																								
36 TGiE’s information secretary said, it was because the Tibetan youth cheered for Pakistan 
during Indian-Pakistan cricket match. Others told me the Tibetan and Gaddi youth fought over 
taxi fare.  
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Wallenberg Medal induction ceremony (Wallenberg Committee 1994). On 21st April 1994, the 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor honored the 14th Dalai Lama with the Wallenberg Medal 
for his outstanding humanitarian work and as a proponent of non-violence (Wallenberg 
Committee 1994). After coming home to Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama publicly requested that the 
Indian government to move his exile residence to some other part of India to avoid more violence 
(Diehl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994). Soon after, several politicians and local businessmen37 from 
Dharamsala met with him to request that he stay in Dharamsala (Diehl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994). 
After that the riot ended with a public display of apology and humility by Indian and Tibetan 
leader, and the communal dispute was swept under the proverbial rug. However, people haven’t 
forgotten the event entirely. During interviews, people would recall the 1994 riot with sadness. 
One Tibetan man said to me, “remember the big conflict from the 90s, where the Indians were 
trying to kick all Tibetans out? The Dalai Lama almost moved out of Dharamsala for that, but 
then Indians came and begged him to stay.” Since the 1994 riot, the intensity of local tension has 
simmered down but the distasteful feeling between Tibetans and Gaddis in Dharamsala, as well 
as between Tibetans and Indian hosts in general, has lingered.38   
After reviewing the information, I reason that the Indian government has had a difficult 
part to play in relation to the communal violence between Tibetans and local Indians. On the one 
hand, the Indian government felt the need to support its citizens and understand their discomfort 
about sharing natural resources, housing, and space in general with a ‘foreign’ refugee 
population. The nationalist sentiment to take care of ‘your own’ before taking care of others 
seemed righteous to many in the rural local Indian population, who were themselves a 
marginalized population within India (See Chapter 3). Therefore, I contend, in the 1994 violence 
																																																								
37 One of the oldest business owners, Mr. Norwoji, from McleodGanj, mentioned that he went to 
meet with the Dalai Lama after the 1994 riots and apologized on behalf of the Indian mob, and 
then requested for him to stay in Dharamsala.  
38 For more information on Tibetans-Indian conflict see Deihl 2002, Avedon 1986, Cayley 1994, 
Goldstein 1978, Michael 1985, Saklani 1984, Penny-Dimri 1994, von Furer-Haimendorf 1990 
among others.  
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case mentioned above, the added support of local politicians fueled nationalist sentiment and 
motivated many local Indians to participate in the riot.  
On the other hand, I contend that the Tibetan refugee community, headed by their 
globally celebrated leader, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, had contributed much to the local 
tourism economy. Tourism in the state of Himachal Pradesh has increased steadily since their 
introduction to Himachal Pradesh in 1969, and therefore, expelling the Tibetan community would 
have been devastating to the local tourism economy in Dharamsala.39 This is why I reason that the 
1994 riot ended as soon as the Dalai Lama suggested moving the Tibetan refugee community out 
of the state of Himachal Pradesh. As a result, the Indian businesses have worked to keep a 
peaceful balance in the relationship between their local citizens of Dharamsala and the Tibetan 
population, as seen by the apologetic attitude of the Indian Dharamsala businessmen. 
Nevertheless, antagonisms between Indians and Tibetans surface time after time in various 
violent events, but usually settle down through the efforts of the two community’s leaderships, as 
neither community wants the trouble of migrating to hurt the local tourism industry.  
The on-the-ground reality I observed for local Indian hosts and the Tibetan community is 
that it contained contentions as well as amiability. I was told by both Tibetan and Indian 
participants that their seesawing relationship of contention and amiability persists when they live 
together as neighbors. And neither Tibetans nor Indians wanted to hide their feelings for each 
other. In spite of efforts by Tibetan leaders and organizations to soothe communal differences by 
making peaceful public remarks that make it seem as if all Tibetan and Indian communal issues 
are resolved. A Tibetan participant sitting and drinking tea with me said, “Indians are just not 
trustworthy, they only care about money not the relationship.”  
																																																								
39 The top destinations in travel guides (India.com, WikiTravel, Trip Advisor, Make my Trip) for 
Dharamsala notes Tibetan arts and cultural institutes, including the Tibetan museum, Dalai Lama 
Temple, Norbulingka Institute  
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Another Tibetan man in the same group added, “all Indians just look at us weird 
[frowning and looking suspiciously sideways], like this, like this, and how do we make friends 
with them?”  
On the other hand, at another time, an elderly Gaddi man conveyed his thoughts on this 
metaphorically, “when there are a lot of utensils in the kitchen, they will bang against each other 
and make noise. But we need all those utensils to make food.” Meaning, when lot of people live 
together there is going to be conflict but they all still need to make peace in order for all to live 
comfortably. 
Another time, a middle-aged Tibetan man commented, “Gaddis are simple people, we 
grew up together, our lives have taken us elsewhere [speaking of resettlement in the west] and 
their lives are here [Dharamsala], so we don't keep in touch but I have soft heart for them.”  
Recently, on an online Tibetan diaspora organized blog called, Tibet Telegraph, a Tibetan 
woman, Mila Rangzen, described the socially fragile life endured by Tibetans in Dharamsala due 
to the oppressive attitude of local Indians. In a personal blog entitled, “Is Dharamsala safe for 
Tibetans?” (2014), the author called out for the Tibetan exile government and leadership to speak 
up against the discrimination and disgraceful actions of the local Indians. Among others, the 
author listed several local small-scale discriminatory events that she witnessed, experienced, or 
heard of.  She mentioned a 2013 case where a local Gaddi threw a Tibetan man off the top of a 
third floor building after a drunken altercation between the groups. She also claimed that the 
reason Tibetan woman in Dharamsala were told to use only taxis instead of public transportation, 
was because of the severe sexual assault of a Tibetan woman who used a local bus to commute at 
night.  The author said that she herself was attacked by a mob of Gaddis and thrashed after she 
defended a 12-year-old Tibetan kid who refused to give up his bus seat to a Gaddi man.  
While the description from the author above seems to dispute my argument in the 
previous chapter that Tibetans and Indian hosts do have harmonious relationships, it is the reality 
of Dharamsala residents. I too was initially confused with the mixed existence of harmonious 
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neighborly behaviors between Tibetans and Indians in Dharamsala, like sharing morning tea, 
while, at the same time, hearing gossip about bar fights between Tibetans and Indians. The on-
ground reality of the relationship between Tibetan and their Indian host is complicated – one that 
cannot be described as either completely harmonious or completely distant.  However, from my 
observations, most of the efforts from official leadership from both communities were making an 
effort to build peace and friendship between two communities40. Which is why, I call their 
relationship relatively harmonious with mixed clouds of violence.  
  
Analyzing the 1994 Dharamsala Riot 
According to the news and media reports, and following the 1994 Dharamsala riot story, 
the publicly acclaimed factor behind the conflict between Tibetans and Indians in Dharamsala 
was, and remains, the fear of Tibetans taking over Indian land and property (IndiaToday 1994). 
The Himachal Pradesh state passed a Tenancy and Land Reform Act (1972) to only allow each 
agriculturalist to hold 5 acres of agricultural land so that the government could distribute the rest 
to landless and poor peasants (HP Govt. 1972). It was found that Tibetans were leasing and in 
some cases purchasing land through what are called the benami transactions (HillPost 2012, 
Times of India 2011, 2012). Benami (‘Be’=without, ‘nami’=name) is a legal term used to 
describe property with no names, which are purchased by stakeholders under somebody else’s 
name (HillPost 2012, Times of India 2011, 2012). In other words, Benami are properties that are 
not owned by a single, named landlord because stakeholders for an unnamed buyer purchase 
them anonymously. Benami land transactions are purchases carried out in the state of Himachal 
Pradesh by people who are not allowed to by land because they have reached their ceiling bracket 
or are not in the agriculturist industry (HillPost 2012, Times of India 2011, 2012).  
																																																								
40 One can see the efforts for friendship between Tibetan and Indian communities from the 
existence of organizations like Indo-Tibetan Friendship Association, Friends of Tibet-India, 
Tibetan Center for Conflict Resolution 
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In 2006, a land tenure investigation in the state of Himachal Pradesh reported finding 
1,897 cases of benami transfers and 81 cases in which Tibetans were involved  (HillPost 2012). 
Prior to that investigation, the local Indians had criticized Tibetans for attaining property deals 
through illegal benami transactions (HillPost 2012, Times of India 2011, 2012). However, after 
several court hearings about benami transactions, in 2006 the state government decided to 
compromise by declaring that all benami land in future was to be leased by the user (initial buyer) 
for a one-time fee of 10% of the market value and a subsequent charge of 1 rupee (Indian 
currency) per year as a token lease (HillPost 2012). The state government’s is ruling on benami 
transaction disappointed several Gaddi agriculturalists because then Tibetans would not be 
punished for attempting to own Indian property (HillPost 2012, Times of India 2011, 2012). 
Furthermore, this ruling allowed Tibetans to legally lease the same property that few years ago 
had criminal record on.  
 Also contributing to the 1994 riot is a socio-cultural factor, which promotes the conflict 
relationship. As the India Today new article above states, the riot was fuelled by old resentments 
derived from the local Indian community’s jealousy of and negative stereotypes about Tibetans. 
The Tibetan community’s comparative affluence relative to the Gaddis, a product of help from 
external foreign sources, has been one issue highlighted by several academics (De Voe 1981; 
Prost 2006; Deihl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994; Goldstein 1978). A closer look at the Tibetan 
sponsorship and welfare aid shows that their external funding situation is complex but has 
become one of their main sources for bettering their livelihoods, and this success has promoted 
the diasporic cultural practice of attracting sponsorship based on pleasing foreign funders by 
highlighting attractive aspects of Tibetan ethnicity, religion, etc (Frechette 2004; Prost 2006; De 
Voe 1981). This practice of seeking international funding has also created an immense resource 
competition within the Tibetan community that M. Goldstein describes as “ethnogenesis” (1978: 
395).  
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Nonetheless, the Tibetan refugee community in Dharamsala is still stigmatized by the 
local Indian community as  “Westernized” (i.e., materialist, spending too much money, immoral, 
drug usage etc.) and “lazy” (i.e., for too easily getting money from abroad without working).41  
Other scholars have noticed as well that stereotypically perceived cultural differences between 
Tibetans and Gaddis, with the former cast by local Indians as people with lose moral values, inapt 
gender relations, improper hygiene, etc., is a leading cause for conflict between the two 
communities (Deihl 2002; Penny-Dimri 1994). During my fieldwork in Dharamsala, I too noted 
that frequently used local descriptors denoting the difference between the two communities were 
“spenders” and “savers” – with Tibetans noted as “spenders” who want to dress-up nicely to 
overcome their barbaric refugee image; and with Indians noted as “savers” who put aside every 
penny to give better life chances, outside of rural India, for their offspring.   
 
Flexible Liminality Fostering Refugee-Host Conflict 
As mentioned in the beginning, the refugee-host conflict is a common topic of study 
within refugee studies. Other scholars have already researched the topic of conflict between the 
Tibetan refugee population and the Indian host community (DeVoe1981; Prost 2006; Deihl 2002; 
Penny-Dimri 1994; Goldstein 1978). Thus, my goal is not to comment further on the topic of 
conflict between these refugee-host populations but to investigate the cultural practices of the 
Tibetan refugee population that contributes to the antagonistic relationship between Tibetans and 
the local Indians. In other words, my goal is to investigate whether the long-term conflict between 
Tibetans and the local Indian population (its tendency to edge towards violence) is a symptom of 
a larger entrenched cultural practice that keeps the two populations from having a lasting amiable 
																																																								
41 Business Standard captured these conflicting sentiments in a 2013 news article with the title of 
“Unease in Dharamsala” which noted that the Tibetan community is negatively perceived by 
Indians for their material attainments. The Tibetan community defend themselves from this by 
highlighting their struggles to gain employment, while, at the same time, having to endure verbal 
and legal abuse by the local Indians. 
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relationship. I argue that the flexible liminality of the Tibetans is the larger cultural practice that 
keeps the Tibetan refugee population distant from the local Indian host community.    
In addition to the resource competition and jealousy that refugee-host conflict studies 
show, I contend that the reason for a prolonged antagonistic relationship between Tibetans and 
local Indians arises from Tibetan flexible liminality practices. Flexible liminality drives Tibetans 
to push their own ideals closer to Western liberal values, which makes them appealing to the 
foreign tourists, and as a result improves the likelihood of their acquiring transnational resources 
from foreigners. The Tibetan community does not acquire any forms of capital (social, cultural, 
symbolic, financial) from the local Indian community; that is, from the Gaddi and the Gorkhali, 
which is why there are no Tibetan cultural practices in place to promote refugee-host population 
togetherness. The local Indian population themselves are a marginalized group, as well as rural 
and poor  (See Chapter 3), so the Indian population does not have much local resource support 
available for the Tibetan refugee community. Indeed, the Indian population must find it bizarre to 
see so many tourists come to visit the Tibetan refugee community in Dharamsala year after year 
to support them socially and financially. I posit that the Tibetan community in Dharamsala has 
not made much of an effort to create or highlight ideals or values it might hold in common with 
the local Indian population because the local Indians cannot provide help with the Tibetan 
political cause, human rights plight, legal security and so on. It should be noted that the Tibetan 
community does have good affiliations with Indian organizations and individuals who are active 
in supporting the Tibetan political cause and human rights plight, and in voicing their support for 
Tibetan refugees in general.42  
I find that the composite reason for prolonged erratic conflict and mutual disdain (and 
mutual friendliness and respect) between the Tibetan and local Indian population in Dharamsala 
is that Tibetans cannot find supportive resources from the local Indians, and hence, cannot build 
																																																								
42 India Friends of Tibet, Indo Tibetan Friendship Chapter, Union of Indo Tibet Friends, and 
many more 
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common ideals with the local Indians. On the other side, the local Indians in Dharamsala find it 
demoralizing to have a refugee-like population that steadily becomes more socio-economically 
affluent than the citizens. In other words, the Tibetan community has been able to shape itself to 
become flexible with various foreign Western nation-states, and grow closer to western liberal-
humanist values, while the Tibetan community has failed to build any such flexibility with the 
local Indian community.  
 
Tibetan friend’s Flag dream 
At a café, I saw a Tibetan friend, Phurbu (the same friend I have described in Chapter 1), 
hunched over his computer concentrating on the screen. I greeted him, happy to see a familiar 
face, and asked what he was working on? He said he was working on a new project that would 
put Tibet in the news again. Phurbu explained, “I want to make the Guinness Book [of the World] 
Records.  I recently learned that somebody made the largest flag; I want to beat his record and 
create the largest flag of Tibet.” He was researching ideas on how large he would have to design 
the Tibetan flag. I asked him about the financial burden of this project. 
“Money is no problem”, Phurbu answered. “I am actually typing email to my friends in 
the U.S., France, Korea, and so on. If everybody even chips in a little bit, I can make it possible. 
So, I am not worried about money.”  
I helped him start his email and edited his grammar. Unfortunately, we were taken aback 
after learning about the actual size of the flag needed to be to beat the previous record. For the 
flag, we learned, would have to be larger than the size of an American football size stadium. After 
thinking about it a bit more, Phurbu decided to give up on the flag project.  
When I asked Phurbu if he had had any awkward situations arise when asking for 
donations like this, he explained to me, “No of course not. These are people I have worked with, I 
have spent time with, and I consider friends. When you set up relationship like this, you are 
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setting up trust, like a ground for friendship. It is not just buying things like you do in the market 
out there.”  
I understood what Phurbu was talking about. I had experienced that after volunteering at 
the English speaking class, where all the Tibetan students and foreign teachers gathered around 
and chatted for a while, and even got together for dinner parties. Dharamsala has become an 
attractive tourist destination because of the celebrated status of the 14th Dalai Lama, and for being 
hometown to largest concentration of Tibetan exiles in India43, as well as the capital of the 
Tibetan diaspora. It was not uncommon to find tourists from a variety of Western and Asian 
countries roaming the streets of Dharamsala.  
Additionally, the town also receives numerous dignitaries visiting the 14th Dalai Lama 
and the Tibetan government in exile. These same considerations also attract journalists, 
researchers, and spectators to the town. Since 2003, the lower Dharamsala cricket stadium, 
HPCAS, has attracted numerous Indian cricket fans from other Indian states for cricket matches – 
The Kangra district had the highest recorded number of tourists in 2010 within the state of 
Himchal Pradesh (H.P. State Tourism Dept, 2010). Domestic tourism in the Kangra district has 
increased from 959,530 in 1997 to 1,035,894 in 2003 when the cricket stadium first opened, to 
2,396,970 in 201644. Foreign tourism in the Kangra district has increased from 13,469 in 1997, to 
32,163 in 2003, to 112,843 in 2016 (Gangotia 2016). Although Himachal Pradesh is ranked 14th 
in 2015 in the number of tourist visits per state in India, the Himachal Pradesh state has gained a 
steady increase in its tourism industry and has plans for improved tourism policies to make it one 
of the top destinations in India by 2020 (Ministry of Tourism, HP state 2015).  
  Tibetan non-profits have found ways to keep the tourists in town by tactically creating the 
‘infrastructure of hanging-out’, like English Classes, internships at non-profits, meditation 
centers, Buddhist Studies schools, volunteer opportunities at Tibetan community centers, 
																																																								
43 According to the TGiE 2009 Census, out of 150,000 Tibetan refugees in India, around 70,000 
live in and around Dharamsala.   
44 Ministry of Tourism, H.P. (1997, 2003, 2015, 2016) 
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education abroad programs and so on. Currently, there are currently (number frequently 
fluctuates) 30 recognized Tibet related non-profit organizations, around 10 politically active 
Tibetan organizations, around 15 Tibetan monastery & nunnery, and around 10 environmental & 
animal rights orientated service organizations. Many other Indian tourism and recreational 
businesses have come to Dharamsala to sustain the demand from tourism. For example, there are 
over 50 registered yoga centers, 25 dance-martial arts-cooking-massage institutes, 8 renowned 
meditation centers, over 15 arts-cultural institutes, and over 500 hotels (number frequently 
fluctuates) in the township of Dharamsala.45    
 
Theories – Capitals and Cosmopolitanism 
I find Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of non-monetary capital, in the article, The Forms of 
Capital (1986), most helpful in thinking about the condition of the Tibetan exile community and 
their relationship with foreign tourists. For the Tibetan exile community, the acquisition of social, 
cultural, and symbolic capital are as useful as acquiring economic capital. In fact, the social, 
cultural, and symbolic capital could even be converted into economic capital.  
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition…” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248) 
 
According to Bourdieu, social capital is a person’s relationship network that could be 
transferred into symbolic or economic capital. These relationship networks could be formed from 
personal relationships based on social reciprocity, or, acquaintances formed from common 
institutions like family, school etc (Bourdieu 1986). For the Tibetan exile community in 
Dharamsala, gaining foreign tourists as close friends is one way of building social capital. 
However, Tibetan exiles are also responsible for maintaining the relationships and building 
																																																								
45 I found most of my information from travel websites, business websites, and blogs about 
Dharamsala, India.  
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stronger bonds with Western tourists based on common interests, like human rights, social 
movements, etc., to form a relationship network capable of transferring social ties into useful 
economic capital.  
Cultural capital is a collection of all non-economic forms of capital like education, social 
class, family background etc. (Bourdieu 1986). Bourdieu distinguishes between three forms of 
cultural capital—an embodied state, wherein what a person knows is integrated into their habitus; 
an objectified state, wherein a person’s capital is represented in material objects like paintings, 
books etc.; and, an institutionalized state, wherein a person’s cultural competence is represented 
in credentials or academic achievements (Bourdieu 1986). I find the concept of cultural capital as 
an embodied state most useful for describing the Tibetan exile community because they have to 
actively learn a Western-influenced habitus that can help them become a cosmopolitan being.46 
One of the most widely popular events in Dharamsala for Tibetan and tourists was English-
practice classes where the foreigner (native English speaker) would teach the Tibetans (English 
language students) how to speak fluently and express themselves in English. Therefore, when the 
Tibetan exile community acquires the leverage to gain close relationships with the foreign tourist 
in Dharamsala, it helps build towards their cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s notion.  
Aihwa Ong in her book, Flexible Citizenship (1999), has added to embodied state theory, 
stating that, for individuals from less privileged sites, embodied states can be learned from other 
mediums like English-medium schools, and language classes, rather than by just being inherited 
from the individual’s family and class background. I agree with Ong that migrants seeking 
recognition in transnational space actively learn the essential cultural signs and habitus necessary 
to interact with others with “metropolitan status and glamour” (Ong 1999: 89). Similarly, Tibetan 
exiles do not inherit their cosmopolitan-style of living from their parents or family, like Bourdieu 
																																																								
46 Cosmopolitanism is described as openness to difference, everybody’s belongingness to one 
world, and trans-history (Kuper 1994, Werbner 2002). However, scholars have argued for a need 
to critically think about a diasporic cosmopolitanism that pushes for diverse nation-state making 
and ‘symbolic ethnicity’ (Gellner 1992, Anderson 1994, Parry 2008, Schiller 2014).  
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mentions, but these exiles are actively learning from their transnational social network, as well as 
foreign entertainment media.47 Therefore, the learned cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s notion, from 
the Tibetan exile community’s transnational network is their embodied state of cultural capital.   
Consequently, the Western, and sometimes non-Western social, cultural, and symbolic 
capitals help build the desired Tibetan diasporic cosmopolitan identity. The Tibetan cosmopolitan 
identity is best described by Atreyee Sen, in the book chapter, It’s Cool to be Cosmo (2014), as 
‘crude cosmopolitan’. Sen describes the Tibetan exile community’s cosmopolitanism as 
“cosmopolitan competence, a state of readiness to make their way through other cultures, whether 
Western or non-Western, through listening, looking, intuiting, acting and reflecting on their lives 
and lives of others” (Sen 2014: 100). Speaking about Hong Kong business elites, Ong says, 
“Hong Kong emigrants seek the kinds of symbolic capital that have international recognition and 
value, not only in the country of origin but also in the country of destination and especially in the 
transnational spaces…” (Ong 199: 89). Similarly, Tibetan exiles have better chances of gaining 
transnational resources, like financial sponsorships or citizenship in the West, if they can adjust to 
internationally recognized values and adopt transnational cultural habits that have currency there. 
Using a similar concept to Ong, I agree with both Ong and Sen that Tibetan exiles are seeking to 
acquire the symbolic capital of cosmopolitanism to help them achieve better social lives in 
western countries.  
Sen also says that Tibetan cosmopolitan leans more towards ‘cosmopolitan sociability,’ 
which Sen describes as an elastic sense of affinity that moves back and forth between global, 
national and neighborhood alliances (Sen 2014: 98).  I agree with Sen that Tibetan exiles have a 
‘crude cosmopolitan’ with the characteristics of cosmopolitan sociability. From my observations, 
I have found that Tibetan exiles aspire to create a new homogenous cosmopolitan persona that 
involves promoting Tibetan nationality as well as a global humanist image that does not 
discriminate between nation-states, or religions, but promotes the oneness of humanity. Hence, 
																																																								
47 Lau (2010); Sen (2014); Diehl (2002) among others.  
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Tibetan cosmopolitanism is not a move towards Westernization but to become elastic and flexible 
between the global and the local. This does not mean that Tibetans are not loyal to their 
nationalist ideals or to a global humanist philosophy; rather, that this elasticity is the very intricate 
substance that feeds the flexible liminality of the Tibetan diaspora. Tibetan exiles can achieve 
better life chances when they are able to be flexible to external nation-state conditions and push 
forward a united global humanist image of the Tibetan diaspora. The Tibetan diaspora needs to 
have multiple nation-states investing interest in them in order to achieve flexibility in a liminal 
status that may come in the form of refuge, exile, migration, or claiming Asylee status in 
diaspora. Thus, Sen correctly describes Tibetan’s cosmopolitan sense as ‘rough and ready’, or 
elastic, and thus ready to move back-forth between global, national, and neighborhood alliances 
(Sen 2014).  
 
The Infrastructure of “Hanging-Out” 
I observed that in Dharamsala market-based and non-profit services for tourists act like 
bridges between foreign tourists, the Tibetan community, and other Tibetan supporters. I argue 
that the availability of humanitarian work and the social acceptance of foreign tourists have 
encouraged foreign visitors to make Dharamsala their second home. As mentioned above, long 
and short-term tourists are found ubiquitously in Dharamsala, and many keep coming back to 
Dharamsala for various reason. One of the chief attractions for foreign tourists is the availability 
of humanitarian work and cross-cultural experiences with the Tibetan community as well as with, 
Indian society in general. As mentioned above, there are non-profits working on refugee-welfare, 
animal services, environmental management, and so on. Most of the tourists that I spoke with had 
volunteered with at least one Tibetan non-profit in Dharamsala. English language teaching was 
one of the easiest ways to volunteer, and the place where this happened was a casual joint where 
anybody with good English could stop by for an hour to teach English. One could also find other 
internships and volunteer positions at non-profits that required more commitment to work hours 
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and preparedness for work. As one of the tourist interlocutors mentioned, “there was always 
something to do.” If nothing else, I found from my experience that one could go to a café and 
make new friends from various places, and, more than likely, one would find that the other people 
at the café were also trying to make new friends. In a way, the town of Dharamsala provides a 
fertile ground for its residents to carryout meaningful work and form deep relationships. The best 
way to describe this condition in Dharamsala is via ethnographic description.  
 
University group from the U.S. 
I went to offer my volunteer services to another non-profit offering an evening English 
speaking class. My offer were declined, however, because a large group of U.S. students had 
arrived who were volunteering at this non-profit that month. This non-profit was in the main 
market and had large signboards directing people to the second story of an old, small, building. 
The main entrance of this building was a narrow framed door set so low and small that a tall 
person would have to bend their head forward to avoid hitting their head on the doorframe. The 
staircase was a couple of steps towards the right, and upstairs were rows of rooms off a narrow 
hallway. I met part of the U.S. student group in front of the non-profit building while waiting for 
the English classes to start. I introduced myself and started conversing with them. I asked them 
why they were doing this program. 
One of the student said,  “we are all part of our university’s summer abroad program. 
One, we get course credit and we get to travel and learn about other cultures. Plus, we can do a lot 
of meaningful work towards Tibetan refugees here. It’s all for a good cause.”  
Another student chimed in, “I also want to help some Indian people, you see them 
begging and mending shoes, they could use help too.” Then I asked if they had made friends with 
Tibetan people?  
They all nodded silently, the first student said, “Well, we have school work so we mostly 
stay together [pointing towards their school group] but we are meeting new people everyday. We 
 
	 110	
were recently invited to a movie trip with some Tibetan guys… it’s with this organization 
[pointing to the non-profit office building] but they will have momos and drinks but I think there 
is a donations-type thing for entrance fee. You should come too.”  
 
Café Ray 
On my third visit to Café Ray (a pseudonym) in Dharamsala, I see many familiar faces 
seated at the café with their drinks. I nod and smile at the familiar faces, and they do the same. I 
order my regular Americano and sit down outside to share a table with other foreign tourists, like 
I have done in the past. It is small café and it only has eight tables – four indoor and four 
outdoors, so all the regular customers have learned to share the table. Most of the customers are 
Western foreigners and a few are Tibetans. Even the street dogs have learned to take a nap close 
by the outdoor tables, knowing they will receive table scraps from the regular customers here. 
There are currently five dogs that have made this café into their territory. I have seen them take a 
nap on the warm couch during the idle time in the café. Most of the regular customers come in the 
morning and stay there until afternoon, and sometimes they even come back to spend the evening 
at the café. Today, a pair of new Indian tourists walked in and ordered coffee. Usually, when new 
customers come in, the dogs are shooed away by the baristas. By now, all the foreigners and 
Tibetans have come to understand that Indians do not like having dogs close to them. The dogs 
were shooed away and I watched as two regular Tibetan customers politely moved their drinks to 
share a table outdoor so the Indian couple could have a full table for themselves. There were a lot 
of Indian tourists who came to Dharamsala for vacation and stayed for a short period of time. I 
had learned to identify the Indian tourists from their modern-style clothing consisting of jeans, t-
shirts on young men and women, and elaborate-expensive looking saris and kurtas on women. 
Unlike the local Indians, who wore plain colored cotton or wool kurtas – the women covered their 
head with shawls and men wore Himachali hats -- the Indians from outside Dharamsala could be 
called city people from the way they dressed. The Indian couple at the café was quiet, with the 
 
	 111	
woman wearing a neatly pleated sari and the man wearing a loosely fitted polo shirt tucked in to 
his jeans. They spoke in small voices and left as soon as they finished their drinks. The two 
Tibetan guys moved back to their empty table after the Indian couple left. The dogs too came 
back after a while; a British tourist at my table joked that the dogs looked upset at having had to 
move from their beds to make way for the Indian couple.   
 
Infrastructure of Hanging-Out: Analysis 
I argue that Dharamsala’s Tibetan influenced infrastructure is designed in such a way that 
it creates spaces for Tibetans and Western tourists to bond together. For example, first, a Tibetan 
residing in Dharamsala would not have to intentionally scheme to socialize with foreign tourists; 
they can hardly avoid them. Moreover, they do not have to strain behaviorally to interact with 
Western tourists more easily than local Indians do; they simply find themselves more closely 
relating and bonding with foreigners with Western liberal ideals than local Indians. Consequently, 
the infrastructure of hanging-out allows Tibetans to seamlessly position themselves to acquire 
some type of transnational resources (social, cultural, or financial capital) from their wider social 
circle. During my fieldwork, I observed that Tibetans had greater access to informal and formal 
bridging institutions that helped them bond with foreign tourists, and consequentially were able to 
gain access to transnational resources. I also observed that the same bridging infrastructure did 
not work for local Indians. I found in Dharamsala that Tibetan non-profit organizations and 
market places functioned to allowed foreign tourists and Tibetan communities to spend time and 
socialize. I call these bridging institutions in Dharamsala its  “infrastructure of hanging-out.” 
 As described in the above two scenarios, the infrastructure of hanging-out pulls Tibetans 
and foreign tourists together to meet, with common intentions, at Tibetan welfare events carried 
out by non-profits and at leisure activities at cafes and shops in market place areas. But in my 
time in Dharamsala I never noticed local Indians from any of its other ethnic groups taking 
advantage of this this infrastructure, only some Indian tourists from other states would barely 
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participating in the tourist business space. In the example above, those U.S. students were 
attracted to Dharamsala because of the Tibetan refugee community, and thus, their sole purpose 
in visiting was to learn and help the Tibetan community in some way. Conveniently, the 
infrastructure of hanging-out helped this U.S. student group, as it helps Western traveller in 
general, by inviting them to events held by Tibetan non-profits; events like the English-speaking 
class and casual dinner parties.  
Despite this U.S. student group’s lack of experience in reaching out cross-culturally, they 
were invited to the space of the language class to mingle and make friends with Tibetans in 
Dharamsala. Similarly, the café provided a common place for most tourists to spend their leisure 
time. Regular customers used the small space of the café efficiently by sharing the table and 
making space for new customers. At the same time, Tibetans and foreign tourists make friends 
with each other by spending hours together at the café on a regular basis.  Therefore, the 
infrastructure of hanging-out works to bridge the gap between the Tibetan exile community and 
foreign tourists in Dharamsala but at the same time, also excludes Indians  (including both 
Dharamsala’s Indian residents and Indian tourists), which, as a result, I argue, perpetuates dislike 
between Tibetans and Indians.  
 
Conclusion 
I argue that the conflict between the Tibetan refugee community and the local Indian host 
community in Dharamsala is a symptom, and consequence, of a larger Tibetan cultural practice 
that directs them to socialize selectively. I argue that the Tibetan refugee community is much 
closer to foreign tourists than their own local host community because they have common 
Western liberal ideals and cosmopolitan interests that help to bond them together. This is because 
the Tibetan diasporic community has adjusted their cultural practices to match Western liberal 
humanist values so that the community can be more appealing to their Western sympathizers. 
This way, the Tibetan diaspora, in various places, including Dharamsala, can bond better with 
 
	 113	
foreign tourists with similar Western liberal values. In Dharamsala, this has led to forming an 
infrastructure of hanging-out that fosters the relationship between Tibetans and foreign tourists. 
At the same time, the Tibetan community has not adjusted their cultural practices to appeal to the 
Indian host community, which is why refugee-host conflict has persisted throughout the years in 
Dharamsala.  
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Chapter 5: The Flexibility of the “Free Tibet” Campaign 
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Promotion of the Tibetan Independence Day concert-2016 © SFT-India 
 
In March 2016, I attended a Tibetan Independence Day concert48 during my fieldwork in 
Dharamsala. The concert was a mixture of traditional dances, Tibetan folk songs, western-style 
band music, western-style dances, and a video on political prisoners in Tibet. After the 
introduction of the organization and the event sponsors, the concert part of the event began with 
the Thangthong Lugar School of Performing Arts who performed a traditional Tibetan drum 
dance. There were five young girls who were dressed in Chupa (traditional Tibetan dress that 
looks like a cloak draped from shoulder, coming to ankle length, and is fastened by the neck and 
waist; it is usually worn with a blouse underneath and belt over the dress) carrying a very colorful 
drum and a drumstick. Their teacher sang in Tibetan in the front corner while the girls took the 
center stage dancing beautifully and creating percussive music. The girls ended their performance 
by pausing in a backbend while playing the drums. It left the audience in awe and the performers 
left the stage to loud applause. The next performers sang traditional Tibetan folk songs – one of 
them was Lu, a Tibetan Nomand song that involved an opera style of singing involving a loud, 
high-pitched influx of the voice. The Lu silenced the audience and left a sad, eerie feeling.  
The concert continued with several other soloes by contemporary Tibetan singers 
following them, each singing in Tibetan with background music played with Tibetan instruments 
																																																								
48 This was the same concert that I have mentioned before in Chapter 3 regarding the Tibetan 
teenage dance group “No Parking”.  
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such as the Dramyin (guitar-like instrument) and Silnyen (cymbal-like instrument)49. After this, 
the highlight of the event was introduced: “No Parking” (see Chapter 3) – clearly the most 
popular group to the audience. In fact, the audience demanded encore performances by “No 
Parking” so the group had to be called back three times. The organizers were busy fumbling 
between getting the videos ready to show interviews by Tibetan political prisoners and clearing 
the stage again for more “No Parking” performances. It was a very odd theatre experience to go 
back and forth between somber stories of political prisoners, and then become submerged by loud 
cheers, and hip-hop dance music. I left the concert after the announcers gave in to the audience’s 
demand for a third encore by “No Parking”.  
 
Introduction 
The organization called Student of Free Tibet-India (SFT) organized the Tibetan 
Independence Day concert under the theme of  “2008 Reclaim Tibet.” This concert was a 
commemoration of the largest Tibetan protest against China in 2008 that started in Lhasa, the 
capital of Tibet, then spread throughout the TAR and later to Nepal, India, North America, and 
Europe. The audiences were informed that the intention of SFT-India was to remind the audience 
to continue their political activism and spread the word of the Tibetan cause. The other agenda of 
the independence concert was to express Tibetan nationalist discourse by presenting something 
that Dharamsala Tibetans were taking part in. Although the Independence Day concert may seem 
like an odd combination of western music blended with traditional Tibetan performances mixed 
with videos from political prisoners, the concert successfully portrayed the diverse nature of 
Tibetan nationalism. I found that from the outside, Tibetan nationalism might seem politically 
																																																								
49 A dramyin is a traditional Himalayan folk music lute with seven strings, used primarily as an 
accompaniment to singing in the Drukpa Buddhist culture and society in Bhutan, as well as 
in Tibet, Sikkim and Himalayan West Bengal. A silnyenis  is a Tibetan percussion instrument in 
the form of a cymbal with a small, or no, central boss. For more information see: Kinga, Sonam 
(2003). Attributes and Values of Folk and Popular Songs. Journal of Bhutan Studies, Vol 3(1): 
134-175.  
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neutral and homogenous; however, Tibetan diaspora people are strongly invested in the diverse 
and conflicting nature of Tibetan nationalism. One of the largest political debates that I learned of 
among the Tibetan diaspora is about the topic of “Free Tibet” where one political party (Rangzen) 
supports complete independence of Tibet from China, and the other political party (Umaylam) 
supports partial independence from China and remain as region under Chinese nation-state. At the 
Independence Day concert too, the organizers, SFT-India, as well as the participants, like the JJI 
Exile brothers and “No Parking” group, were all taking part in Tibetan nationalist discourse. 
However, the debate remained invisible to the non-Tibetan audience. And even at other times, 
this debate about “Free Tibet” taking place within the Tibetan diaspora remains invisible to 
others, as if all of the Tibetan diaspora shares one simple, homogenous, political position.  
In this chapter, I will unpack the complexity of Tibetan nationalism and show why the 
diversity of Tibetan politics remains invisible to outsiders. I will focus on the political campaign 
of “Free Tibet”, its meanings, and its opposition, media portrayal, and the discourse on the 
ground among the Tibetan diaspora, to show the diverse nature of Tibetan politics. I will describe 
its global popularity in the West and its effect on Tibetans, especially in India. I will argue that 
the homogenous appearance of the “Free Tibet” campaign is because of the flexible liminality of 
the Tibetan diaspora is reflected in their political agendas. “Free Tibet” is one appearance of 
Tibetan political discourse, but it captures the multitude of views within Tibetan nationalist 
discourse. At the same time, “Free Tibet” seems like a homogenous political agenda from the 
outside. Therefore, I argue that Tibetans do not have to hide their contradictions because the Free 
Tibet campaign hides them for them. As a side note, I will be using this chapter as a transitional 
space in the journey of Tibetans from India to the West. This chapter will consist of stories from 
Tibetans living in diaspora in India and the U.S.  
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 “Free Tibet” during the Independence Day Concert 
The political topic of “Free Tibet” or complete independence is a charged political topic 
for the Tibetan diaspora. In exile, the Tibetan community has developed two different approaches 
to the Chinese occupation of the Tibetan state, or, as named by the Chinese government, the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). In fact, many Tibetans in exile argue that the TAR only 
includes the U-Tsang district and they remind others that Amdo and Kham should be part of the 
Tibetan region too (PO 2014, 2016). However, Tibetan exile leaders are content for now to only 
negotiate for the limited geographical land of Tibet (CTA 2018). On the one hand, there are a 
majority of Tibetans, including the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters, who suggest that Tibetans 
should run the TAR area autonomously while remaining under the larger Chinese governance. 
This approach is called the Umaylam or Middle Way (Office of HH Dalai Lama 2016). On the 
other hand, there are Tibetans who have asked for complete independence from China of the three 
districts, U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham. This separatist position is called the Rangzen, or the Free 
Tibet Movement (Students of Free Tibet 2015). In short, there are two ideological positions 
among the Tibetan diaspora—there are Tibetans who have asked for the complete independence 
of Tibet from China, also known as the Rangzen group, while in opposition are the Tibetans who 
have asked for regional control of Tibetan Autonomous Region but working under the 
government of China, also known as the Middle Way group.  
The complete independence of Tibet from China, or, “Free Tibet” position was indirectly 
talked about during the Tibetan Independence Concert. I understood that the event was, at one 
site, a performance of Tibetan arts, an activist event of “Free Tibet” propaganda, and an 
educational event about human rights violation in Tibet. The organizers of the Tibetan 
Independence Day concert, the Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), was formed in 1994 by Tibetans 
in New York City to convince young people to press for human rights and independence in Tibet. 
The goal of the organization is to secure the complete independence of Tibet from China, hence a 
“Free Tibet”. . The organization aims to create pressure on China using economics, politics and 
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international human rights law (SFT 2015). For example, the organization has gained global 
recognition for several high-profile protests against China during Olympics torch events on the 
Golden Gate Bridge, at the Great Wall of China, and on Mount Everest (Phayul 2004, 2007, 
2007; CNN 2008). SFT-India adheres to the legacy of the other well-established SFT chapters, 
but they have added their own unique style of grass-root networking involving educating Tibetan 
youths, non-violent protesting, and the promotion of Tibetan arts and creativity through event 
such as the concert I attended. Thus, the Tibetan Independence Day concert of 2016 was one of 
their activist, political, arts-performance events whose main theme, ‘Reclaim Tibet’, was in 
commemoration of a worldwide event, ‘the 2008 Tibetan Mass Uprising’.  
 
Origin of the “Umaylam” Middle Way Movement 
The original idea of Middle Way was formed under the leadership of the 14th Dalai Lama 
in 1973 (Office of Dalai Lama 2016). The Middle Way policy argues for a political compromise 
between the Chinese and the Tibetan exile government, where the Tibetan government would 
accept the governance of China over Tibetan state but the Chinese government would have to 
allow the Tibetan administration to rule the area50 (Houston and Wright 2010). While a political 
tactic, Middle Way 51is grounded in Buddhist philosophy to achieve nirvana (ultimate escape 
from worldly suffering). The 14th Dalai Lama has said that Tibetan happiness is his ultimate goal; 
and he believes that Tibetans can achieve this by being under limited Chinese sovereignty (Office 
																																																								
50 Tibetologist have argued that the idea of Middle Way, of Tibetans accepting the Chinese 
sovereign rule over Tibetan state, dates back to when the 14th Dalai Lama was forced to sign the 
17-point agreement, and lacked foreign allies willing to support the Tibetan cause (CTA 1997). 
Others argue its origin was, perhaps, even further back, in 13th Century, when the Tibetan state 
had a client-patron relationship with the Mongol Empire and then, afterwards, in the 17th century, 
with the Manchu Qing Empire (Smith, 2014). 
51 The 14th Dalai Lama was using the same language, drawn from the philosophical notion of the 
‘middle path’ of the Buddha, that enlightenment is found poised between complete self-denial 
and hedonism.   
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of Dalai Lama 2016, Smith 2014). Nonetheless, by inter-mixing Buddhist philosophy with 
Tibetan politics, the Dalai Lama is introducing a new way of approaching Tibetan nationalism.   
There were two main meetings between the Dalai Lama and Chinese authorities in 1987 
and 1988 (Houston and Wright 2010). The Dalai Lama later shared the only compatible advice 
that came from the liberal Chinese politicians: that the Chinese government could be willing to 
negotiate everything besides the independence of the Tibetan state (Office of Dalai Lama 2016). 
Realizing the potential for conflict on this issue, the Office of the Dalai Lama conducted a 
preliminary opinion poll from 1996 to 1997 among the Tibetan diaspora in which more than 64% 
voted that they would support the leadership and decisions of the Dalai Lama (CTA 1997). 
Hence, on June 15th 1998, The Middle Way Policy was announced at a European Parliament in 
Strasbourg as the official political policy of the Tibetan exile government. However, nothing 
concrete resulted from these meetings and the presentation of Middle Way Policy memorandums 
to the PRC (CTA 2008, 2009).  
Instead of a good Sino-Tibet relationship, resulting from the introduction of the Middle 
Way Policy, a different reality ensued when Chinese authorities released a White Paper in 
September 1992 called “Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation” (PRC 1992). 
China’s State Council White Papers are the highest-level official publications of the PRC, and a 
major part of its international propaganda efforts (Smith 2013). This White Paper (1992) claimed 
that since Tibet has always been part of China there is neither reason for it to acquire 
independence, nor any question of anyone disputing China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The merger 
of the two states, then, was only natural given the long history of conjoined working-together of 
the two neighboring states (PRC 1992). Moreover, the CCP claimed that it had peacefully 
liberated the people of the Tibetan state from a feudalistic serfdom ruled over by the religious sect 
of the Dalai Lama (PRC 1992). Therefore, the claim by the followers of the Dalai Lama that they 
should take back Tibet could only mean reverting Tibet back to its dark ages. However, it went 
on, the Chinese nation-state would never allow the occupation of Tibet, nor any loss of personal 
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freedom for its Chinese ethnic minority, the Tibetans (PRC 1992). This is the gist of the first of 
thirteen White Papers released by Chinese government on Tibet that all in different ways 
proclaim that Tibetan region and Tibetans are minority of Chinese nation-state (PRC 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015). I found that these 
subsequent China State Council White Paper documents not only reiterate China’s claims over 
Tibet, but also distort the intentions of Tibetan exile leaders to suit the present political interests 
of China.  
 
A Political Divide over Rangzen & Umaylam 
Since the introduction of the Middle Way by the 14th Dalai Lama, however, Tibetans in 
exile have been divided over this policy. For many Tibetans the Strasbourg proposal, or the 
Middle Way policy, was a betrayal by Tibetan leadership, whom they thought should be working 
to gain complete Tibetan independence (Phayul 2006). This was because the Free Tibet 
movement, Rangzen, a movement that was also a concept, had prevailed since the beginning of 
the occupancy by China. But after Strasbourg it became the opposition to the Middle Way. The 
strongest proponent of Rangzen has been the Tibetan Youth Organization (TYC), formed in 
Dharamsala, India on October 7th, 1970. TYC has carried out various popular protests:  indefinite 
public fasts, protests at the Beijing Olympics with Free Tibet banners, and protests in front of the 
Chinese Embassy in Delhi accompanied by self-immolations (Phayul 2008, TYC news archive 
2008, 2012, Tibet Sun 2012). The Tibetan Youth Congress, hence, has gained the reputation of 
being “radical,” “terrorist,” “aggressive,” and yet also “effective” (Chinaview, 2008; BBC, 2009; 
Sinha 2012).  
Similarly, other Free Tibet movement activities have mostly been led by Tibetan activist 
organizations and NGOs like the TYC. The other large international organizations publically 
promoting the Free Tibet movement, or Rangzen, are:  the Free Tibet Campaign (London, UK); 
Students of Free Tibet  (New York, U.S.); International Tibet Independence Movement (Indiana, 
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U.S.); and the International Tibetan Aid Organization (Amsterdam, Netherlands). In order to 
understand this divide within the Tibetan exile population, then, it is useful to take a look at the 
Tibetan organizations that are officially recognized by the Tibetan exile government. In 2014, 
there were eight central non-governmental organizations created and run by Tibetan exile 
population that were officially recognized by the government in exile: the Tibetan Youth 
Congress (est.1970), the Tibetan Women’s Association (est.1959), the Cholkha-sum [meaning 
three provinces; the Tibetan geographical area covering three region of Amdo, Kham, and U-
Tsang] the Ngari Association (est. 1993) [representing people of Ngari Korsum in Western 
Tibet], the Gu-chu-sum (est. 1991) [meaning, 9, 10, 3 in Tibetan signifying pro-independence 
demonstration months in Tibet], the National Democratic Party of Tibet (est.1995), the United 
Association (est.1964), and the Students for Free Tibet (CTA 2013). Since 2014, some of the 
NGOs, like the United Association, the Cholkha-sum, and the Ngari Association, have closed 
down for various reasons (CTA 2017). All of these NGOs promote the purpose for social welfare 
(like women’s rights, public political education, expression of Tibetan youth etc.) and have 
participation from the Tibetan diaspora all over the world. The table below shows which NGO’s 
support the middle way and which support the “Free Tibet” movement.  
Table 5.1: Middle Way vs. Free Tibet Tibetan Organizations (CTA website, 2014) 
Middle Way Approach Free Tibet Movement 
Tibetan Women’s Association Tibetan Youth Congress 
Cholkha-sum National Democratic Party of Tibet 
Ngari Association Students for Free Tibet 
Gu-Chu-Sum  
United Association  
 
 
On-The-Ground Tibetan Political Activism 
While Tibetan organizations are neatly divided between the two political ideologies, the 
on-the-ground reality is not so clear among the Tibetan diaspora. Especially in Dharamsala, I 
found that pro-Rangzen people expressed their political opinions mostly in indirect ways so as to 
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not sound like they were against the Tibetan exile government or the Office of the Dalai Lama. In 
contrast, Tibetans in the U.S. were more overt about their alliance to their favored political camp. 
During fieldwork, moreover, I found a variety of political expressions that aligned people 
somewhere in between the two political camps. But the key point to understand is how the 
Tibetan people and their situation are displayed on the ground, and for this I will now present 
several ethnographic examples.  
The first time I heard people discussing Free Tibet in the field was when I went to 
interview a French woman living in Dharamsala, India. I had heard from a Nepali resident in 
Dharamsala that Martha, a French woman, was renting the top two floors of another Nepali 
family member’s house with her Tibetan husband, Tashi. I learned that the couple were running a 
tourism business from this space and regularly had French students who would come to work 
with them. I managed to acquire an appointment with the couple. It was almost five o’clock in the 
afternoon by the time I got there, and there was a small group of foreigners gathered on the 
rooftop balcony smoking and just sitting, looking out over the valley. I could tell this was an end 
of the workday gathering. I was told to go and wait inside the room where Martha would meet 
me. Another foreign lady said that they had just finished their meeting, so Martha would be out 
soon.  
The room was furnished with two office desks, and on top of them were computers, 
office supplies, and piles of scattered paper. Martha came and took her seat; behind her was a 
small string of Tibetan prayer flags 52giving off bright colors in the room. After I briefly 
explained to her what my research was about, she informed me that her husband was on a 
																																																								
52	In Tibetan culture, prayer flags propagate well wishes by spreading Buddhist prayers in the air; 
and it is thought to bless any living thing that comes in contact with the blessed air. For more 
information see: Sulek, Emilia Roza (2017) “Fading Colors of the Tibetan Prayer Flag”. 
HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies. Vol 37 (1): 122-
127.  
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business trip and that they ran a Buddhist pilgrimage travel agency. They invite students from 
France to come for a few months of educational and spiritual travelling in the Himalayas. After 
our introductory conversation, Martha invited in a young Tibetan woman, Lhamo, explaining that 
she might be able to help us with the interview too.  
 
A Free Tibet- Ideology of Individual Activism 
Lhamo looked like she was in her 20s, spoke good English, and struck me as very 
outspoken. Lhamo was working for Martha at the moment during her school break, and was 
originally from Ladakh, which is in the northern most state of India, Jammu and Kashmir. I 
started asking my interview questions to both of them, and the interview took the form of a group 
discussion about the future of Tibetan people in exile. At one point during the discussion, Lhamo 
shared her own experience of the Tibetan political plight, 
“I also participated in the peaceful protest when the Chinese delegates came to Delhi, but 
I was put in jail by the Indian police for five days. [Lhamo took a pause and sighed] I 
never imagined I would be in jail for peaceful protest. Most of the NGOS are influenced 
by India’s aim for mild propaganda for Tibetan cultural revival and all… but most the 
work is not really [doing] anything [for the freedom of Tibet].” 
 
She continued giving examples of a few scholars in the past that had sent some books 
written in the Tibetan language to Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR is the official name given 
by the Chinese state for Tibetan area covered by China) in order to revive Tibetan language 
education in TAR. Lhamo reiterated that something radical like this on a local level is necessary 
for Tibetan freedom. Tibetan language education and the everyday use of the Tibetan language 
has been suppressed in China, and over the years, several news outlets have noted blatant forms 
of discrimination against Tibetan’s human rights in many public places like schools, service 
industries, local trade business etc. (RFA 2013; Kirt 2015; NYTimes 2015; TCHRD 2016; Phayul 
2016). So Lhamo was addressing this Tibetan language discrimination when she was advocating 
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for ‘radical’ public activism.  Later on, she would also passionately state that she would never 
seek Indian citizenship because that would not help the Free Tibet cause.  
For Lhamo, Free Tibet was an initiative taken at the local level and by individuals for the 
support of Tibetan freedom from China. To her, the Free Tibet movement meant an ideological 
change among Free Tibet supporters that would lead to various instances of organized activism 
against China that could eventually bring change in the TAR area in China. However, Lhamo is 
skeptical if this can take place on a government-to-government level, especially if the government 
is the Indian government. Even though the Indian government has given Tibetans a temporary 
home, and allowed a few initiatives for reviving Tibetan culture, this was not enough for Lhamo. 
According to Lhamo, mild activist tactics, like those of the Indian government, does very little to 
put pressure on the Chinese government to hand over Tibet’s freedom. A few days after meeting 
with Martha and Lhamo, I went to go visit the Tibetan exile government’s offices. Here, I heard a 
different opinion of the Indian government’s efforts from some Tibetan exile government 
workers. Among them, At the Tibetan exile government, I was able to acquire an interview with 
an officer of the Tibetan Library and Archival Collection. The officer explained to me, contral 
Lhamo, that the Indian government had been the main reason for Tibetan diaspora’s success. He 
also spoke of Tibetan freedom but, unlike Lhamo, he spoke of ‘Free Tibet’ in terms of a 
governmental change in the TAR geographical area in China.   
 
Free Tibet – An Ideology of International Politics 
The Tibetan exile government is located in between McLeod Ganj and lower 
Dharamsala. Since it is in between two big towns, it is located on an isolated hill but covers a 
large geographical space. I was given a shortcut through a Gaddi village. The Tibetan government 
space was separated from the surrounding Indian villages by a large wall that went all the way 
around the periphery of the Tibetan exile government’s space. Apart from the Tibetan exile 
government’s main gate, the compound wall had several informal entrances to create shortcuts 
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into the Tibetan government area. Inside the compound, there were several Tibetan government 
buildings and residence halls for the government workers. A few Tibetans in McLeod Ganj told 
me that they saw the Tibetan exile government as like a ‘mini country’ within the tiny town, and 
they were not wrong. Once I entered the gate, I noticed a difference in the environment. I saw a 
very few Indians and more nicely dressed Tibetans in traditional clothing, Chupas. There was no 
traffic noise or pollution, and, most noticeably, no cars or motorbikes honking at pedestrians. One 
could feel this peaceful environment as a relief from the outside world’s chaos.  
Inside the Library staff’s office, I was seated in a cubical next to a big window looking 
out to the clean compound of the Tibetan Library and Archival building. A librarian rushed in to 
greet me. He was a middle aged Tibetan man who was babysitting his son today. He came in 
apologizing, explaining about being late by saying that he had had to leave his son entertained 
while he came to our meeting. I said I had no problem waiting and after some short small talk I 
introduced my research topic. I first asked him why he thought the Tibetan refugees were 
successful in the South Asia. He said,  
“I think Tibetans are successful because of India. Indian government has relaxed its 
regulations for us, which allows us to have freedom. We can do business, [and] move 
around, which also allows us to compete with other Indians in the job market. On top of 
that India also gives scholarships for college and reserved seats in college – maybe 1 or 2 
in the college campus.” 
 
I asked him about the foreign scholarships that Tibetans receive from the West. He said,  
“The Tibetan education department also finds scholarships. There are those for 
educational purpose and also outside of academia, which are like crash courses. The 
training gives them some type of diploma and they can find a job with it… There are 
individuals from the west who sponsor Tibetan kids. About 40% of Tibetan students who 
graduate are directly sponsored by the western individuals but [the] Indian government 
has most for us, there are 60 library staff and we are all under the Indian government 
salary.”  
He continued,  
 “[The] Indian government has a policy of preserving Tibetan culture and from there we 
get funds for several projects in Tibetan community, this library is one of them…Indian 
government wanted us to take care of our own issues like Education, Settlement, Cultural 
preservation and so on. We have judiciary system that has Tibetan laws but it works 
under the Indian government rules. So if there is any fight between two parties, they can 
come to Tibetan court and if they still don’t like the decision, they can go to the Indian 
court. But our government is an actual democratic model government so when Tibet 
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becomes free, there will not be any worry for new government because we already have 
one that can be applied directly to Tibet53.”  
 
Then, our conversation went off on a tangent about my ethnicity and the cultural commonness 
between Nepalese and Tibetan people. We ended our interview when the officer’s son (around 
nine years old), apparently no longer ‘entertained’, ran into the office crying and speaking to his 
father in Tibetan. He explained to me that a monkey had scared his son while he was playing out 
in the yard. After a brief laughter and small talks, I thanked the librarian and left.  
 
An Analysis of Free Tibet in Dharamsala 
At a glimpse, these two approaches of Tibetan exiles to the Chinese occupation seem 
neatly dualistic, either Free Tibet or the Middle Way. But these approaches translate differently 
on the local level among people in Dharamsala, as expressed by above participants. On the one 
hand, this seems to be a debate about who should take the initiative for change and political 
activism. For Lhamo, it should be individuals at the local level who instigate change; whereas for 
the Tibetan exile government officer, change should be put in motion at the state level, and it is 
government activities that can make a real difference in Tibetan people’s lives. On the other hand, 
this debate seems to be about how best to put pressure on the Chinese government to obtain the 
freedom of Tibet. For Lhamo, this pressure should be through radical, loud, and public 
expression. She did not believe mild political tactics would make a difference; whereas, for the 
Tibetan exile government officer, the freedom of Tibet will come from international political 
tactics. According to him, the Indian government is showing its utmost support for the Tibetan 
exiles by giving political-economic-social leeway to Tibetans in India. Perhaps there are many 
more ways of locally expressing the contrast between the Free Tibet versus the Middle Way that I 
was not aware of; but this was what I found in these local-level dialogues during my fieldwork. 
																																																								
53 The staff member is correct in describing the plans of the Tibetan government in exile. The 
TGiE and Tibetan political leaders all claim to the plan to move the Tibetan governance model 
directly to Tibet when the plan for middle-way becomes successful.  
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But I should also mention that the Tibetan exile government’s existence solely relies on India; 
thus, the Tibetan exile government staff members are naturally biased towards Indian 
government.  
However, one thing Tibetans in Dharamsala had in common was that nobody openly 
discussed these contradictory perspectives on Free Tibet and the Middle Way. This debate 
between the Middle Way and Free Tibet came up in conversations as a difference in political or 
ideological tactics between Tibetan individuals. However, I did not encounter this difference 
expressed as blatantly contradictory positions. For example, between Lhamo and the Tibetan 
government officer, it simply seemed at first like they had different opinions on how to tackle the 
problem of the Chinese occupation in Tibet. Despite their different opinions, it never seemed like 
they were in opposition to each other. However, I interviewed a Tibetan-American writer who 
openly took a stance in favor of Free Tibet over the Middle Way. This is when I realized that the 
Tibetans in Dharamsala were in a much different position than the Tibetans in the U.S.  
 
A “Free Tibet” Conversation in the United States 
I had a chance to have a phone interview with a Tibetan-American writer in the U.S. I 
had found his blogs online. He was a middle-aged man who had come to the U.S. in early 1990s 
soon after he finished his college education in India. I had found his writings eloquent so I asked 
him via social media if I could get an interview with him. While speaking to the Tibetan writer, I 
found out that he was a salesman at a jewelry store in New Jersey but that he liked to write during 
his free time. He had warned me that he only had 45 minutes to spare because he had to go get his 
daughter from school. So I got straight to my interview questions. I asked him how he got started 
writing about Tibet and Tibetans? He said, 
 “I am doing what I want in my own way. I am writing in papers but it is just my opinion, 
on Facebook too, people just want to see what I write. That is how it all started. I used to 
write my opinions on Facebook and just share it with my friends on Facebook. Somebody 
told me to submit my work on newspaper and get a larger audience. So I did and just a lot 
of people read my work. I have opinions that [laughing] I can write better. [After a brief 
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pause without any prompt from me] I believe in Rangzen that is complete independence 
rather than CTA’s [Tibetan exile government’s] middle way approach. I don’t think that 
[Middle Way Approach] is good [for the Tibetans].”  
 
Since he brought up the topic without any prompt from me, I asked him “Why do you support 
Rangzen?” He said,  
“You see, 97% of Tibetans are living in Tibet right now under the Chinese occupation. 
There are only 3% who are outside of Tibet, living in diaspora. The future of Tibet [the 
country] belongs to the ones in Tibet. [Speaking in future tense] The Tibetan diaspora 
would only bring about campaign for Tibetan independence.”  
 
We were interrupted by a phone call from his daughter but he was still willing to speak more after 
he spoke with her. During the interview with the Tibetan-American writer, I realized how much 
more freely he was willing to speak on the topic of Free Tibet and Middle Way, compared to 
Tibetans in Dharamsala, and even without any direct question or prompting from me. Moreover, 
the Tibetan writer was blunt in making his claim that the Tibetan exile government choosing the 
position of the Middle Way tactic was not good. It is interesting to note that I did not hear 
Tibetans in Dharamsala openly disagree with the Tibetan exile government’s position and speak 
so overtly about Rangzen Free Tibet vs. the Middle Way. I contend that the reason for the 
difference in the rhetoric of Tibetans in Dharamsala compared to Tibetans in the U.S. lies in their 
place of residence. Tibetans in Dharamsala know they have an image to uphold to the 
surrounding society and to the global media for the sake of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile 
community. Tibetans in the U.S., however, are free from this type of responsibility to keep up the 
image of Tibetans to the world.  
This act of cover and overt action of Tibetan exiles could also be analyzed with the 
Tibetan cultural practice of flexible liminality where the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala 
(India) has to be subtle about their political opinions and the Tibetan exile community in the U.S. 
can be forthright about their political opinions. I argue that the change found in the expression of 
political opinion among the Tibetan exiles depending on their place of residence is an instance of 
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adjustments in habitus depending on context. In other words, Tibetan exiles have found a way to 
use flexible liminality in their political opinions as a strategic common sense depending on their 
place of residence. 
 
Covert Political Opinions in Dharamsala 
I argue that the reason for the lack of strong political expression regarding Rangzen or 
Umalyam in Dharamsala is because of awareness of the global media attention focused on 
Dharamsala’s Tibetans. I observed that the Tibetans in Dharamsala usually received a lot of 
attention from the foreign media, journalist, scholars, activists, and tourists, whereas, Tibetans in 
the U.S. do not receive the same type or volume of attention from the outside world. A Tibetan 
NGO director in Dharamsala told me that Tibetans there were frequently interviewed. He himself 
had given over 100 interviews, but now he was reluctant to give interviews unless the topic 
interested him. Another time in Dharamsala, during an English conversation class, I was seated 
with eight high school girls for English conversation practice. Since I was a new volunteer at the 
organization, the first thing the girls told me was “Please no questions about politics…” 
[Giggling]. So I could tell that even young schoolgirls had received their own fair share of 
political questions. The Tibetan NGO director and the Tibetan high-school girls were just a few 
of the many residents of Dharamsala who have received an overwhelming amount of tourist and 
research questioning about themselves as Tibetans exiles. Thus, I would argue that the reason 
Tibetan in Dharamsala are covert about expressing their opinions on the Free Tibet or Middle 
Way debate is because of their awareness of their sensitive position in Dharamsala.  
Tibetans in Dharamsala receive lots of attention from various medias and they have 
learned to become careful of how they present the “image talk” of Tibetans to the rest of the 
world. A long-time Tibetan resident of Dharamsala explained to me that many local Tibetans 
have learned to keep their distance from the foreigners. He continued,  
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“The people who get interviewed most are those who have newly come to Dharamsala 
and the political prisoners. The ones who have newly come don't know how the world 
really works. They have been sheltered from the global news, journalism, and way the 
[things] works in general. So they are eager to share their part of the story, their journey, 
and life in Tibet. They are just very eager, and they want to talk to every foreigner. And 
the political prisoners, they feel responsible too to share what they know, their experience 
in Tibet. The other people are government workers, and NGOs—but the high level 
officers are so busy that they pass down the “image talk” to the assistants. So the assistant 
staff ends up talking to a lot of researchers, journalists, and they get tired of similar 
questions.”  
 
Hence, many Tibetans have learned to stay away from exposing their opinions but when 
they do want to express their opinions, or engage in “image talk”, they have to do so carefully so 
that they do not sound like they are speaking against the Tibetan exile leaders, the Tibetan exile 
community, or the Dalai Lama. Thus, a key reason for the locally expressed ambiguity and 
vagueness about the Free Tibet vs. Middle Way debate in Dharamsala is because of a shared 
responsibility to uphold Tibetan-image to the world.  
However, there have been cases where the Tibetan exile community in India seemed to 
experience a fracture, though both Free Tibet and Middle Way parties quickly mended their 
public disagreements. For example, when Tibetan exile leaders first actively put forth the Middle 
Way policy (1999-2000), Free Tibet activists said they were hurt by the idea of not seeking 
complete independence anymore. One activist stated in a local newspaper, “the Tibetan word for 
independence, Rangzen, was effectively deleted from all official (and unofficial) 
communications, and our long-term cry, ‘Bod Rangzen Tzangma Yin!’ (Tibet’s independence is 
unquestionable!), suddenly became a dirty phrase” (Phayul, 2006). There was a sense of division 
within the exiled community because of these different opinions. Yet, despite this rift within the 
Tibetan diaspora, and the opposition between popular “Free Tibet” Tibetan organizations and 
Tibetan exile leaders, there has also been tolerance between the two camps.  
The reason for this seemingly political harmony lies in the willingness of the two groups 
to show respect to the Dalai Lama and to each other. First, despite their disapproval for Umaylam 
or the Middle Way, Rangzen supporters have not disrupted Middle Way plans for conferences, 
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political speeches, and for the Dalai Lama’s high profile international public talks on the Middle 
Way Approach. Instead, Rangzen supporters have showed public respect and honor to the Dalai 
Lama on various occasions (TYC 2013, SFT 2015, International Campaign for Tibet 2015). 
Second, the leaders of the Tibetan exiled community have accepted that the opposition’s ideas are 
part of being in a democratic community. Representing the CTA (Tibetan exile government) for 
the Middle Way education conference, Prof. Rinpoche said that “there was the need for divergent 
views and lively debates in healthy democracy whether it is independence or Middle way, both 
aim for the welfare of the Tibetan people” (CTA 2013). 
 As a result, while the debate within the Tibetan exile community over “Free Tibet vs. 
Middle Way” may seem like a typical matter of political oppositional parties contradicting each 
other, I argue that this opposition is expressed differently at the local level based on the 
surrounding geo-political situation. In Dharamsala, I found that the Tibetans are careful to 
express their opinions and political party alliances because they have to uphold the Tibetan-image 
before the constantly watchful eyes of the media, activists, scholars, and tourists. Therefore, their 
local way of expressing their political stance regarding Free Tibet or the Middle Way comes 
across as a tactical decision about the best way to deal with the Chinese occupation of Tibet; and 
one that avoids portraying the deepness of the rift within the Tibetan community. Regardless, 
they claim, they all have the same goal. In the U.S., on the other hand, Tibetan-Americans feel 
free of this responsibility for image making or “image talk”. Therefore, they are freer to speak 
their minds about their political stances, and even feel free to stand openly against the Tibetan 
exile government.  
 
Political Harmony in Tibetan Politics 
Despite the large volume of global media attention directed towards the Dharamsala 
Tibetan community and the numerous public events held by various Tibetan organizations 
throughout the world, political discourse within the Tibetan diaspora remains invisible or seems 
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homogenous. The Tibetan exile population is seen as a cohesive and homogenous group from the 
outside. One of the major reasons for this is due to conscious efforts of supporters of both 
Rangzen and Middle Way positions; they have been able to create a united and harmonious 
environment within the Tibetan diaspora despite the existence of opposite points of views. I argue 
that one of the successful results of this conscious effort for Tibetans to a show-united image has 
been the “Free Tibet” campaign.  
For the Tibetan political cause has gained popularity in South Asia and the West (Smith 
and Warren 1989, Norbu 2001, Stokes 2010, WashingtonPost 2008, TheGuardian 2011, BBC 
2017, CNN 2018). There is definitely much effort put into “image making” by Tibetan activists 
and organizations, and that is what has made the Tibetan political campaign so popular 
worldwide. One of the key participants in popularizing the Tibetan diaspora’s plight, of course, is 
the 14th Dalai Lama, and it is through his tireless efforts that the Tibetan political cause has 
become popular on a global scale. While I respect and recognize the Dalai Lama’s influence in 
popularizing the Tibetan political cause, in this section, I want to go beyond recognizing his 
charismatic influence. Here, I will talk about the communal effort that has formed the social 
movement; that is, the Tibetan political campaign that has also helped popularize the Tibetan 
political cause on a global scale.  
 
The Global Marketing of “Free Tibet” 
  It has become common to see “Free Tibet” activism displayed on stickers, bags, badges, 
clothing and so on (PO 2014, 2015, 2016; See pictures below) in India and the U.S. “Free Tibet” 
activism and its swag has become so well recognized that it is even used in popular Western 
entertainment media (See the pictures below). Even the gift shops at the Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries in Kentucky and Indiana carry “Free Tibet” design items. And even though US 
monasteries (Sera, Drepung Gomang, and Gelug), as branches of the Dalai Lama’s Buddhist 
school of thought, should be followers of the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy. Moreover, it is 
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common to see the Tibetan flag and the Dalai Lama’s picture splashed on “Free Tibet” campaign 
events posters (See picture below), even though this directly contradicts the Dalai Lama’s own 
position of the Middle Way or Umaylam.  
Despite the contradiction between Free Tibet and the Middle Way policy, holding a “Free 
Tibet” banner is not considered controversial or a rebellion against the Tibetan leaders or the 
Dalai Lama. On the other hand, one does not see many (indeed, hardly any) Tibetan political 
campaigns led by banners showing the “Middle Way” or Umay-lam approach. In fact, I observed 
that selling and purchasing these items with “Free Tibet” images on them and displaying them is 
seen as supporting Tibetan nationalism and the Tibetan political cause. The Free Tibet campaign 
widely uses the 14th Dalai Lama’s photo, and the Rangzen political camp also uses these same 
symbols for their political ideology (See the pictures below). Again, neither Rangzen nor Middle 
Way supporters, nor even the Tibetan’s various political sympathizers, see this use of imagery to 
represent seemingly contradictory ideas as actually in contradiction, or even in the slightest 
degree odd. This is all the unique effect of the “Free Tibet” campaign itself working as an empty 
signifier, as defined by Ernesto Laclau (2005) and I will speak about it in the section below. I 
should also point out that the image of the 14th Dalai Lama as an icon is being used by supporters 
of Free Tibet (Rangzen) as an index of their cause, as defined by Charles Sanders Peirce (1902). 
Even though the 14th Dalai Lama himself would be opposed to the political idea of Rangzen, the 
14th Dalai Lama stands as a symbol for Tibetan political cause. On the other hand, the Tibetan 
Government in Exile would also uses the image of the Dalai Lama as an index of its Middle Way 
Policy. So the Dalai Lama, as an indexical sign, can say either position. 
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Figure 5.2: ©Magik-City online store, U.K. Figure 5.3: Rangzen poster ©ManjushriNL Figure 5.4: Ep. ‘I 
am Peter, hear me roar’ ©FamilyGuy 
 
The Flexible Liminality of “Free Tibet” – A Theoretical Analysis 
So Tibetan politics has two large camps, Rangzen and Umalyam. Most Tibetan 
organizations are clear about which political camp they support. However, people in the Tibetan 
diaspora can range in action from subtly to strongly expressive of their political expressions. 
Either way, however, people in the Tibetan diaspora are definitely not trying to hide their political 
differences. Rather, there is a much larger public political project that hides Tibetan diaspora’s 
internal differences. The larger political project, commonly called a “campaign” by diaspora 
Tibetans, is also commonly known as “Free Tibet,” and so I will be calling it the Free Tibet 
campaign. I would also argue that the Free Tibet campaign is a reflection of the Tibetan 
diaspora’s “flexible liminality.” As a result, the Free Tibet campaign has, become flexible so that 
it can hold within itself several different versions of Free Tibet ideology.  
 
“Free Tibet” as an Empty Signifier 
As I said above, I contend that the “Free Tibet” campaign works as an “empty signifier”, as such 
figures are defined by Ernesto Laclau in his book, On Populist Reason (2005). Laclau argues that 
populism is a political ideology where people from different schools of thoughts can come 
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together as a homogenous group to stand against an exploitative elite or any dangerous others. 
Laclau further claims that populist political discourse needs to create a populous hegemonic bloc 
whose unity can be based on the creation of an empty signifier (Laclau 2005). The empty 
signifier can be words and ideas that express a universal idea of justice and symbolize a political 
environment; thus, this signifier is a vague symbolic word or idea, which everybody can use to 
create their own individual meanings (Laclau 2005). In a way, Laclau has rediscovered what 
Sherry Ortner said in her 1973 American Anthropologist article on ‘key symbols’, which I will 
describe in detail below.  
I argue that Tibetans use the “Free Tibet” campaign as an empty signifier as defined by 
Ernesto Laclau (2005). The Tibetan diaspora have their own diverse perspectives on the Tibetan 
political future, but these remain hidden from their global audience by the empty unity of the Free 
Tibet signifier. Consequently, the Tibetan diaspora do not have to hide their political opinions 
because the “Free Tibet” campaign hides it for them. Since the “Free Tibet” campaign works as 
an empty signifier, the meaning of free Tibet really depends on the individual thinking about the 
“Free Tibet” campaign, and on whether they are projecting their hopes, their fears, their security, 
and so on.  
Moreover, that is also why we have the Chinese government claiming that Tibet is free 
from old feudalistic corruption, Tibetan exiles pleading for Tibetan independence from Chinese 
occupation, and a Tibetan exile government trying to negotiate with China to gain autonomy over 
geographical Tibetan land. For all of these different parties is either asking for a “Free Tibet” or 
else claiming that there already is a “Free Tibet.” Here, the Free Tibet campaign becomes an 
empty vessel ready to be filled by several different ideologies and groups. Sometimes, the “Free 
Tibet” becomes a unifying symbol where the different Tibetan political opinions come together 
under a unifying umbrella of “Free Tibet”; and other times, “Free Tibet” used by the Chinese 
becomes a politically defensive mechanism for the Chinese nation-state for Tibetan occupation by 
China.  
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However, I argue that “Free Tibet” is not a completely empty signifier because it allows 
members to full it in with ideologies that support Tibetan political independence, cultural 
promotion, and Tibetan Buddhism. Even though “Free Tibet” is an empty vessel, it has 
restrictions about is representable, and so the “Free Tibet” symbol seems to represent both a 
dichotomy and a continuum within the political ideologies of the Tibetan diaspora.  
Despite this political difference within the Tibetan exile community, both political camps 
have time and again mended their disagreements, as discussed above. The Tibetan exile leaders 
disapprove of the Rangzen organization’s activism but they have been passive in regards to the 
activities carried out by the Rangzen group. I contend that even without the watchful eyes of the 
media, Tibetans of opposing political camps do respect each other; they are not simply making 
creative comments to preserve their image on media. Instead, the two Tibetan political camps are 
finding creative ways to co-exist alongside each other and that is what we find reflective in the 
media. As I have argued above, this also shows why, though there is still disagreement between 
the two parties about the proper way to approach the Tibetan political cause, both camps remain 
respectful of each other and tolerant, even if disapproving, of each other’s activities.  
 
“Free Tibet” – a Summarizing Symbol and a Consensus Framework 
While I am making an argument that the “Free Tibet” campaign is an empty signifier, 
where the campaign just reflects whatever an individual may want to see in it, the people 
involved in the Tibetan political cause may not think so. The Free Tibet campaign, regardless of 
its contradictions and complexity, means something to the people who follow it. It is not simply a 
carefree individual’s blind plight that forms into the Free Tibet campaign. For the people in the 
Tibetan political movement, whether they are in the Middle Way camp, or the Rangzen camp, or 
a neutral party simply supporting the Tibetan diaspora, the “Free Tibet” campaign has come to 
stand as a central symbol for all encompassing events related towards the support of the Tibetan 
diaspora. In order to elaborate these perspectives, I want to use two different theories that 
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resonate with the “Free Tibet” campaign – first, Sherry Ortner’s summarizing symbol (1972), and 
second, Patrick Mooney and Scott Hunt’s (2009) notion of sharp and flat keys.  
Ortner (1972) argues that summarizing symbols are those that become compact sacred 
symbols for a community. Such a symbol could range from a physical item, like a national flag, 
to words that pull members into some kind of communal commitment. Ortner also calls this a 
‘catalyzed feeling’ for members, one where they are all feeling a commitment of the same item. 
However, Ortner also says that while such summarizing symbols work to pull people towards the 
same community, what they are committing to may not be the same, or, simply, not relevant to 
that unity. For example, a national flag may mean different things to different people, but it still 
works to bring an entire citizenry under the same umbrella of nationalism. Similarly, Free Tibet 
works as a summarizing symbol for the Tibetan diaspora because it brings the entire Tibetan 
diaspora and its supporters under the same umbrella. However, Free Tibet does not mean the 
same to all participants. Regardless of this, however, and in terms of summarizing symbol theory, 
this variety in perception of Free Tibet does not matter; what matters is that all members of the 
Tibetan community are feeling a commitment towards the Free Tibet community.  
Looking at Free Tibet from another angle, there is Mooney and Hunt’s (2009) argument 
that something called a consensus framework is a strategy used by an organization to lead a 
campaign without causing opposition. Tibetan political organizations, I think, are using just such 
a consensus framework in “Free Tibet” to put all Tibetan political activities, both Rangzen and 
Umaylam motivated events, under its one banner. The Rangzen groups also receive a large 
following of Tibetans and foreigners despite their radical activist (sometimes even non-Buddhist) 
events and their direct opposition to the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way or Umaylam position. The 
Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Policy or Umaylam followers also use a “Free Tibet” catch phrase to 
promote their version of the Tibetan political cause. Furthermore, as Mooney and Hunt (2009) 
explain, there can be two keys for every such ‘frame’: a flat key and a sharp key. The sharp key 
is, in their model, is the dominant interpretation of the frame; and the flat key is, hence, the 
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alternative interpretation of the frame. In the case of the “Free Tibet” frame, the sharp key is 
embodied by the Rangzen group, who state that China needs to completely abandon the 
occupancy of Tibet; whereas, the flat key is that of the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way or Umaylam 
followers who say that China can still rule over Tibet as long as local governance is handed over 
to the Tibetan exile government. Within the cover of “Free Tibet”, then, the Rangzen group can 
ask for their completely free Tibet while the Umaylam group can seeks their middle path to fulfill 
the needs of both the Chinese and Tibetan people while, in the end, still achieving a free Tibet. In 
other words despite the existence of several competing versions of “Free Tibet,” a Mooney and 
Hunt consensus frame has enabled all Tibetan political activities and activists to seem 
homogenous and non-conflicting. 
The Free Tibet campaign, therefor, is an excellent example of the flexible nature of the 
Tibetan diaspora, which I will explain in detail in the next chapter in which I describe their 
flexible liminality further. For now, I argue the flexible liminality of Tibetans can be 
characterized as the Tibetan diaspora’s ability to adjust to any situation, people, and geo-politics 
that confront them. For example, Tibetan Buddhism is a form of tantric Mahayana Buddhism that 
mainly focuses on monastic practitioners, or monks, when it comes to attaining enlightenment; 
but it has come to be known in the West as perfectly aligned with the Western liberal values of 
community development, women’s rights, environmental rights, animal rights, human rights, and 
individual self-actualization. So Tibetan Buddhism has become both the traditional school of 
tantric Mahayana, and the Western liberal philosophy. In another case, Tibetans living in 
Dharamsala had a good understanding of Western cultural norms, as well as a good 
understanding of Indian cultural norms. So, while Indian and western tourists had difficulty 
bridging cultural differences between each other, Tibetans could mingle easily with the Western 
tourists and live under the same roof with their Indian neighbors (See Chap 4). Hence, I argue 
that Tibetans in diaspora have developed a unique form of cultural flexibility, which I call 
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flexible liminality. This is the very reason they are able to construct a global political campaign 
like the “Free Tibet” campaign.  
The “Free Tibet” campaign is a flexible entity; it is an embodiment of the Tibetan 
diaspora’s flexible liminality. I argue that the Tibetans or their supporters never had to explain 
their true thoughts related to Free Tibet because the campaign itself shifts and adjusts to 
everybody’s needs. Until examined closely, the Free Tibet campaign may function as a human 
rights movement, or a socialist justice movement, or an anti-China movement, or a pro-China 
movement, or a Buddhist religious rights movement. Until the contradictions are no longer 
overwhelming, all politically active Tibetans can view the Free Tibet movement as a 
summarizing symbol of their diaspora, a unifying signification that pacifies the interests of all 
parties. As a result, from the outside, the “Free Tibet” campaign looks like a homogenous 
political movement.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that despite the general acceptance of the “Free Tibet” 
campaign as a tagline for Tibetan political activism, there is more to it. The “Free Tibet” 
campaign, in its original form, only spoke to one of the popular Tibetan exile political camps, the 
Rangzen, which seeks the complete independence of Tibet from China. The other Tibetan exile 
political camp, the Middle Way Policy, was introduced by the Dalai Lama and is largely accepted 
by Tibetan leadership and the Dalai Lama’s religious monasteries. However, over time, “Free 
Tibet” has come to stand for any Tibetan exile population related event or campaign – whether 
run by the Rangzen or by the Middle Way camp. Hence, my argument that the “Free Tibet” 
campaign has become an empty signifier as described by Laclau (2005); an open cup into which 
individual Tibetans and their supporters may pour their various hopes and dreams about Tibet.  
However, I also realize that supporters of the “Free Tibet” campaign do not really share 
the same aims; and thus, I argue, that for such members, and when looked at it from the 
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perspective of those within this social movement, “Free Tibet” has become also a summarizing 
symbol as described by Ortner (1972), and a consensus framework as described by Mooney and 
Hunt (2009). Here, that is, members have come to accept the all-encompassing slogan of “Free 
Tibet” for all their forms of Tibetan exile related political activism, and despite their own 
knowledge of the contradictory ideologies of its members. For “Free Tibet” brings all Tibetan 
exile related activities under one umbrella. As a result, Tibetan political activities, ideologies, and 
efforts can seem homogenous to outsiders, even though they are not. I contend, further, that it is 
the flexible liminality practiced by diaspora Tibetans that, has transformed “Free Tibet” into a 
flexible entity. In this way “Free Tibet” has come to represent a variety of contradicting 
ideologies as if they form one united front of Tibetan political activism.  
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Chapter 6: “Tibetan-ness”- The Tibetan Exile’s Journey to the West 
I was video chatting with my Tibetan friend, Phurbu (the same Tibetan man I introduced in 
Chapter 1), in Dharamsala after coming back to the United States. We were sharing things about 
ourselves that had happened since I moved from Dharamsala. I am offering this particular snippet 
of our conversation here because it depicts the confusion the “refugee” category holds for Tibetan 
exiles.  
Sneha: I work at a refugee resettlement office now. So, I help newly arrived refugees get 
settled in in the U.S. 
Phurbu: Have you met any Tibetan refugees there? 
Sneha: No… because the U.S. government doesn’t recognize Tibetans as refugees, so I 
don’t see any Tibetans here.  
Phurbu: Oh… that’s right. 
Sneha: Yeah…Since the first batch of Tibetans in 1990s, the U.S. government hasn’t 
resettled any other. 
Phurbu: Ah yes, yes, I remember now.  
[Pause…] 
Sneha: From what I know, I think most Tibetans just apply for asylum when they get to 
the U.S. So, they don’t go through a government resettlement agency like this one.  
Phurbu: That’s true, true. Some of my friends did that.  
Sneha: Do you know the asylum process? I mean, if you want to come to the U.S. later 
how will you go through with it? 
Phurbu: I have my family who lives in the Jersey area so if I want to come to the U.S., I 
will just come through them. 
Sneha: Oh okay, it will be nice if you came to the U.S. 
Phurbu: Yeah [laughing] it will be nice. We will see about it. I am also thinking of 
leaving Dharamsala… 
 
Introduction 
The Tibetan exile community casually recognizes and calls themselves “refugees” 
because this has become a commonplace identity for Tibetans exiles living in India – I will 
discuss this more in the sections below. However, calling oneself a refugee is quite different from 
being recognized as a refugee by an international organization like the United Nations or host 
countries54. Tibetan exiles are not recognized as refugees in their main host country, India, and 
																																																								
54	UNHCR states, “A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because 
of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UN 
Geneva Convention 1951, UN Protocol 1967).	
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neither has the UN-India led any initiative to approve Tibetan exiles refugee status. This chapter 
will explore why the Tibetan exile community self-proclaims their refugee identity, and will 
explicate the peculiar style of Tibetan nationalism Tibetans use to justify their refugee or 
victimized identity. Additionally, I will also talk about the dark side of liminality that Tibetan 
exiles experience due to their stateless status in India, and alternative methods used by Tibetan 
exiles to substitute for the refugee resettlement services they are denied in western countries.  
In this chapter, I will explain two key aspects of the Tibetan exile “refugee-hood” 55 
experience. First, there is the effect of legal and bureaucratic work on the liminality of Tibetan 
exiles in India (including, Nepal) where they must live as neither “citizens” nor  “refugees”(UN 
Convention 1951). To illustrate this I will convey stories of the struggles of Tibetans to attain 
asylum in the U.S. As a comparison to the Tibetan exile’s story of immigration and resettlement 
in the U.S., I will also introduce the resettlement story of a UNHCR refugee from South Africa. 
My exploration of these two stories will help us to understand where differences between the 
forms of liminality experienced by these two groups began. Second, I will introduce the unique 
form of Tibetan nationalism – called Tibetan-ness – that Tibetans use to externalize their 
victimized identity, and retaliate against China’s narrative that Tibet was never an independent 
state.  
I have argued in previous chapters that the ability of Tibetan exiles to adjust their cultural 
practices to the influences of multiple nation-states has garnered them better life chances. 
However, flexible liminality is not a magic lamp that equally endows all Tibetan exiles with 
better life chances, and, in fact, some Tibetan exiles have been caught in very inflexible situations 
because of their liminal status. The very nature of liminality, as described by Victor Turner, is 
dangerous: or, as he puts it, “frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to 
darkness, to bisexuality, to wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon” (Turner 1961: 95). 
																																																																																																																																																																					
	
55 Even though Tibetan exiles are not legally refugees, I use the term “refugee-hood” and “exile-
hood” to illustrate their experience living as displaced population in foreign-host countries.  
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In other words, liminality relates to a radical segregation from regular society, and for an 
individual, it frequently provokes the feeling of social death or invisibility from others in the 
regular society. It is unusual; therefore, to find a social group like Tibetan exiles that both 
experience liminality and use this marginalized status to gain better life chances. Yet it is through 
liminality that Tibetan exiles have gained opportunities that are not available to other non-Tibetan 
populations. Regardless, liminality does not protect all Tibetan exiles from the oppressive nature 
of liminality. In this chapter, I will also shed some light on the geo-political influences on flexible 
liminality that allow some Tibetan exiles to gain better life chances even as others are left behind 
in perpetual liminality.  
I have two goals for this chapter – first, to show how the Chinese government’s narrative 
that Tibet was never an independent state plays a huge role in the lives of the Tibetan exile 
community. The international community (UN, India, and the U.S.), out of deference to China, 
has barred the Tibetan exile population from being recognized as having refugee status (HRLN 
2007; Talmon 1999; Hess 2009; Brauen 2011; Artiles 2009); and this has assured them perpetual 
hardship when it comes to attaining stable citizenship status, or even the identification of having 
Tibetan heritage (Nowak 1984; Vahali 2009; Diehl 2002; Mishra 2014). Previously, I have talked 
about Tibetan exile dreams of going abroad for a better life and of representing the Tibetan cause 
on a global scale. Here, I will talk about the factors that affect the Tibetan exile’s ability to 
resettle in Western nation-states and to take up the responsibility to advocate for the Tibetan 
political cause. This chapter will talk about the journey of Tibetans who are attempting to resettle 
in western countries; those who have recently arrived in the U.S., and the process Tibetans go 
through to become U.S. citizens.  
Second, I will show how Tibetans who have resettled in the U.S. are affected by the 
Chinese government’s narrative, and how they attempt to preserve their Tibetan identity in the 
U.S. Tibetans in the U.S. see their legal citizenship as a powerful tool to bring them closer to their 
home country of Tibet; but at the same time, many Tibetans also have much difficulty 
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establishing their Tibetan identity to others in the U.S. (Hess 2009). This chapter will convey the 
stories of Tibetans living in the U.S. and their words of struggle and of finding success as first- 
and second-generation migrants making their way to living transnational lives as Tibetan-
Americans.  
 
Not Refugees 
Tibetan exiles are caught in the complex geo-politics that go on between India, China, 
and the Western nation-states (U.S., Canada, France, Australia etc.). I have stated before that this 
is one of the two factors influencing the Tibetan exile practice of flexible liminality. One of the 
most influential geo-polities shaping the Tibetan exile experience is China, and the Chinese 
government’s narrative claim that Tibet was never an independent state56, which is why the 
international community does not recognize Tibetan exiles as “refugee”. The UN grants refugee 
status to migrant groups who can prove that they are being persecuted in their home country and 
hence are forced to flee the country (UN Convention 1951; UN Protocol 1967). However, if the 
Chinese government claims that there is no need for Tibetans to flee their home country, then, 
their reasoning for forced migration disappears. Which is why, Tibetans are disqualified from 
UN’s definition of refugee category.  
The consequence of not being recognized as refugees by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or as a “victimized population” by the host country, is 
that the exile group loses UNHCR’s umbrella of services and humanitarian assistance provided 
by the host country. In India, often Indian politicians symbolically call Tibetan exiles “refugees” 
but that does not mean that India has legally granted them the status of refugees or asylum-
																																																								
56 China’s State Council White Papers are the highest-level official publications of the PRC, and a 
major part of its international propaganda (Smith 2013). See the White Paper in September 1992 
called “Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation” (PRC 1992). This release claimed 
that since Tibet has always been part of China there is no reason for it to acquire independence or 
any reason to dispute China’s sovereignty over Tibet. This is the first of thirteen White Papers 
released by Chinese government on Tibet (PRC 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 
2009, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015)  
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seekers (See Chap 2 for more detail) (TheGuardian 2014). Tibetan exiles have not been 
recognized as refugees from the United Nations because the Chinese government claims that 
Tibet was never an independent country, and the Chinese nation-state always had some type of 
governance over the Tibetan state even prior to the complete occupation of Tibet in 1950s (PRC 
White Paper 1992) 57. Thus, Tibetan exiles in India (including Nepal) are not recognized as 
refugees. I argue that despite, or even because of, these geo-political complexities, the Tibetan 
exile community has managed to craft their experience of liminality for better life chances 
(HRLN 2007; Frechette 2004; Nowak 1984). I will first describe the geo-politics surrounding the 
Tibetan exile community and how it shapes their liminality. Next, I will show the various ways 
that Tibetan exiles are attempting to overcome the shortcomings caused by their liminality.   
Usually, any host country has the legal ability to extend humanitarian support to a 
displaced population that qualifies for refugees or asylum-seeker status. This they do if those in 
question cannot return to their home-country due to fear of persecution, for this qualifies the 
population for the host country’s humanitarian assistance under international law (UN 
Convention 1951; UN Protocol 1967). Tibetan exiles in India are not recognized as refugees and 
they are treated as “foreigners” in the country, albeit foreigners who enjoy the freedom to live, 
work, and travel within the country (TJC 2011; Artiles 2009; HRLN 2007; Bhatia 2002). Indeed, 
India has given Tibetan exiles more freedom than it provides any other refugee group in the 
country. India has graciously accepted the Tibetan exiles since 1959, and has been sympathetic to 
																																																								
57 China’s State Council White Papers are the highest-level official publications of the PRC, and a 
major part of its international propaganda (Smith 2013). White Paper in the September 1992 
called “Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation” (PRC 1992). This release claimed 
that Tibet has always been part of China so there is no reason to acquire independence or any 
question to dispute China’s sovereignty over Tibet because it has always been part of China. This 
is the first of thirteen White Papers released by Chinese government on Tibet (PRC 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015)  
 
	 146	
Tibetan residents in India, but they have never openly opposed China’s claim that Tibet was 
never an independent state58.  
On the other hand, not being recognized as refugees deters Tibetan exiles from attaining 
stable citizenship in most foreign countries because, legally, Tibetan exiles are seen as regular 
foreign tourists, not as a persecuted or displaced population (Hess 2009). Similar to this Indian 
government policy, other western nation-states that are sympathetic towards Tibet (e.g. 
Switzerland, Australia, Canada, U.S., France and so on) have also only accepted Tibetans as 
displaced people, not as legal refugees (Hess 2009; Prost 2006). In the United States, Tibetans 
have only once been accepted in a wave of 1000 displaced people (not refugees) in 1992; since 
then, all other Tibetans going to the U.S. have resettled via the asylum-seeker (not refugees) or 
family reunion category (Hess 2009). I will speak about the difference between asylum-seeker 
and refugee more in detail later in the chapter. Similar to India, the U.S. does not want to 
jeopardize their political relationship with China, and so, the U.S. also has never rejected China’s 
narrative about Tibet. 
Tibetan exiles are unable to access refugee status from the UNHCR because the Tibetan 
exile community cannot show the UNHCR that Tibet was an independent country before Chinese 
occupation (DIIR 2018; See Tibetan government in exile’s report here https://tibet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/DIIR_report_2018-web.pdf.). China’s deterrent claim that Tibet was 
never an independent country halts all argument for legal refugee status for Tibetans (DIIR 2018). 
There are several scholarly and legal forms of evidence pointing towards the independence of the 
Tibetan state, legitimate governance over the Tibetans, and the forceful Chinese occupation of 
Tibet (Schaik 2010; McGranahan 2010; Goldstein 1989, 2012; von Furer-Haimendorf 1990). 
However, China argues that Tibet was never an independent country, that Tibet was always under 
larger territorial governance of foreign neighboring states like Mongolia, and Qing Dynasty 
																																																								
58 India does not accept Tibetans as refugees to maintain its Sino-Indo relationship. India has 
never opposed China by claiming that Tibet was an independent country (TJC 2011; HRLN 2007; 
Bhatia 2002; Talmon 1998; McConnell 2011) 
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(current People’s Republic of China), which further shows that the Chinese Communist Party 
only took over the direct governance of the Tibetan area in 1959 to improve the quality of life of 
people living in it (Schaik 2010; Goldstein 2007; Shakya 1991; Nowak 1984). Consequently, 
today, if Tibetans do decide to leave the Tibetan region of China and live in foreign countries for 
prolonged periods, it is marked as their individual decision to do so. China claims that their 
country considers Tibetans to be Chinese citizens, not victims of colonization or cultural 
genocide.  
 
Liminality in India 
The nation-states hosting Tibetan exiles need to walk a fine line between keeping good 
relations with China and sympathizing with the Tibetan exile population. As mentioned above, 
India has not recognized Tibetans as a victimized population but has allowed Tibetans to stay in 
India as honorary foreign guests (TJC 2011; HRLN 2007; Bhatia 2002; Talmon 1998; McConnell 
2011). This means that India does not have to provide military protection and humanitarian 
support that it is obligated to provide towards other refugee groups like Tamil refugees, Afghani 
refugees, and Burmese (Myanmar) refugees (Artiles 2009; HRLC 2007). As a result, life for 
Tibetan exiles is comparatively better than for other refugees.  That said, being stateless foreign 
residents means that Tibetans in India cannot live their lives to the fullest as citizens nor can they 
rely on international organizations for resettlement, as can other refugees. Let me portray the 
liminality of Tibetan exile life through my interviewees’ stories.  
One of my interviewees from Dharamsala is Tenzin. She seemed to me like a friendly 
person. I met Tenzin at Dharamsala’s marketplace where she was working at a tourist shop as a 
sales person. Tenzin had good spoken English, and although we couldn’t socialize much in 
person due to her work hours, we exchanged WhatsApp numbers, so we could stay in touch. 
Tenzin is in her late 20s and is the oldest of her siblings. She remains active on social media, so 
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we were able to stay in touch even after I came back to the U.S. I asked her for an interview via 
WhatsApp and she was eager to share her story for my research work. Tenzin said, 
 “I have MA in Economics from Madras [reputed University in South India] but cannot 
get a job to my qualification because they ask for citizenship papers, and a passport, 
which I don't have, they don't agree with my RC and ID card. Fortunately, I got a sales 
position here [Dharamsala] but the pay is low…My youngest brother only had completed 
10th standard and he joined the army because we couldn’t afford his further studies, [in a 
small voice] he wanted to continue his studies – but he sacrificed his [career] life for our 
family.”  
 
I had noticed from my fieldwork that many young Tibetans in India (including Nepal), 
like Tenzin, aspire to go abroad to earn a better income and support their families. Tenzin was 
slowly saving money to apply for travel documents to either U.S. or Canada because she had 
school friends who could help her in those countries.  
Additionally, many of my interviewees expressed that they only feel safe around the 
Tibetan settlements in India like Dharamsala or Majnu ka tilla in New Delhi. There were several 
horror stories of corrupt police and border patrolers threating Tibetan lives. One interviewee was 
a middle age Tibetan woman who recounted a horrifying event that occurred while she was 
traveling to Nepal. My Tibetan friend and I were chatting at a café when a middle-age woman 
walking home called my friend’s name. When my friend asked her to recall her story for me, the 
middle-aged woman started telling her story in Tibetan and my friend translated this into English 
for me. The middle-aged woman was travelling with her four children to Kathmandu to meet her 
elderly mother. She said at every Indian border she had to pay Rs 200-Rs 500 to get past the 
border patrol. She said,  
“They asked for identification paper, I showed them my RC but this meant nothing to 
them, [sigh] they even wanted to tear my RC in front of me. So after [a] long time saying 
please, please, and finally negotiating [signaling money with her hand], they let me go 
through. This happened at every station. Finally, when I saw my mother, I hugged her 
and we cried together for a long time.”  
 
The RC and ID cards for Tibetans are the main forms of identity paperwork Tibetans must hold, 
but the lack of mainstream recognition of these documents by Indian officials puts Tibetans in a 
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vulnerable position (Artiles 2009; TJC 2011; HRLN 2007; Bhatia 2002; McConell 2011). The 
lack of citizenship rights marks Tibetans in India as outcasts in dire need of legal protection, 
whether for travel, employment or education. Thus, some Tibetans, like the ones I spoke to, feel 
desperate to get to western countries for a better quality of life for themselves and their family. 
However, it is not easy for Tibetans to obtain access to the U.S. There are only certain channels 
through which Tibetan exiles can manage to go abroad: family, educational institutes, and 
employment sponsorships. So, if the Tibetans do not have established American sponsorship 
partners willing to ‘pull’ Tibetans into the U.S., they cannot get into the U.S. Many foreigners 
living in the U.S. are asked by Tibetans in India and Nepal to help them get to the U.S. 
Below is a social media conversation I had with a middle-aged Tibetan monk after I had 
come back to the U.S. from India. I had become close friends with this monk while teaching him 
English in Dharamsala. He looked like he was in his 50s and spoke fondly of his dream to go to 
the U.S. someday. His main monastery is in Nepal and, after attaining the highest degree possible, 
he spends his days now travelling to Tibetan areas in South India, Delhi, and Dharamsala. 
Whenever we spoke, he spoke a little in English and rest in Nepali and Hindi. I could understand 
him when we spoke in person, but on online chat, his writings took a little while for me to 
understand. The monk friend had to rely a lot on online translation software to write in English so 
his sentences may not be very clear below. I could understand his writing from having several 
personal conversations prior to our online communication.  
 
[This conversation occurred after exchanging short chat about our health, weather, and work] 
Monk friend: I am no money. What I do.  
Sneha: Money is always a problem. I know!!  
Monk friend: I will come USA? Your help me!!!!  
Sneha: Sorry friend! I am not a U.S. citizen I cannot help you come to the U.S… Maybe I 
can help you somehow when I am in India or Nepal? Maybe your monastery can help 
you with sponsorship? 
[Pause in chat for over 20 minutes] 
Monk friend: Ok. have a great day. Bye. Bye. I am sleeping.  
Sneha: Okay Good Night 
Monk friend: Thanks, my sweet friend.  
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I observed that it was not easy for Tibetans living in India (as well as in Nepal) without legal 
paperwork or stable income sources to apply for travel visas to western countries. Many Tibetans 
(like my monk friend mentioned above) cannot even get foreign people or institutes to sponsor 
them. This is the ugly truth of living a liminal life for Tibetan exiles. I argue that it is a 
commendable effort of Tibetan exiles to seek better life chances even in the face of prolonged 
liminality and minimal citizenship rights. This is what makes the flexible liminality of Tibetan 
exiles a unique and valuable condition. Despite the struggle, I heard several success stories of 
Tibetans who acquired scholarships in American Universities or obtained job offers in American 
businesses, and many came to the U.S. with the aid of naturalized-American family support. In 
order to better understand the factors influencing flexible liminality, I will present the case study 
of Tibetans who have migrated to the U.S. and of the Tibetan-Americans who are balancing their 
Tibetan identity as a duty to their family and the exile government.  
 
Liminality in the United States  
The short conversation I recounted with Phurbu at the beginning of this chapter showed 
how Tibetan exiles themselves often do not know the legality behind the term refugee. I observed 
that the geo-political complexity of the Tibetan exile community, and the legality of being a 
target refugee population, remains invisible, even to Tibetans. In the United States, Tibetan exiles 
do not fall under the category of refugees; similar to their situation in India, they are not seen as a 
victimized population.  Many Tibetans are able to resettle in the U.S., however, by going through 
sponsorships to travel to the U.S., and then seeking the asylum-seeker59 status. Unlike refugees 
resettled by the UNHCR, asylum seekers have to physically arrive in the U.S. territory and only 
																																																								
59 According to the UNHCR, and under the current law of the United States the definition of 
Asylum-seekers is as follows: a person may qualify for asylum within the United Sates if that 
person can demonstrate that he or she has been persecuted or can show a ‘credible fear’ of future 
persecution because of his or her political opinion, race, nationality, religion, or membership in a 
social group (UNHCR 1961, USCIS 2018) 
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then prove their vulnerable situation to the U.S. government60. Moreover, as asylum-seekers they 
do not have any rights or benefits until their petition is accepted and they gain the status of Asylee 
(TJC 2011). I argue that despite the difficulty in gaining travel permits to get to the West, or even 
resettle in the West, the Tibetan exile community have crafted avenues for individual Tibetans to 
be to able to resettle in the West. I will describe the creative avenues channeled by the Tibetan 
exile community for migration and resettlement to the U.S. 
The 2009 CTA (Tibetan exile government) census revealed that there are approximately 
10,000 people in the U.S. who claim Tibetan heritage (CTA Planning Commission 2009; U.S. 
census 2010). However, most Tibetans are skeptical towards the census report because, as many 
mentioned to me, they know several Tibetans living the U.S. who are in the process of acquiring 
their permanent residency or asylum. The number revealed in the official census statistics is 
generally of people who have legally acquired citizenship or permanent residency in the U.S. and 
does not cover the population of Tibetans who are still in the process of gaining permanent 
residency in the U.S. Thus, the number of actual Tibetans living in the U.S. in 2018 can be safely 
said to be above 10,000. The main migration stream provided for Tibetan exiles was the 1990s 
Tibetan U.S. Resettlement Program (TUSRP) where the first 1000 Tibetans were invited to 
resettle in the U.S. These 1000 Tibetan migrants to the U.S. were also called “anchor relatives” 
because they were expected to invite their immediate family (spouse and children under 21 years) 
to resettle in the U.S. after they had become U.S. citizens (NYTimes 1991; Hess 2009)  
Even today, many Tibetans who have resettled in the U.S use the same process of family 
migration. The most common answer I received to “how did you come to the U.S.?” was, “I came 
through my parents/mother/father,” or, “I came through my husband/wife,” or, “I came through 
																																																								
60	It should be noted that after January 2018, there have been changes in U.S. asylum seeker 
application process implemented by the U.S. President Trump. However, I conducted my 
interviews and research before this, while the changes were still being implemented; therefore, 
my participants had some idea of changes that were about to occur to asylum seeker application 
but were not sure what would change. My participants’ answers relied on the asylum seeker 
application process prior to changes from the Trump Administration.	
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my sister/brother.” It is difficult to find statistics about methods of resettlement for Tibetans in the 
U.S. but, from speaking to my Tibetan interlocutors, most seem to have found their way in the 
U.S. via their immediate family network. The government calls this type of resettlement in the 
U.S. “family reunion.” Anybody who is a U.S. citizen, permanent resident, or a refugee/asylee 
can seek to sponsor their immediate family to become a U.S. resident and, eventually a citizen. 
They do not come under the same category as refugees or asylee, and they simply must have 
immediate family members (Parents, Siblings, Children, Spouse) who are U.S. citizen or 
residents.   
The next type of resettlement of Tibetans is through the asylum-seeker category. As 
mentioned above, the asylum seekers have to be physically present in the U.S. There are several 
ways that Tibetan exiles have pursued opportunities to arrive in the U.S. – student visas (F1), 
religious visas (R1/R2), tourist visas (B2), and employment visas (H1B); full list of the visa types 
can be found here https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas.html. 
It is not easy to acquire these visas; even a Tibetan scholar or a religious clerk (Tibetan 
monks/nuns) must be vetted by a U.S. institution, such as Buddhist monastery or 
religious/educational institutions, and invited to come to the U.S.  This is considered to be a 
highly prestigious event. One of my interviewees, Mingma, had just finished her first year in a 
U.S. university. I came to know Mingma through other Tibetan friends who were also alumni of 
the same university as her. Mingma is in her early 20s; she had a cheerful personality and aspires 
to use her skills to become a nurse. She explained that she was the first of her seven siblings to 
attain such high level of education successfully. She told me that her short-term goal is to apply 
for Asylum status and get U.S. citizenship as soon as possible so she could sponsor her younger 
siblings for higher education in the U.S. Mingma explained,  
“I was always a very good student, I even got into Delhi University in scholarship, you 
know it is a very competitive place to get in. But I got rejected from so many U.S. 
colleges. For two years, I kept trying and when I was ready to give up then, I heard back 
from [XYZ] college saying I was accepted. I was so happy! ...I want to help my younger 
brothers and sisters to come here too” 
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Even after getting all the paperwork ready, it is an uphill battle to prove your intent to 
migrate to the U.S. embassy in India and Nepal to get a U.S. visa. From what I gathered, many 
Tibetans were failing to acquire visas even after they had spent a large amount of money on 
applications and travel. I was able to speak with Martha, a staff member at a Buddhist monastery 
in Louisville. She was helping Tibetan monks at a Buddhist Monastery in Louisville acquire R1 
visas to do Buddhism tours. The same monks from the monastery in South India have been 
visiting the Buddhist monastery in Louisville since 2002 for regular sacred tours of the U.S. But, 
Martha said,  
“since 2017 we have been having a hard time getting monks for our Buddhism tour. Even 
before, it used to be difficult getting visa for the monks, but now it’s like impossible. 
There are always the same 9 monks who come for our tour, and in 2017, only one got the 
approval for a visa… [Sighing in disbelief] so we had to cancel the whole event.”  
 
After all these bureaucratic trials, when Tibetans can finally get to the U.S., there are 
various organizations and Tibetan social support groups that help Tibetans go through the process 
of being an asylum-seeker. When talking to Tibetans, they said they had help from family and 
friends who had earlier gone through the process and who helped them network with 
organizations that could help newly arrived Tibetans. I learned that most Tibetan non-profit 
organizations in the U.S., no matter their organization’s stated purpose, would go out of their way 
to help newly arrived Tibetans to assimilate and find lawyers for their asylum applications. I was 
able to gather a better understanding about the application and bureaucratic process of asylum 
seeking from the people’s stories I found on legal websites like that maintained by the Tibetan 
Justice Center (http://www.tibetjustice.org/?page_id=68). Some of the sample petitions available 
online for Tibetans to use were anywhere from 30-35 pages long, detailing the asylum-seeker’s 
life history and why they fear returning back to the Tibetan-Chinese territory. One common 
theme was that every single asylum-seeker’s case is different. Even though one may have the 
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same background and travel history, nobody could guarantee that Tibetan asylum-seekers would 
get approved for asylum.  
According to other Tibetans who had gone through this process, it is better to get an 
immigration lawyer willing to work pro-bono for the Tibetan cause. Additionally, they said, the 
entire process is very complicated and could take anywhere from two months to two years. 
Tenzin and her husband came with college scholarships, and right after they graduated from 
college (before their student visa expired) they applied for asylum together through a lawyer 
willing to work pro-bono for Tibetans in the U.S. Tenzin said,  
“We applied for citizenship through asylum status in the state of California right after 
college. We went through it okay but…there are others who are just stuck in the process 
of asylum and they are just waiting and waiting forever… We had to stay with my family 
members until then with no other place to go. It’s so difficult to even talk about it, I just 
want to forget that situation.”  
 
In the United States, Tibetan exiles do not fall into the category of refugees; and, similar 
to in India, they are not seen as a ‘victimized population’ under the UN definition. Only once has 
the U.S. government extended an official helping hand towards Tibetan exiles. Ed Bednar, NYC 
Director of Refugee Services, was moved by the Dalai Lama’s speech in 1979, and convinced 
Massachusetts Congressman Rodney Barker to help bring Tibetans from India and Nepal as 
displaced people (Howe 1991, Hess 2009). In 1990, Congressman Barney Frank was able to pass 
a bill (1990 U.S. Immigration Act section 134), which allowed 1000 Tibetans from India and 
Nepal to resettle in the U.S. as displaced people (Howe 1991, Hess 2009). This resettlement act 
was called the Tibetan United States Resettlement Program (TUSRP). The Immigration Act 
required showing the migrants as self-sufficient immigrants and not dependent refugees. In other 
words, Tibetans would not receive any U.S. federal funding or the government services that are 
given to legal refugees resettled in the U.S. for the first 3-8 months after their arrival (Hess 2009). 
As a result, the TUSRP relied upon the idea of “cluster sites communities” for Tibetan migrants; 
and they were required to have a job offer, English-language tutoring, and housing arrangement, 
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all prior to their arrival to the U.S. (Howe 1991, Hess 2009). These pre-arrival arrangements for 
Tibetan migrants, however, were made possible by Tibetan exile government support, by various 
Tibetan support organizations, and by volunteers from U.S. communities who opened their homes 
to the new migrants (Howe 1991, Hess 2009).  
TUSRP has been the largest migration program to bring Tibetan exiles to the West at one 
time, and since then, no other official U.S. government support has been extended towards the 
Tibetan exile population. Prior to that, in 1988 the U.S. Congress passed a bill to sponsor 
displaced Tibetan students to study in American universities called the Tibetan Scholarship 
Program (TSP) (U.S. Department of State, 2010). As of April 2010, 364 Tibetan students have 
acquired entry to an American University through the TSP program (Yeshi 2012; TSP 2010) I 
have been told that currently the conventional method for Tibetans wanting to settle in the U.S. is, 
first, to legally arrive in the U.S. via various foreign visas (student, travel, tourist, employer etc.), 
and then apply for asylum-seeker status. The other methods for Tibetans to acquire permanent 
residency are by marrying a U.S. citizen, going through the channel of family reunion, or by 
getting sponsorship from an employing institution or affiliated religious institute.  
These Tibetans exile stories of migration and resettlement in the U.S. are very different 
from what occurs with UNHCR recognized refugees. In order to show how different this can be, I 
will introduce a story of Daniel, a UNHCR recognized refugee. In doing so, I will be directly 
comparing the resettlement stories of Tibetan exiles to a UNHCR refugee to show the true 
difference between calling oneself a refugee and being officially recognized as a refugee. My aim 
is to portray the creative infrastructure of migration and resettlement that has been built by the 
Tibetan exile community to compensate for their exclusion from the structured bureaucratic 
refugee resettlement infrastructure that guides UNHCR recognized refugees.  
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UNHCR Refugee Resettlement 
I worked as a caseworker (2016) and interpreter (2016-2018) at a refugee resettlement 
agency in Kentucky as part of my ethnographic research for the doctoral program. The refugee 
resettlement agencies, like the one I was involved in, work on behalf of the US government in 
lieu of the larger resettlement agencies to help newly arrived refugees to resettlement in a 
particular city. During my time at the refugee resettlement agency, I was able to develop close 
relationships with staff, volunteers/interns, and refugees who were actively involved in the 
agency. For example, I developed a close working relationship with a staff member, Daniel. After 
learning his story, I asked Daniel if could interview him and he agreed.  
Daniel is a Congolese-American man who was resettled in Lexington, KY from South 
Africa. I had come to know Daniel as a kind and helpful person at the resettlement agency. He 
was always dressed nicely and liked to chat with me about various social theories on diaspora. He 
was always there to interpret and help other refugee clients from Central Africa during office 
hours at the Louisville resettlement agency. Daniel came to the U.S. in 2001 after the Congolese 
militia targeted his family. Today, Daniel is a well-respected staff member at the refugee 
resettlement agency. Some of his close friends at work call him a nerd for his perpetual delight in 
conversations about social theories.  
In 2000, Daniel fled his hometown in Congo for South Africa in order to have a better 
life and political freedom. In South Africa, he first submitted his application as an asylum seeker 
to South African Homeland Security. Here he had to pledge for his case and wait until the judge 
looked at his petition. Daniel explained the paper work process to me 
“The government gave me a document stating that I was an asylum-seeker in the country 
and until the government approved me as an asylum, I had to renew this document. But I 
had also stated that I wanted to be resettled in either U.S. or Canada; I knew [a] few 
friends and family members who had gone there. So, the government also had to wait 
around for the UNHCR to pick my case. Since I was a single guy, no family behind, I 
knew I had a long wait.”  
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Daniel knew his case could take anywhere from 6 months to 2 years, but his case got 
called in sooner than he anticipated. He found out that his uncle was almost kidnapped by the 
Congolese militia and had had to escape to South Africa as well. Daniel said, “then, just in one 
night, the South African Police took us under high protection status. We were told to pack up our 
bags and leave for a remote town to live incognito until the UNHCR was able to arrange our 
resettlement process.” Daniel and his uncle’s status were changed to the refugee category because 
of the newly manifested evidence of their victimhood, and the UNHCR program subsequently 
resettled them. Daniel’s uncle was higher up on the list for resettlement, so his uncle migrated to 
the U.S. within two months. Daniel, on the other hand, had to wait for another five months until 
his number was called for resettlement. Daniel said,  
“There were refugee services, just like our[s], in South Africa. Imagine I was young, 
alone, and waiting without anything, the refugee services there helped me. I am forever in 
debt to them. That is why I work at the resettlement agency here, I think it is my duty to 
give back what I received. It is also my academic and professional activist pursuit that 
brings me to work every single day to help other refugees.”     
 
From my fieldwork at a refugee resettlement agency, I soon learned the rest of the 
bureaucratic process that Daniel would have had to go through. Once the UNHCR approves the 
case, the local resettlement office receives information about incoming refugees from the national 
resettlement office (called VOLAG – short for Voluntary Agencies), and the local agency 
prepares for the refugee’s arrival. In Daniel’s case, he was brought in from EMM (short for 
Episcopal Migration Ministries) for resettlement in Lexington, Kentucky. Once the local 
resettlement office receives the arrival date of the refugees, the caseworker assigned to the ‘case’ 
(a refugee family or individual) goes to receive the clients at the airport and drop them off at a 
rented-apartment the resettlement organization has sought out for them. The resettlement 
organization is also responsible for spending the federal ‘welcome money’ that each refugee 
receives on arriving in the U.S. The ‘welcome money’ is $925 for each individual and this money 
is directly dispensed to the resettlement organization to be used for housing, food, transportation, 
 
	 158	
and other specific basic needs. The ‘welcome money’ is to be used within the first 90 days of the 
refugee’s arrival in the U.S.; otherwise, the money is absorbed back to the U.S. government. 
Thus, for the first three months, the resettlement agency only distributes the ‘welcome money’ in 
denominations of gift card to grocery stores, bus passes or tickets, and a limited amount of cash 
for pocket money.  
Besides the ‘welcome money,’ the refugees can still get government welfare assistance in 
the form of RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance), and, in Kentucky, KTAP  (Kentucky Transitional 
Assistance Program) from the Kentucky state government, until the eighth month after their 
arrival in the U.S. The resettlement agency is responsible for applying for government services 
like, food stamps, medical insurance, KTAP, and a social security card for the refugees within 
their first two weeks of arrival. These services change according to various states’ laws and 
benefits. In Kentucky, refugees can apply for KTAP and food stamps that help the family with 
food and transportation assistance depending on the family size. These programs require refugees 
to actively volunteer or do something to acquire jobs. However, for the first two months, refugees 
are allowed to count their English as a second language (ESL) classes as part of their active 
employment and skill building. From the third month, all adult members of the household have to 
do volunteer work in order to build their employable skills. The state government requires all 
families relying on KTAP and food stamp to volunteer 35 hours per week for each adult in the 
household in order to continue receiving state government services.  
 Below is a flow chart summarizing the procedure that a refugee goes through until they 
arrive in the U.S. I also learned about this process during my resettlement agency caseworker 
tenure. This process for a refugee is a complicated and challenging procedure that should not be 
taken for granted. First, the refugees have to set up an application for their status that puts them 
into the category of either P1- regular refugee, P2- special concern refugee, or P3- family member 
of a refugee. After being filtered through this paperwork, they meet a U.S. refugee coordinator 
who interviews them to further verify their information. Thereafter, if they are approved from the 
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interview, refugees go through an intensive orientation about U.S. bureaucratic processes and 
social life in the U.S. Meanwhile, there is another layer of interrogation by U.S. immigration 
services. The refugee’s information is put into databases with their fingerprints and criminal 
history to learn if the refugees are eligible for admission to the U.S. If the refugees pass through 
that, they are sent to the clinic for medical screening. Soon after that, refugees go through a 
cultural orientation where they are taught airport norms and provided with International 
Organization Migration (IOM) loans for their airplane ticket. Once the refugees land in the U.S., 
they go through an additional background check and interview with the U.S. Customs and border 
staff. This process could take from few minutes to hours or days depending on each refugee’s 
case.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2018 
Figure 6.1: United States Refugee Admissions Program Flow Chart (USRAP 2018) 
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Tibetan Exiles vs. UNHCR Refugees 
  There is a stark difference in the migration and resettlement process of Tibetan exiles, 
like Tenzin and Mingma, compared to what happens with a UNHCR recognized refugee like 
Daniel. The difference begins with whether or not one’s group is recognized as a persecuted or 
victimized population by international organizations, the UN, and host countries. While refugees 
like Daniel can petition for his refugee case to be heard based on his ethnic group’s victimized 
status, the Tibetan exile population cannot do the same. International organizations, given the 
geo-politics surrounding the Tibetan exile community (those of India, UNHCR, and other western 
countries), do not consider them a persecuted population in any official sense recognized under 
international law. Western countries like the U.S., hence, would rather grant asylum based on 
individual petition rather than recognize the entire population of the Tibetan diaspora as victims 
of cultural genocide.  
From my knowledge as a refugee resettlement caseworker, of course, and given the 
process of resettlement for UNHCR refugees, I know the journey of Tibetans from exile in India 
to the U.S., and their eventual resettlement process there, is remarkable. Indeed, I say it is even 
more remarkable because they are able to accomplish it due to what they themselves have done; 
that is, through their flexible liminality and the institution they have built to support it. I argue 
that the Tibetan migration and resettlement process is remarkable because the entire procedure is 
the large infrastructure, born of flexible liminality, that the Tibetan exile community has built to 
guide individual Tibetan’s toward resettlement in the U.S. and the better life chances that affords.  
Upon comparing the Tibetan exile’s migration process to that of a UNHCR vetted 
refugee, I found two stark differences: first, UNCHR refugees receive support from international 
organizations and host-nation-states to resettle in western nation-states; second, in the selection 
process for resettlement, a refugee’s legal qualifications outweigh whatever individual skills or 
qualifications they might have for resettlement (UN Convention 1958; UN Protocol 1967). In 
terms of getting protection from external agencies, Daniel, for example, because he belonged to a 
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pre-existing refugee group arriving from Congo, and could provide enough evidence of his being 
in danger, was temporarily given protection by his first host country, South Africa, and thereafter 
given protection by UNHCR and marked as fitting for resettlement. A Tibetan exile in India can 
gain residency in the host country, India (or Nepal or Bhutan), but they do not receive any 
military protection, and despite their aspirations for resettlement to other countries, they cannot 
get support for this from international organizations like the UNHCR. Before even beginning the 
process of resettlement in the U.S., a Tibetan exile will have to use their educational 
qualifications, an institution’s prestige, their family/friend network, their English language skills, 
and must be able to prove their financial and social ability just to be able to travel to the U.S. For 
example, in the case of Mingma and monks seeking entry to conduct a religious tour, mentioned 
above, they had to polish their educational and religious skills just to be recognized by the 
sponsoring institutes in the U.S., and even then they could easily be denied travel visa by the U.S. 
American embassy in India. It does not become easier for Tibetan exiles after they arrive in the 
U.S. because they have to go through the bureaucratic processes of asylum seeking or sponsored 
residency via Tibetan-American family members.  
In comparison, UNHCR refugees, like Daniel, are vetted by host nation-states in large 
numbers simply because they belong to the legal category of refugee. Daniel did not have to 
prove his employment or educational skills, cultural competency, or use his social network with 
his host countries. Daniel was placed in the U.S. because of the request on his application and the 
fact that the U.S. government accepted refugees. Next, he was placed in a city matching his 
language skills and ethnic community. Tibetan exiles miss out on this type of encompassing 
refugee support and resettlement facilities because they are not a legally recognized refugee 
group.  
As an additional note, I should clarify that it is difficult to be a UNHCR refugee as well; 
the difficulties are just different. From my work at a resettlement agency, I learned that from the 
day a refugee applies for resettlement, it may take anywhere from two months to five years before 
 
	 162	
they arrive at the airport of their desired country. Until refugees receive confirmation for 
resettlement, many of my refugee clients told me they lived in a temporary camp without good 
amenities, no authorization to employment, minimum ration for food, and secluded from 
mingling with citizens. My refugee clients often expressed that they were happy to leave the 
temporary camp because even though they felt safe, they felt like they were not living a full life. 
My point is not to minimalize the difficulty of a UNCHR vetted refugee’s journey to 
resettlement; but, rather, to show how a Tibetan exile’s journey to resettlement is different from 
that of a UNHCR vetted refugee. 
In other words, the very threads (i.e. the interests of multiple geo-polities) that weave and 
enable the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles also creates a barrier for Tibetan exiles that keeps 
them from receiving refugee-related services. I argue that the Tibetan exile community’s 
liminality begins with the Chinese government’s narrative claim that Tibet was never an 
independent country, and is anchored by their various host countries’ needs to keep a cordial 
relationship with China. Because Tibetan exiles are not accepted as a victimized population by 
many countries, UNHCR cannot extend support to the Tibetans. Thus, Tibetan exiles have been 
left on their own to improvise creative ways to maneuver toward better life chances for 
themselves. In lieu of limited support for Tibetans from multiple geo-polities and the UN, I 
contend that flexible liminality has been the cultural practice that has helped Tibetan exiles grab 
opportunities where they present themselves.  
 
Tibetan-ness in the United States 
I contend that the countries hosting Tibetan exiles understand that Tibetans should fit into 
the regular legal category of “refugees,” yet, they cannot declare Tibetans “refugees” out of fear 
of ruining their international relationship with China. I argue that this inherent contradiction, and 
hypocrisy, born of geopolitics is what the Tibetan diaspora have to deal with every single day. 
Despite common knowledge of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Tibetans exiles are treated as 
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mere tourists in India, and regular immigrants in the U.S. – not as a victimized, displaced, 
population (HRLN 2007; Hess 2009; Artiles 2009; Yeshi 2012). Moreover, I observed that the 
Tibetan exiles are also faced with the challenge to prove their Tibetan nationalism in order to 
counter the Chinese government’s narrative that Tibet was never an independent state. This is 
where I argue that the practice of “Tibetan-ness” comes alive, for Tibetan exiles must externalize 
their nationalism to showcase their counter-narrative that Tibet did once exist as an independent 
state. 
 After resettlement in the U.S., I argue that the Tibetans in the U.S. feel they are handed 
an invisible baton of nationalist duty called “Tibetan-ness.” Along with the better life chances for 
economic success and mobility comes a duty to maintain their Tibetan nationalism in the U.S. 
(Hess 2009). Here, I argue the Tibetan exile community has made another exceptional cultural 
adjustment to combat the Chinese government’s narrative that Tibet was never an independent 
country. My participants have informed me that the Tibetan exiles conduct “Tibetan-ness” to 
become a member in good standing exile of their community. From my observations and 
interviews, I understood “Tibetan-ness” to be a set of identity markers that can be improved on by 
individual effort: that is, by gaining a good command of the Tibetan language, carrying out 
Buddhist philosophy, taking part in Tibetan community service or political events, and 
advocating Tibet’s cause to non-Tibetan people. While Tibetans in India also carry out  “Tibetan-
ness” (See Chapter 3), Tibetans living in the U.S. realize that they have the greater ability to 
exhibit their Tibetan identity on a global scale; so, they advocate Tibetan causes to non-Tibetans 
as a duty they feel they owe towards their family, the Tibetan community, and the exile 
government. Below are few examples of how Tibetan diaspora speak about Tibetan-ness and their 
long-distance nationalist duty: 
In May 2018, I was able to speak with a Tibetan-American woman, Dawa, on the phone. 
She had come to the U.S. about seven years ago to live with her husband. Dawa is in her late 20s, 
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pursuing a career in nursing and during her free time, she volunteered at different Tibetan 
organizations in her area.  
[Towards the end of the interview] 
Sneha: How do you respond to people who don't know where Tibet is or what happened 
to Tibetans?  
Dawa: [laughing…] A lot of people have asked me, ‘where are you from?’ But you know 
in this area there are many Chinese, Hmong and other Asians. When I say, I am a 
Tibetan,’ if they don't understand I then explain, ‘I am a Tibetan, born and raised in India. 
Tibet is a country beyond Nepal and it is currently under Chinese occupation.’ 
 
The same week, I was able to speak with another Tibetan student, Phentsuk, currently living in 
the U.S. She had just finished her first year in college. Phentsuk was in her early 20s and was 
pursing a Bachelor’s degree but hadn’t decided if she would like a career in law, nursing, or 
education.  
[Towards the end of the interview] 
Sneha: You have been in the U.S. for a little while now, how do you respond to 
Americans who ask where Tibet is? 
Phentsuk: On campus, many people are educated about Tibet, so it is not a problem. But 
for others who don’t know about Tibet, I usually say ‘I am a Tibetan born and raised in 
India. Tibet is a country within China right now. I have never seen Tibet in [my life but I 
was raised in a Tibetan settlement in India where we were taught Tibetan values, culture 
and language so I can proudly say I am a Tibetan.’  
 
In September 2017, I spoke with Kunga, a Tibetan-American man in his mid 20s. He had moved 
to the U.S. when he was barely 10 years old. His parents were one of the lucky 1000s in the 
TUSRP migration.  
[Towards the beginning of the interview] 
 Sneha: What is it like growing up as Tibetan in American society?  
Kunga: It was hard because there weren’t any other Tibetans around us, just my family. 
And so many Americans don't know what happened to Tibet. I always had to say I am 
not Chinese – I am Tibetan. I will tell you one time in school, maybe elementary school, 
my teacher told me to point out on the map where I was from… But I couldn’t find Tibet 
on the world map [laughing…] it was bad, I mean that time, I just felt so bad, but now I 
know to say ‘Tibet is under Chinese occupation so you won’t find it on the map.’   
 
In June 2018, I was able to speak with a Tibetan student, Pasang, who had been in the U.S. for 
three years now. Pasang grew up in the Bir Tibetan settlement, a small hill town close to 
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Dharamsala in India. Pasang was awarded a full-ride scholarship to a U.S. college right after she 
finished her high school in India. She is a smart, outspoken woman in her early 20s, and she has 
been active in Tibetan organizations in the U.S. for the past three summers teaching Tibetan 
language to young Tibetan-Americans who were born in the U.S.  
[15 minutes into the interview] 
Sneha: What do you think of Tibetans who were raised in the U.S.? Are they passionate 
about Tibetan cause?  
Pasang: Some are very passionate, and some don’t care at all. It’s half-half. In America, 
there is more freedom [of] speech and human rights so they [Tibetans born in the U.S.] 
can speak loudly about [the] Tibetan cause. [Snickering…] they are even more devoted to 
preserving Tibetan culture than Tibetans in India. But some are opposite. I understand… 
it is an identity crisis for Tibetans here. You are in a city where nobody knows where you 
came from and there are not many other Tibetans around. It can be daunting. You just 
want to assimilate and forget about it [Tibetan heritage].  
Sneha: But do all Tibetans have to take part in Tibetan political cause? 
Pasang: So, being a Tibetan means you have a duty, it is not so much about personal 
choice. You can ignore it, but you have a refugee mark in you. We went through cultural 
genocide in Tibet, so we have to preserve our culture outside. Our Tibetan community 
expects everybody to preserve the concept of Tibetan-ness. So that everybody can speak 
the [Tibetan] language, [become] educated about politics, [have the ability to] meet a 
stranger and advocate for [the] Tibetan cause, carry out Buddhist values, and things like 
that. Our society, exile government, and parents, everybody is pressing you to do it. It is a 
big task so some young Tibetans who don't want to do it all. It is understandable, but 
culture is everything that makes our identity.  
 
 
Analyzing Tibetan-ness 
In various interviews and casual conversations I had with Tibetans in the U.S., I observed 
that most Tibetans do understand and seriously partake in their responsibility for performing 
Tibetan-ness. Whether they are Tibetans who have newly arrived in the U.S., have lived in the 
U.S. for while, or were born or raised in the U.S., many of my participants had learned to nurture 
some form of Tibetan-ness. Their Tibetan-ness showed most naturally when asked, “Where are 
you from?” It is a very casual question but translates into a complex one for Tibetan exiles. This 
very question is charged with the complex geo-political battle that Tibetan exiles have to live 
within. It is not easy to state the country of your origin if it does not even exist on a world map, 
like with the case of the participants above. On the other hand, to pass up this question would be a 
shame to one’s identity, one’s community, and one’s exile government. For Tibetan exiles, the 
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answer to “where are you from?” is an opportunity to advocate for Tibetan politics, carry out their 
Tibetan-ness, and to share in the Tibetan community’s answer to the Chinese occupation of Tibet.  
In the above conversation with Pasang, she helped me really understand the meaning of 
Tibetan-ness and the individual responsibility of carrying the ‘refugee mark.’ Pasang explained 
that Tibetan-ness is the duty Tibetans feel to know their language, practice Buddhist values, be 
educated about their exile government and Tibetan politics, and advocate to non-Tibetans about 
Tibet. She also recognized that it could be a huge responsibility for Tibetans living in the U.S. – 
going against the natural direction of assimilation within the American community and causing 
one to stand out as a Tibetan person. Of course, unlike Pasang, who grew up within a Tibetan 
settlement and so could easily adapt her identity, Tibetans in the U.S. are spread out and often 
have a hard time nurturing their Tibetan identity. But while Tibetan-ness is an individual practice 
that can be learned and conducted, with more or less intensity, along with one’s other activities, 
Pasang indicated that all Tibetans naturally carry the “refugee mark”. The refugee mark is the 
burden of being part of the Tibetan diaspora; a mark that is automatically passed onto all Tibetans 
and is present even when a Tibetan individual ignores their responsibility of Tibetan-ness.  
In other words, there are two ways to gain Tibetan nationalist identity in exile: first, an 
individual can portray characteristics of Tibetan-ness to create a good social standing for 
themselves within the exile community; second, via the naturally occurring ‘refugee mark’ that is 
passed on to all Tibetan placed or born in diaspora. It is hard to recognize the ‘refugee mark’ 
within the Tibetan diaspora, but Tibetan-ness was easily found among the Tibetans in the U.S. 
The conversation with Pasang reminded me of other conversations I had with Tibetans living in 
the U.S. who similarly talked about the importance of advocating for Tibet and their Tibetan 
identity. The practice of Tibetan-ness shows one way that Tibetan flexible liminality functions on 
the ground. As a side note, I have only been able to touch the surface of Tibetan-ness in this 
dissertation; more research will need to be conducted to understand the full extent of Tibetan-ness 
and the externalization of Tibetan nationalism.  
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Public Talk by the Dalai Lama, 2016 
The practice of flexible liminality by an ethnic group relies on multiple exclusions from 
different geo-political entities, and the ethnic group’s ability to make cultural adjustments to those 
doing the exclusioning. The Tibetan diaspora interacts with the Chinese government to counter 
their narrative and replace it with Tibetan nationalist response by externalizing their nationalism, 
their Tibetanness, in an attractive way that invites the interest and sympathy of individual 
Westerners despite official disinterest by their governments. This was evident during a fieldwork 
trip for Public Talk by the Dalai Lama to Indiana in 2016 with my research assistant, David.  
There were about 4000 audience members at the Public Talk by the Dalai Lama and the 
most visible identity of the attendants to the Public Talk was white-Americans who had interest in 
western Buddhism or liberal-philosophical ideas preached by the Dalai Lama. David and I tried 
our best to speak with as many audience members as possible during the day event. We noticed 
that many audience members were from Indiana, and the surrounding area (Illinois, Kentucky, 
Ohio, Tennessee etc.). We learned that many people came to learn about the Public Talk event 
from their local Buddhist monastery, interfaith organizations, and Tibetan community center 
(incase of Tibetan-Americans). This was an interesting find because despite the large celebrity 
status of the Dalai Lama, the Public Talk events are not popular in immediate social media. Even 
for me, as a scholar of Tibetan exiles, I learned of this Public Talk from David, who learned of it 
from our local Buddhist monastery in Louisville, KY. For many attendant members, this event 
involved a family or organization group trip – all of the people we spoke to had travelled in 
groups. It was interested to find clusters of audience members before and after the event, and 
almost all the time, people standing around together were from the same location. When asked 
how they came to learn of the event, almost all spoke of their community center, monastery, or 
network of interfaith organizations. Thus, from my observations, I argue that Buddhist 
monasteries (including, religious and education institutes), as well as, other Tibetan community 
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organizations (like, community centers) are a key source to educate western audience about 
Tibetan community.  
Tibetan-ness as a way of externalizing nationalist sentiment is a unique phenomenon in 
Diaspora Studies that works through the Tibetan diaspora’s practice of flexible liminality. 
Anthropologically, I would argue that it is a peculiar situation where for a member of a diaspora 
to be compelled to display their nationalism externally to promote their political plight to 
outsiders. In the case of other diaspora, studies have talked about various diaspora groups 
portraying nationalist sentiments through political support in their home country, also called long-
distance nationalism (Schiller 2005, Toloyan 2000, Whitaker 2006, Anderson1992). However, 
these studies have only talked about diasporas encouraging homeland nationalism, realistically or 
unrealistically, from a distance through financial and symbolic support (Schiller 2005, Toloyan 
2000, , Whitaker 2006, Anderson1992). In such cases the intended audience is the diaspora group 
and their larger imagined community alone. In the case of Tibetans, though, practicing their 
nationalist identity – their Tibetanness – involves displaying their identity as a way of advocating 
their cause. This is, Tibetan diaspora nationalism involves practicing Tibetanness to showcase 
and explain their cause in the most attractive way to outsiders. In a way Tibetanness is a 
performance that is meant to attract sympathy from foreigners and it is used to preserve Tibetan 
nationalist identity. As with the ‘infrastructure of hanging out’ in Dharamsala, then, practicing 
Tibetanness in the U.S. is a way for marginalized Tibetans to build bridges to Westerners. It is 
flexible liminality in yet another form. Since Tibetanness involves externalizing Tibetan identity, 
educating foreigners (western sympathizer, especially) about Tibetan culture, and speaking about 
Tibetan political cause, the primary form of Tibetanness is a form of outreach to the West.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have highlighted the struggles and achievements of Tibetan exiles on 
their journey to the West. Tibetans are not considered legal refugees because the Chinese 
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government has claimed that Tibet was never an independent country; from this point of view all 
Tibetan exiles are simply living out of their home country out of personal choice, not because of 
persecution or victimization. The host countries sheltering Tibetan exiles have also officially 
accepted this narrative; hence, Tibetans in India (including, Nepal) are legally treated as foreign 
guests; and Tibetans in the U.S. are only allowed entry as regular, temporary, visitors. Tibetan 
exiles are left without any refugee-related support (like UNHCR resettlement services) and live 
their protracted exile lives in South Asia without the benefit of either citizenship or UNHCR 
recognized refugee status. As a result, many Tibetans aspire to resettle in Western countries 
where they can apply for asylum and gain permanent citizenship. In order to travel to the U.S., 
however, Tibetan exiles have to either use their family and friend networks in the U.S. or prove 
their educational or religious skills to the U.S. institutions that can sponsor them. Unlike UNHCR 
refugees, who are vetted just for being refugees, Tibetan exiles have to use their personal skills, 
social networks, and qualifications just to get into the; and then work further, via asylum-seeking 
processes or family sponsorship, to remain in the U.S. Even after their resettlement to the U.S., 
Tibetan exiles still feel like they carry the mark of the refugee, which is the exile community’s 
expectation that each Tibetan must publicly exhibit their Tibetan-ness. Tibetan-ness is the duty, 
passed on to every Tibetan in diaspora, to advocate the Tibetan cause to non-Tibetans, and to 
preserve Tibetan culture via language, religion, community service, and forms of political 
activism that remain, for the most part, yet also attractive to Westerners. 
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Chapter 7: The U.S. Anti-Immigrant Storm: The Tibetan Diaspora’s Story  
I was able to interview a member of Louisville’s Tibetan monastery61 staff named 
Martha. She is the key staff member responsible for the bureaucratic work of visas, travel, and 
legality for Tibetan monks to stay in the United States. Martha has been a friend to the Louisville 
resident monks for over ten years but still shows her respect to them by bowing deeply during 
religious events. She is a white middle-aged woman with short-cropped hair and a welcoming 
smile. Martha sharply remembers most visitors after their first visit to the monastery. She 
remembered my name even after my absence from the monastery for two years, and when I 
requested an interview, she graciously obliged. After conversing about the visa process at length, 
I asked her if the staff had witnessed any discrimination towards Tibetans during the visa 
application process, travelling, or after arriving in the city. Martha explained there was more 
discrimination against Tibetans while they were going through visa process at the U.S. Embassy 
in Delhi [India], mostly witnessed during visa interviews with Tibetans; otherwise, the monks, 
going through their monastic institution, had not really witnessed any discrimination within the 
U.S. Martha described one event that summed up her opinion of how Louisville, for example, 
viewed Tibetans in the city. 
Martha: Your kind of are really noticeable in robes [Tibetan monks wear bright red robe 
with yellow colors mixed]. Some people were curious and sometimes rude, but it’s based 
on not knowing they are being rude… But individuals have been consistently friendly… 
One time, our attendant monks were walking around sightseeing [in Louisville], and 
some people walking past bowed down to them [laughing] they [Tibetan monks] were 
really surprised.  
Sneha: Were they Tibetans or Asians who knew the Tibetan monks, or just regular 
Americans? 
Martha: Just regular- white- Americans- showing respect to our monks [with a big smile 
on her face]. Isn’t that amazing?  
Sneha: Wow, that really is amazing. I wonder how they knew to bow and show respect 
like that? 
Martha: It may have been because they have seen His Holiness [the Dalai Lama] and 
seen how other people bow down to him. Our monks here wear the same robe as the 
Dalai Lama so they probably wanted to show that respect to a Tibetan monk too. That is 
just what I think though.       
																																																								
61 I will not be using the official name of Louisville’s Tibetan monastery for discretion. In this 
chapter, I will be calling them “Louisville’s Tibetan Monastery” to better identify them.   
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Introduction  
The story above is remarkable in the United States in 2017. Here were immigrants, and 
non-white, non-Christian people, being shown respect and acceptance by ‘regular’ Americans 
from the host community. Yet in the United States, since the election of the President Donald 
Trump, there has been reported a sharp increase in hate-crimes, including against immigrants. 
FBI data showed that since 2014 to 2016, hate crime increased by 11.7%; and other research from 
California State University showed a rise of hate crime of 12% from 2016 to 2017 (Levin and 
Reitzel 2018). There has been a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment in the news since the 2016 
Presidential election, during which non-white people were targeted for speaking in a foreign 
language, wearing non-western clothing, or simply existing as a non-white people (TheDailyDot 
2018). In 2016, Louisville, KY, right after the Presidential election, a White elderly woman 
yelled at a Latino woman in the JCPenny’s check-out line to “speak in English;” and “go back to 
wherever the f*** you came from” (NBCNews 2016). In 2017, I also heard from the Louisville’s 
refugee resettlement agency62 that a Syrian female client came to the office to complain that she 
was harassed at the bus station by other bystanders for wearing a headscarf and full-length 
covering. The agency made sure to keep the Syrian client’s wish that her identity be kept 
anonymous but distributed the story to alert all staff members to be vigilant about keeping 
refugees safe.  
Louisville is a unique city in Kentucky for having a long history of post-revolutionary 
war immigrants (West East European, Southeast & South Asian, Caribbean, African) attracted by 
industrialization, trade, and refugee resettlement programs as a means to settle and find new lives 
in the U.S. (The Urban Inst. 2007; Yater 1987, McDowell 1962). Nonetheless, Louisville has not 
been an exception to the recent nation-wide rise in anti-immigrant sentiment as seen by the 
																																																								
62 I worked at the Louisville’s refugee resettlement agency since 2016, as an intern, full time 
caseworker, and later as a translator/interpreter. In this chapter, I will keep the name of the 
organization anonymous and simply call it “refugee resettlement agency.”		
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outwardly racist expressions of a white woman in JCPenny’s and the harassment of the Syrian 
woman at the bus station. Given these instances of anti-immigrant sentiment, it is intriguing to 
hear that Tibetan monks, publicly expressing, with their clearly non Western orange robes, a 
different religion and ethnicity-race, were nonetheless offered respect and acceptance by a 
random group of white people within the city. Hence, in this chapter, I will discuss recent 
changes in U.S. immigration laws and attitudes toward foreign migrants, and show how the 
Tibetan diaspora is weathering the anti-immigrant storm in the U.S. I will argue that the 
ubiquitous, celebrated, status of the 14th Dalai Lama has garnered acceptance for the Tibetan 
diaspora in the U.S. but also that the Tibetan diaspora’s ability to adjust to external influences has 
created a shelter for them to use protect them from the recent anti-immigrant climate.   
In order to understand why regular white Americans were bowing down to Tibetan 
monks, I will first introduce the city of Louisville and the way it is seen by the immigrants in the 
city. I will briefly talk about the history of Louisville, the leadership that represents the city, and 
the history of immigration within the city. Thereafter, I will describe, ethnographically, how 
migrant groups initially find religious institutions as entry points to assimilation within the city’s 
community. I will highlight how Tibetan ethnic groups are received relatively well, compared to 
other immigrant groups, within Louisville; a reception that includes a deep respect and personal 
affiliation that has developed between the Dalai Lama and Louisville’s Mayor, Greg Fischer. 
And, I will argue that the well-developed acceptance of Tibetans within the U.S. community 
arises from the long history of Western Buddhism, and from a Tibetan flexible liminality that has 
adjusted Tibetan practices to fit the western imagination of Tibet. Lastly, I will talk about the 
scholarship of  “ideal refugees/immigrants”, and argue that Tibetans in U.S. are frequently 
thought to be a model minority by commentators in the US because Tibetans are influenced by 
their flexible liminality, prior to their entrance to the U.S., to adjust themselves to become “ideal 
refugees/immigrants.”   
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U.S. Immigration Policy under the Trump Administration 
My years of dissertation research and writing (2016-2018) were during rapidly changing 
times for immigrants in the United States. The 45th president of the U.S., Donald Trump, was 
elected in November 2016, and immediately we saw a plummet in the numbers of refugee 
received by the U.S. The 2018 U.S. immigration statistics shows a 59% decline in the number of 
refugees received by the U.S. since the election of President Trump (CNS News 2016). In 2017, 
similar anti-migrant sentiments were followed by the Trump administration when it imposed a 
travel ban for migrant from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and 
Yemen (CNN 2017).  
In the offices of refugee resettlement agencies in Kentucky, I observed a correspondingly 
rapid drop in employment and volunteers after 2016 simply because there was no work for staff 
members to do. In 2018, the U.S. stepped up detention actions by U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) against illegal migrants after President Trump signed an executive order, 
called Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (EO), on January 2017. ICE 
reports show that from 2016 to 2017 the arrest and removal of migrants rose by 30%, which was 
the highest number of administrative arrests of the past three years (ICE 2017). In April 2018, the 
Department of Justice announced a new “zero tolerance policy” regarding border crossings that 
explicitly mandated child separation and the denial of a migrant’s right to request asylum. In 
other words, if ICE caught undocumented or illegal migrants in the U.S., ICE would separate 
them from their children and deported them without any legal hearing. As of May 2018, the 
Department of Health and Human Services reported that there were 10,773 migrant children in 
custody, a sharp rise from 8,886 in April 2018 (WashingtonPost 2018).  
Similarly, the Trump administration also has revoked protection status for migrants from 
‘perilous’ countries of origin, forcing those migrants to return to their home countries, and 
deporting those who have overstayed their temporary visa status. For example, 15,000 Temporary 
Protection Status (TPS) visas were given out in 2015 to migrants from Nepal after a disastrous 
 
	 174	
8.1 Richter scale earthquake there (ThinkProgress News 2018). There are still about 9,000 Nepali 
TPS immigrants living in the U.S. since their homes were destroyed by the 2015 earthquake who 
have now been given a year to depart from the U.S. There is a total of 321,220 immigrants who 
were given TPS and now are being asked to go back to their home countries (Romero 2018; 
Journal of Migration Studies 2017). 
The sweep of such anti-migrant sentiments from President Trump’s administration was 
felt strongly in my second dissertation field site, Kentucky. Politically, the state of Kentucky 
usually leans towards the Republican Party63, and in the 2016 Presidential election it did so too, 
as 62.54% of Kentucky’s voters voted for President Donald Trump (NYTimes 2016). The 
exception for the Presidential election was Jefferson County (which includes Louisville) and 
Fayette County (which includes Lexington), who voted for the liberal Democratic Party 
candidate, Hillary Clinton (NYTimes 2017). Given the newly elected President Trump’s anti-
migrant sentiments, the Mayors of Kentucky’s two Democratic party cities made their stance 
clear the following year; after the white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, VA in August 
201764, the mayors of Louisville and Lexington reviewed the city’s public art and removed 
Confederate monuments in order to denounce the U.S. history of bigotry, racism, and slavery 
(InsiderLouisville 2017).  
My dissertation field site, Louisville, is a unique, diversity-welcoming city within the 
largely socially and economically conservative and nationalist state of Kentucky. A better 
representation of the city of Louisville is the elected mayor, Greg Fischer. Since the beginning of 
his term in 2010, Mayor Fischer has pushed for Louisville to become an economically and 
																																																								
63 The Republican Party is one of the two big political parties represented in the U.S. government; 
the opposition party is the Democratic Party. The Republican Party for the most part stands for 
conservative values and economic and social policies like, less government spending, pro-life, 
decreased taxes, etc.  
64 White Supremacists are group of people who follow a racist ideology holding that 
white/Caucasian people are superior to other races. In the U.S., they display support for the white 
population and for nationalist ideals preserving privilege for the U.S. white population. The 
Confederate battle flag and confederate soldier monuments are favorite symbols of white 
supremacists in the U.S. 
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socially progressive city. This showed up in the results when in 2015 Louisville entered the top 
20% of states absorbing refugee resettlement in the U.S. (Washington Post 2015). The Mayor of 
Louisville even led a pro-immigration rally in January 2017 after U.S. President Donald Trump 
declared a travel ban on selected countries (Courier Journal 2017).  
 
Louisville, Kentucky (KY) 
Metropolitan Louisville includes 22 surrounding counties, 14 in Kentucky and 8 in 
Southern Indiana (The Urban Inst. 2007). This also has led to people commonly referring to 
Louisville Metropolitan as ‘Kentuckiana’. The Ohio River provided the geographical advantage 
that allowed the city of Louisville to quickly turn into a 19th-century major shipping port for a 
variety of goods, from cattle, to basic provisions, to lime, brick etc. to be shipped from the 
Northeast Pennsylvania and Europe (Heller 1922). Much of Louisville’s history is associated with 
the Ohio River as a source of transportation and geographical borderline65 (Yater 1987, 
McDowell 1962).  
Socially, Louisville had its own internal tension regarding race, slavery, and immigrants 
(Yater 1987, McDowell 1962). During the civil war period, since Indiana was a free state, 
Louisville was often an escape portal for African-American slaves fleeing to the north (Adams 
2011). When the civil war broke out in 1861, Kentucky declared neutrality and became an 
important geographic barrier state (Yater 1987, McDowell 1962). Even before the civil war, 
Louisville had a head-on confrontation between new-immigrants and ‘nativists’ (people who 
believed that only those born in the U.S. should be have political power) (Yater 1987, McDowell 
1962). As a result, the well-known tragedy of 1855, ‘Bloody Monday,’ a riot between new-
																																																								
65	During World War II, Louisville was a center for the factory war production of aircraft 
(Johnson 1984). The manufacturing industry continued to be the primary to the economy of 
Louisville; some of the big manufacturing companies in the city now are Ford Truck Plant 
(Automotive Vehicles), General Electric (Home Appliances), and Brown-Forman Heaven Hill (a 
bourbon distillery), among many more.  
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immigrants from Europe and native-born Americans occurred in Louisville, KY (McDowell 
1962). I will speak more about it in later section.  
 
Immigrants in Louisville 
Louisville’s non-European immigrant populations have been in the United States for a 
shorter period than is true for similar populations in the rest of the country (The Urban Inst. 
2007). Kentucky began receiving its first group of non-Europeon refugees after the end of the 
Vietnam War in 1975 (Kentucky Office of Refugee 2018). However, the majority of migrants 
prior to 1980s were from Europe, Canada, and Oceania; the demography of migrants for 
Louisville changed after 1990 to reflect a greater numbers of migrants coming from Asia-Pacific, 
Latin America-Caribbean, and Africa (The Urban Inst. 2007). A 2004 survey by the Louisville 
Metro showed that only 4.5% of the city’s residents were foreign born, and among them, 38% 
identified as Latin American, 35% as Asian, 15% as African, and 12% as European/Canadian 
(The Urban Inst. 2007). However, between 1990 and 2000 foreign-born immigrants in Kentucky 
grew by 135%, putting it among the top ten fastest growing state for immigrants (The Urban Inst. 
2007).  
 
Figure 7.1: New Immigration Growth by States (1990-2000) 
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Immigrant’s social community in Louisville  
In this rapidly growing city of immigrants, I wanted to understand how migrants were 
finding assimilating into the Louisville community, and what factors affected the extent of their 
assimilation. After speaking with multiple resettlement staff members in Louisville, I learned that 
one of the ways for migrants to find their community is via religious institutions (churches, 
temples, and monasteries, etc.). A male resettlement staff member, Daniel, (in his mid 30s) who 
mostly worked with newly arrived refugees from South and Central Africa explained,  
“Every ethnic group has its own community – mainly revolving around spirituality like 
Church, mosque, temples. There is so much ethnic variety even just for refugees from 
Congo – whether you are from East Congo or West Congo matters because they don't 
like each other. But in a new country, you need place to celebrate holidays together, and 
you need places for funerals, weddings, birthdays etc. Religious institutes are the first 
place lending the new refugees a helpful hand for social integration. You feel like a 
community by celebrating festival and prayers. Then come social organizations, once you 
have a stronger bond with your community, like the Somali youth organization here in 
Louisville. Then come professional and private communities, like with friends and 
family.”  
 
From my observations, I too noticed that many of my refugee clients found their initial 
social community through a religious organization (like a mosque, temple, church etc.). As 
Daniel above also explained, even though refugees may dislike this or that about their fellow 
migrants, refugees will still share the acceptance of religious institutions. Refugee families were 
using religious institutions, that is, where they could carry out common activities (praying, 
singing, dancing, sharing food etc.) to form communal bonds with each other. I will give two 
ethnographic accounts of how immigrants were forming communal bonds at faith institutions. 
These involve two very different families that I worked closely with during my field work in 
Louisville – first a newly-arrived, non-English speaking, Rohingya refugee family that I was able 
to observe closely as their caseworker, and second a well-settled Tibetan-American family I met 
at the Louisville monastery. Before that, let me briefly visit theoretical models present for 
immigrants incorporating in the western host countries.   
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In terms of speaking about immigrants incorporating into western host communities, 
specifically North American and European countries have created three main models that social 
and political scientists tend to be divided on: assimilation (urge migrants to adopt the host 
community’s cultural and linguistic practices), multiculturalism (the idea that migrant groups 
might or should retain enough of their former cultural practices and language to retain a distinct 
group identity), and segregationist (distinguish ethic-cultural communities by legal framework). 
Some people, politically, favor assimilation into a homogenous American and European 
population, while others see this as a kind of cultural imperialism (Alba 1999, Yazbeck Haddad 
& Balz 2006, Murray 2006, Silverman 2007). On the other hand, there are conservatives who 
think only assimilation into homogenous American or European communities should be allowed 
(Warner and Srole 1945, Sowell 1996). There are other mixed arguments regarding assimilation 
versus multiculturalism wherein some sociologists minimalize the need to have two extreme 
sides; some scholars have now found that different ethnic group members are starting to 
emphasize and express the need for harmonious coexistence rather than taking sides for 
assimilation or multiculturalism (Vani and John 2009, Lambert and Taylor 1988, Wolsko and 
Judd 2006, Rodgriguez-Garcia 2010). The current U.S. President Donald Trump’s politics, 
however, wants neither assimilation nor multiculturalism; rather, President Trump holds a 
‘nativists’ position that Juan Perea, in his book Immigrant Out! (1997), argues is basically an 
stance so opposed to foreigners as to deem any immigrant population as illegal and alien within 
the host community (Perea 1997:2).   
In the case of Louisville’s immigrant population, I side with Dan Rodgriguez-Garcia 
(2010) who argues for going beyond bimodal thinking towards a “mutualist model of socio-
cultural incorporation that reconciles cultural diversity with social cohesion.” Rodgriguez-Garcia 
tends to have an optimistic outlook, and imagines that interculturalist incorporation is possible 
when all social members have full social and political participation in a cohesive manner. Thus, 
the interculturalist model encourages cross-cultural interactions for better mutual understanding 
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and incorporation between groups. My research fieldwork on Louisville immigrants is not full 
faceted enough to definitely argue for the interculturalist mode. But from my observations of 
various refugee groups and the Tibetan community, I tend to think the interculturalist model the 
most useful and likely. The immigrant population in Louisville is not functioning in isolation 
within their own ethnic groups; nor is the population completely assimilated within American 
society; instead, as we will see with the Rohingya family, migrants are seeking to form a 
community with people from different ethnic groups but similar common socio-religious values. 
Moreover, I argue that religious institutions in Louisville have opened their doors for migrants to 
find, or make, a social community with people from various other ethnic groups who have similar 
socio-religious values. Hence, I side with the interculturalist model because it best reflects what I 
was seeing in Louisville where immigrant families frequently found their solace with other ethnic 
groups within the communal spaces of shared religious institutions.  
I also argue that this same is true for the Tibetan migrant community as well, for they too 
are creatively using religious institutional spaces to form a social community. In the next section, 
I argue that in addition to using religious institutions for communal gatherings, the Tibetan 
community is also practicing flexible Tibetanness in them; that is, preserving Tibetan cultural 
traits and spreading them to the host population. The ability of the Tibetan community to spread 
their signature cultural practices, and agency to their American host community is unique. 
Tibetan diaspora’s assimilation tactic and use of Tibetanness does not fit into any of the models 
of assimilation previously put forward by scholars. Hence, it has to be taken into account by my 
theoretical model of flexible liminality.  
 
Religious Institution for Communal Integration 
A Rohingya family of five (a father, mother, and three children) was a refugee case 
handed to me as a refugee resettlement caseworker. The father of the family was in his early 30s, 
the mother of the family was in her mid-20s, the oldest child was 12, and the youngest child was 
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about a year old. Due to the age of the youngest children, the mother usually had to stay home 
and could not visit our offices. This was the first year that the resettlement agency was receiving 
Rohingya families, so we could not find anybody who spoke the language. The father spoke Urdu 
(similar to Hindi), which is why I could communicate well enough with him; otherwise, the rest 
of the family simply did not have any way of communicating with others. I was worried about the 
mother of the family since she was getting even more isolated because of the language barrier. 
We were able to enroll her in a refugee program for mothers with young children, but that was the 
extent of my power as a caseworker66.  
About a month later, I spoke with the family again and the father of the family told me 
that the family was doing better than when they first arrived because they had found a mosque to 
visit regularly. At the mosque, he was able to meet up with other Muslim families in a social 
environment. He was also able to have his wife socialize with his acquaintances from the mosque. 
It may have only been a small progress, but it provided an entry for a new immigrant family to 
assimilate into the community. Despite the language barrier, the religious community67 provided 
a common bond for the new Rohingya family to satisfyingly socialize within the American 
community. Muslims as a religious community have been much marginalized since the 9/11 
event, so this Rohingya family’s entry into the Mosque helped them assimilate within a subset of 
American society but it still does not completely integrate them into U.S. society. Thus, I argue 
for the intermediary model in understanding the assimilation of immigrants in U.S. society.  
																																																								
66 As a refugee resettlement caseworker, I had the power to extend my American cultural 
knowledge, give information about programs available in the city for the refugees, and put the 
refugees in touch with other families to become friends with. My capability of building deeper 
friendships was limited, however, because of my professional responsibilities for other refugees 
and the agency. I was also informed that I should not build too much of a personal relationship 
with refugees in order to best provide my services as a caseworker. However, this was negotiated 
by each caseworker in their own personal way. For example, caseworkers were not to receive any 
food/drinks at the refugee’s house during work hours, but there were some caseworkers that 
accepted food/drinks because they felt disrespectful rejecting kindness and cultural practices of 
guest/host behavior.   
67 I found out that the Louisville mosque community consisted of people from various ethnic 
communities such as Somali, Iraqi, Syrian etc.  
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In the case of the Tibetan community in Louisville I observed, as well, that many isolated 
Tibetan families from neighboring states (Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee) came together to Louisville 
to meet-up at the Tibetan Buddhist monastery for Tibetan holidays. One day I was invited to a 
Tibetan woman’s house for an interview. She was a middle-aged woman, whom I shall call Pema, 
who was working from home to babysit her young children. Pema and her husband have lived in 
Kentucky for the past decade. The two went to college in Kentucky and found careers within the 
state. I entered Pema’s house and was welcomed with hugs from her children since we had met 
before at the Louisville monastery. Her living room walls were garnered with Tibetan Thangka 
art68 and were furnished modestly with two couches and a large table. I asked her how people in 
the Tibetan community met with each other here. Pema said,  
“Mostly we meet at the monastery itself. In big cities, where there is a large Tibetan 
community, they have community centers, [a] separate monastery, youth organizations, 
and many separate-separate centers for different things. Here, we [Tibetan community] 
have the monastery in Louisville, [laughing] it is our community center, monastery, 
everything!”  
 
In Summer 2017, the Tibetan monastery hosted a youth camp for Tibetan children, where 
the Tibetan children could learn Tibetan songs, dances, alphabets, and explore the city together. 
In summer 2018, the Tibetan monastery hosted Tibetan cultural events, open to the public at 
large, for which the monastery invited Tibetan musicians, activists, prestigious lamas [monks], 
and laid out Tibetan food and drinks.  
 The Louisville Tibetan monastery started hosting social events with Tibetan families only 
in the past five years. When I had a conversation with staff members and Buddhist followers of 
the Louisville monastery, both groups informed me that the Louisville monastery gained many of 
the Tibetan families who used to gather at Bloomington, Indiana’s monastery. But after the death 
of the Dalai Lama’s brother, Thubten Norbu (who used to head the Bloomington monastery), the 
																																																								
68	Thangka Art is a religious Tibetan Buddhist painting on cotton scroll or applique on silk scroll. 
Thangka is usually hung in monasteries and private homes after a priest/lama conducts a prayer 
ceremony and blesses the Thangka.  
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Tibetan families from the surrounding states slowly shifted their community gatherings 106 miles 
south to the Louisville monastery. The staff and followers of the monastery all thought the shift 
was due to the friendly nature of the head lama of Louisville’s monastery, affectionately called 
“Geshe la” by everybody. To understand why Geshe la’s friendly nature attracted Tibetan 
families, I talked to a Tibetan man from Ohio who regularly attended these social gatherings. 
Dorje is in his early 50s; he has a calm nature and a ready smile for everyone during social 
gatherings. I asked Dorje what it was about Geshe la and the Louisville monastery that attracted 
so many Tibetan families from a hundred miles away. Dorje said,  
“It is I think a Tibetan thing, where if you invite someone personally, you are more likely 
to go to that event. But if you just say ‘please come to this event, and oh bring friends’, 
you won’t invite friends [laughing]. So you have to get the invitation personally, and 
Geshe la is very good about maintaining that personal contact with each families…we 
[dorje and his wife] used to go to the Bloomington monastery for Tibetan events but our 
Tibetan friends started coming here and we got to know people here [Louisville 
monastery] too so we come here now.”  
 
In Louisville, the majority of immigrants have found their social assimilation into the 
U.S. via religious institutions. For the Tibetan community as well, the Louisville monastery has 
provided them space for social communal gatherings. As Pema mentioned above, cities with a 
larger population of immigrants have a variety of organizations for social gatherings, religious 
functions, and political activities; but for a city such as Louisville that hosts a small and relatively 
new population of immigrants, religious institutions like the Louisville monastery have become 
spaces for Tibetan community gatherings. This also eventually led me to understand that 
Louisville, as a city, has strong inter-faith programs. 
 
Louisville’s Interfaith Program 
Even before Mayor Fischer’s election, Louisville was a migrant friendly city and a city 
encouraging of inter-faith dialogues. When I spoke with local Louisville residents who were born 
and raised in the city, I learned that there used to be more of an aversion between people 
 
	 183	
belonging to different churches. A simple search on Google about Christianity in Louisville 
brought me to one of the most regretful riots in the history of Louisville, the event called “Bloody 
Monday.” “Bloody Monday” took place in 1855 and was the result of the hangover of 19th 
Century anti-immigrant sentiments towards the newly settled Germans and Irish migrants 
(Courier Journal 2015). Americans, mostly “natives” born, white Protestants, felt threatened by 
new immigrants, Irish and German Catholicism, and socially liberal ideas about racial equality 
(Courier Journal 2015).  
From my observations, the history of this bad relationship between Catholics and 
Protestants in Louisville has encouraged a lot of the city’s current interest in inter-faith activity 
between various faiths. I spoke with a long-time member of an interfaith program, Patty, an 
Asian-American woman in her 50s who first got involved in the program as her Church’s priest. 
Today, Patty is a retired priest who regularly attends interfaith program and speaks of religious 
diversity in the city. Patty and I met at the Tibetan monastery for a fire-puja ceremony, and 
during a break of the ceremony I asked her about interfaith programs in Louisville, she 
commented,  
“Louisville is unique anyway; interfaith work here is very unique for the size of the 
city… Which is attributed to IPP [Interfaith Peace Program] and CIR [Center for 
Interfaith Relations] as they have consistently gathered people and created the dialogues. 
And then we have a city leader like our Mayor Fischer who gathers religious leaders and 
meets with them to ask about the city, [Leaning closely to me in a friendly manner] I 
don't think that is really common [giggle].” 
 
Tibetans in Louisville 
In Louisville, there are only six permanent Tibetan residents and one Tibetan Buddhist 
monastery that also perform as a community center for all Tibetans from the tri-state area (OH, 
IN, KY). During Tibetan holidays, there are over twenty different Tibetan families (around 50 
people) who travel from surrounding states, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and from around 
Kentucky, to celebrate holidays at the Louisville monastery. Given such a small population of 
Tibetans, it is remarkable to find that the Tibetan community has a large presence in Louisville. 
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For example, the Tibetan Buddhist monks are regularly welcomed to perform prayers for 
auspicious beginnings and create sand mandala offerings for social wellbeing in the city69. 
American Louisville residents are regular visitors at the monastery for religious (Sunday morning 
prayer, full moon puja, fire offering puja etc.) and social events (momo70 and movie nights, 
Tibetan lecture guests etc.). A staff at the Tibetan monastery disclosed that the Tibetan monastery 
in Louisville has 1700 people on the list for regular monastery’s newsletter and events, and 190 
of them are paid members that means the members get regular exclusive discounts on events and 
hear more details on the decision-making process of the board members. In comparison, other 
immigrant communities who have come to Louisville via refugee resettlement programs, like 
Somalis, Iraqis, Syrians, Congolese, and Bhutanese people, do not have the same type or degree 
of representation in the Louisville community. 
Most of the Tibetan community’s presence in Louisville is realized through their Tibetan 
Buddhist monastery that has created a special space for itself in the heart of the city71. The city of 
Louisville was preparing for another visit by the Dalai Lama in 2017 but unfortunately this was 
cancelled because of his health problems72. In 2017, again, Tibetan monks were denied U.S. entry 
visa so the staff members from the Louisville monastery along with Tibetan monks visited the 
main monastery in India, and also visited the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. While waiting in New 
Delhi to make their transit to Dharamsala, the monks found out that Louisville Mayor Greg 
Fischer was also in New Delhi for a City Mayors meeting. When Mayor Fischer learned of the 
Louisville monastery member’s plan to visit the Dalai Lama, he decided to extend his business 
																																																								
69 “Tibetan Monks create sand mandala for world peace” (Courier Journal 2016); “Tibetan Monks 
perform prayer and sand mandala to pray against gun violence” (WDRB News 2015, 2016) 
70 Momo are Tibetan style steamed dumplings stuffed with meat or vegetables 
71 A remarkable example is when the Tibetan monastery invited the 14th Dalai Lama to come to 
Louisville for a public speech in 2013; the mayor was personally involved in the tour of the city 
during the Dalai Lama stay in Louisville. The 2013 Dalai Lama’s public speech drew 
approximately 15,000 people to the YUM! Center, and I talked with several audience members 
who had driven from as far away, respectively, as the states of Washington and Colorado State 
specifically to attend the Dalai Lama’s talk.  
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trip for a couple of days to visit the Dalai Lama himself together with the monastery group. 
Below is the picture of Mayor Fischer (wearing khata- a silk scarf with printed prayers, presented 
in Tibetan culture to respected guests) and the Dalai Lama (posing with a Muhammad Ali hat 
gift73). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The 14th Dalai Lama is wearing a Muhammad Ali hat, posing for photo with 
Louisville’s Mayor Greg Fisher. Feb 20th, 2018 in Dharamsala, India. Photo Courtesy: DGCEC 
 
At this particular meeting, in February 2018, Mayor Fischer took the opportunity to 
inform the Dalai Lama about the Mayor’s compassion project. The compassion project was 
started in November 2011, when the mayor declared Louisville, KY as a compassion city and 
signed a commitment for a 10 yearlong compassion campaign. Mayor Fischer recognized that the 
political quest for compassion goals were similar to what the Dalai Lama also spoke about during 
his public speech in Louisville. So, during Mayor Fischer’s recent visit to India, he found it 
important to show the report about making Louisville into a compassion city to the Dalai Lama.  
I have been informed by several of my interlocutors that it is hard to receive someone like 
the Dalai Lama, who speaks of kindness and compassion, with xenophobia; instead, socially 
liberal politicians like Mayor Greg Fischer, eagerly honor and seek to identify with the Dalai 
																																																								
73 Louisville prides itself for producing an activist & boxer – celebrity Muhammad Ali. One of 
the major works in the city for social justice program is held by an organization called the Ali 
Center. By presenting the Ali hat, Mayor Fischer was presenting a souvenir to the Dalai Lama 
from the city of Louisville, KY.   
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Lama and his philosophy. The charismatic persona of the 14th Dalai Lama is irresistible (as I have 
mentioned in previous chapters). It is the amiable philosophy and appealing presence of the 14th 
Dalai Lama that has earned him acceptance within the international arena. From my observation 
of the Tibetan community, the Dalai Lama has opened a space for the Tibetan diaspora and 
Tibetan Buddhism within Western cities.  
It is clear from my observations that the Dalai Lama has made a sufficiently positive 
impression on his Western audience to impute some of that good will onto other Tibetan monks 
as well. However, I will argue that it is not enough of an explanation to say that the 14th Dalai 
Lama’s popular personality is what causes Americans to like and respect all Tibetans and Tibetan 
Buddhism (and even exempt them from xenophobia in the U.S.). Instead, we will have to visit the 
history of how Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet have made their way to the West.  
 
Why Tibetans? Lamaism and Western Buddhism 
During the early 1900s the Tibetan state was still minimally involved in international 
politics because of its own desire to remain as a neutral Buddhist state (Schaik 2010; Goldstein 
2007). The Western world heard of Tibet during this time through adventurers, missionaries, and 
military travelers (Schaik 2010). During this time, Western audiences fascinated by Tibetan 
Buddhism started Buddhist-influenced societies as a result of their imaginary identification with 
the religion (Shakya 1991; Lopez 1999, 1998, Frechette 2004). For example, in the late 19th 
century Madam Blavatsky (founder of the theosophy movement) borrowed and popularized 
tantric Tibetan Buddhist notions to awaken spiritual enlightenment for people in the West, and 
Evan Wentz wrote the Tibetan Book of the Dead, wherein a European man demands respect by 
insisting he is a reincarnated high Tibetan lama (Lopez 1999, 1998). These created new, largely 
imaginary, points of departure for Westerners seeking to understand Tibetan Buddhism and 
Lamaism, and fit them within even larger Western imaginaries about the supposedly mystical, 
anti-materialistic, and therefor desirable East (Lopez 1999, 1998).  
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Lamaism was originally a derogatory term used by European colonists (1920-1950) for 
what the colonists believed to be a “tainted Buddhist philosophy” which had adopted 
superstitious rituals such as venerating senior monks and teachers, worshiping deities, and 
Buddhist teachings used by priests-like lamas, to bring luck to lay people (Huber 1956; Lopez 
1999; James 1997; Dapsance 2017). But eventually a new type of western imagination of Tibet 
arose when a ‘new-age’ (1970-80s) audience started, in the late 1960s, to revive the 19th century 
works of Madam Blavatsky (Lopez 1999, 1998). This in turn led some to express a desire to be a 
part of Tibetan identity, as if ‘Tibetan’ was an empty signifier waiting to be filled with their 
Western imagination (Lopez 1999, 1998). This time, far from being critical, the Western audience 
of Tibetan Buddhism wanted an exotic, new age religion ready with promises of individual 
spiritual enlightenment and self-contentment (Huber 1956; Lopez 1999; James 1997; Dapsance 
2017). Thus, the earlier colonial scorn about Lamaism was replaced with visions of hoped for 
Eastern enlightenment in the land of Tibet, or Shangri-La, as in the imaginary Tibet-like utopia 
created by James Hilton for his 1933 novel Lost Horizons, and subsequently adopted by a western 
neo-Orientalist audiences as a model of their imagined Tibet, a land filled with secrets and 
promises of self-fulfillment (Lopez 1999).  
After 1959, post-colonial Tibetan exiles come face to face with this western version of 
Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism, and the Tibetan state. For example, the movie Lost Horizon (1937), 
based on Hilton’s book, wove a Shangri La myth that portrayed a version of Tibet that the 
Tibetan exiles could not relate to (Shakya 1991; Goldstein 2007; Schaik 2010). The combined 
fantasy of Lamaism and Tibetan Buddhism in the New Age cult and in the Shangri La myth seeps 
into all aspects of Tibetan’s social, religious, and individual identity (Shakya 1991; Lopez 1999, 
1998, Frechette 2004). Strangely, however, these Western imaginaries woven about Tibet created 
a sympathetic if inaccurate image of their homeland for newly exiled Tibetans to use (Frechette 
2004). In 1960, Switzerland became the first nation to grant complete asylum to Tibetan exiles, 
claiming Tibetans are “mountain people, just like the Swiss” (SwissInfo.Ch 2010). Other western 
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nations supported Tibetan exiles with humanitarian aid, sponsorships, and resettlement (See 
Chapter 1&2).  
As newly arrived exiles in western environments, Tibetan lamas found the venue of 
western Buddhism quite useful in conveying Buddhism to western audiences (Lopez 1999; 
Frechette 2004; Goldstein 2007; Dapsance 2017). This is not to say that Tibetan lamas are simply 
taking advantage of Western followers or lying to their Western students. Rather, I have been told 
that Tibetan lamas have learned that western followers want only certain aspects of Tibetan 
Buddhist philosophy. Even the 14th Dalai Lama presents Tibetan Buddhism as a philosophy of the 
mind74. So Tibetan monks quickly learned that they were better off not disturbing the Western-
version of Buddhism, which treated Buddhism as a scholarly philosophy rather than as a religion 
(The Dalai Lama 2011). Unlike the practices the Lamas carried out for Tibetans, western 
followers were not interested in communal-social-ritualistic events at the monastery, nor in 
venerating the Rinpoches (reincarnated great teachers) and Geshes (the highest degree obtained 
by monks) for their enlightened spiritual attainments and practical techniques like, compassion, 
mindfulness, meditation, etc. (Lopez 1999; Dapsance 2017).  
From my observations at the Louisville monastery, the Western followers of Tibetan 
Buddhism range in interest from those seeking strictly philosophical knowledge to those seeking 
a thorough religious scholarship about Tibetan Buddhism. Sophie, a middle-aged woman, spoke 
to me about her motivation for coming to the Louisville monastery. Sophie said, “I heard the 
Dalai Lama once and I really liked what he said, so I started coming to the center here to learn 
more about eastern philosophy.” Like Sophie, I have heard other monastery members also say on 
several occasions, “Buddhism is so much [more] like philosophy than religion” or “the Sunday 
morning classes are like [a] philosophy seminar.”  
																																																								
74 For more information see, His Holiness the Dalai Lama (2011). Beyond Religion. Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. New York, NY”.  
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Another Buddhist follower, David, in his late 20s, was very motivated to become a 
Tibetan monk, and talked about his experience of joining the Louisville monastery. David 
explained,  
“Basically, what motivated me was when I was around 14-15, I started reading different 
religious books… I think it was my 14th birthday when my mom got me a book called 
How to Expand Love by the Dalai Lama… Overall I think I got into Buddhism before 
Buddhism was cool… So, I was looking for different dharma centers of any kind. It 
wasn’t just Tibetan. I just googled it and I saw that it was a Tibetan center [in Louisville].  
So, I went to the center and I just opened the door and walked up the stairs- there was this 
little mahakala statue [Buddhist protective deity], that I didn't recognize it was mahakala 
at the landing. He has got this little scary wrathful face things looking at me and upstairs 
the monks were in the middle of saying prayers. This was different – it wasn’t Buddhism 
as I expected [meaning, not the scholarly or philosophical at first-look]. I feel like a lot of 
people are turned away – these are just elements of Tibetan Buddhist culture – I think 
people think it’s supernatural and too much about lamas. Anyway, I just sat there for the 
teaching and I was 16 years old back [then and] I didn't know what the teachings were 
about. But I went back every Sundays and I really liked it.”  
 
The followers of the Louisville monastery came to the center for various reasons. Some 
followers only came to seek philosophical knowledge, whereas others wanted to soak in the 
ritualistic and religious aspects of Tibetan Buddhism. As mentioned by David, there were some 
Western audiences who wanted to differentiate what they regarded as supernatural aspects from 
Buddhist philosophy, and some eventually turned away from the center when they could not 
separate the two. When I spoke with the staff at the Louisville monastery, they seem to have 
realized the varied needs of their audience, which is why the monastery now has two legally 
registered names for the same organization: one, Tashi Norbu (pseudonym) that signifies it as an 
educational and Tibetan activist institute, and the other, Chopel Gompa (psuedonym) that 
signifies the religious pursuit of the center. The monastery explained that the two names helped 
them in acquiring visas for monks from India, but they also signify the dual work that the 
monastery conducts. Nonetheless, the varied needs and demands of the western audience of 
Tibetan Buddhism, do useful to the Louisville monastery center, were there because the western 
imaginary had already created a space for Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism in Louisville.  
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I argue that rather than remaining oriental others, Tibetans have been re-introducing 
themselves to the West, and adjusting themselves to prevailing western imaginaries about Tibet, 
to remake themselves as, in a sense, Western subjects. This is part of Tibetan flexible liminality, 
which includes the practice of adjusting cultural practices to meet external foreign influences. The 
flexible liminality of Tibetans relies on the interest multiple nation-states have in Tibet and their 
ability to adjust their cultural practices to influences to those external entities. In previous 
chapters, I have argued that Tibetan exiles are influenced by multiple geo-political entities and 
have adjusted their cultural practices to accommodate these various external influences. As a 
result, over time, the adjustment made by Tibetan exiles to external influences has garnered them 
better life chances. This ability to roll with the multicultural punches thrown by the world at large 
is what I call the flexible liminality of Tibetan exiles. In the case of the Louisville Tibetans, we 
can see in them a good example of how cultural adjustments are made by Tibetans in diaspora.  
From my observations, people of the Tibetan diaspora are respectfully using a pre-
existing space created by the Western imagination, yet still reeducating Western audiences about 
an actual Tibet and actual Tibetan Buddhism (as compared to how Tibet is imagined). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Vajrayana Buddhism is a form of Mahayana Buddhism that uses a faster 
vehicle to liberation through tantric ritual. The religious practice involves using mantras (prayer 
chants), dharanis (incantation and recitation), mudras (bodily gestures used to seal spiritual 
energy), and mandalas (diagram or geometric pattern representing Buddhist cosmos), and 
visualization of deities and Buddhas (Davidson 2002).  
The Louisville monastery balanced true-Tibetan practice and demand from Western 
audiences was visible in the Louisville monastery’s continuing use of rituals, prayers, deity 
worship, and other puja ceremonies (mantras, dharanis, mudras, mandalas, deity and Buddhas 
worship), while at the same time conducting a Sunday morning public congregation as a Buddhist 
philosophical seminar. Traditionally, Buddhist philosophical seminars were only reserved for 
Buddhist students interested in becoming monks/nuns, but at the Louisville monastery this has 
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become a weekly public event that coincides with the American tradition of Sunday morning 
church services and Sunday school. The Sunday congregation at the Louisville Monastery still 
starts and ends with Tibetan prayers that everybody recites from an English translation of Tibetan 
words; and thus, still takes place within the realm of true Tibetan practices. This once again 
shows the balancing of demands from a western audience with the need to educate westerners 
using true-Tibetan practices.   
 
Analysis: Americans bowing to Tibetan Monks 
Going back, then, to the story in the beginning of this chapter about regular Americans 
bowing down to show respect to Tibetan monks in Louisville, we can now ask: why are some 
Americans willing to accept and respect Tibetans, especially, in the current incredibly sensitive 
political climate of U.S. anti-immigrant politics? If even in Louisville other ethnic groups are 
being targeted with verbal (and sometimes physical) abuse for being different, why are Tibetans 
(for the most part) excluded from such xenophobia? However much it was pleasing to learn from 
most of my Tibetan interlocutors in the U.S. that Tibetan immigrants have not been targets of full 
fledge hate-crimes, the puzzle of their relatively benign treatment remains. A few of my 
interlocutors did mention that Americans who assumed that the Tibetans were not born in the U.S 
passively criticized them for having an accent, or, in other cases. However, I recognize that 
Tibetans in the U.S. cannot completely bypass the history of orientalism and racism that is 
common for American residents of Asian heritage. Regardless, Americans bowing to Tibetan 
monks is an action by regular Americans signifying an acceptance and respect for Tibetans and 
Tibetan Buddhism in general.  
I argue that there are three main reasons why those Americans bowed to Tibetan monks 
in Louisville, KY that relate to the larger issue of why Tibetan immigrants, for the most part, have 
been well treated. First, Louisville has laid a good foundation for inter-faith dialogue between 
different religious institutions. Moreover, Louisville’s Mayor even encourages this inter-faith 
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work by inviting the leaders of different religion to consult with him about the city’s progress. It 
is within this space of inter-faith diversity that Louisville’s Tibetan monastery (and the Tibetan 
diaspora) found recognition in the city of Louisville. Second, the popular charismatic impression 
created by the 14th Dalai Lama has bequeathed to Western audiences an overflowing sense of 
respect towards the Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. We can see the evidence for this in Louisville 
Mayor Greg Fischer wanting to make a visit to the Dalai Lama’s hometown in Dharamsala and 
proudly presenting his work on the compassion project. The compassion project has been front 
and center in Mayor Fischer’s election campaign since 2010; and, finally, after eight years, with 
the project showing good social-economic progress, he wanted to share this with the Dalai Lama 
(See Louisville’s website for project progress: 
https://louisvilleky.gov/government/compassionate-city).  
Lastly, the Tibetan diaspora has created an incredible balance between the pre-existing 
western imaginaries about Tibet and re-educating western audiences to an appreciation of actual 
Tibetan practices. This can be seen from David’s remark above about American Buddhist 
followers not employing the “superstitious” or ritual aspects of Buddhism, the Louisville 
monastery’s use of two different registered names for their religious and educational purposes, 
and from the Louisville monastery’s efforts to address their American audience’s demand for 
Buddhist philosophical rather than obviously religious seminars.  
These factors of inter-faith dialogue, the Dalai Lama’s popularity, and the Louisville 
monastery’s efforts to keep up the interest of American audiences in Buddhism, have made a 
generous space for Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism in the landscape of Louisville city. However, 
Tibetans with Asian phenotypic profiles may never be exempt from the racial profiling and 
orientalist attitude commonly held by Americans towards Asians residing in the U.S. There could 
be a whole other study about Tibetans becoming Asian Americans, but this will have to be 
addressed in future research. My research now only covers the visible public actions that 
immigrants face while interacting with Americans in the U.S. From my observations in the city of 
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Louisville, I note that Louisville residents have accepted Tibetans better than any other immigrant 
community. I argue that, ultimately, the reason for this better acceptance of the Tibetan diaspora 
lies in the flexible liminality of the Tibetan exile community.  
 
Tibetans – Ideal Refugees/Immigrants 
The Tibetan diaspora have entered the Western refugee stereotype of the “ideal 
refugee/immigrant”75. Tibetan exiles have built on the previous Western imaginaries of Shangri-
La and yet are re-educating their Western audiences with actual Tibetan practices. From my 
observation, other migrant populations in Louisville (like Syrian refuges, Bhutanese refugees, 
etc.) did not have the same type of voice or power to influence Americans. In order to better 
evaluate the “ideal refugee/immigrant” stereotype in the U.S., I will use scholarship on 
‘refugeeness’ in Anthropology. It can be limiting to attempt to describe the ‘refugee’ experience 
using simply legal definitions by “category” of people. In the case of Tibetans, they are not 
recognized by the UNHCR or host nations as refugees (See Chap 6). Thus, refugeeness is more 
often recognized within refugee studies in Anthropology as a better avenue to understanding the 
holistic experiences of refugees.  
Lissa Malkki (1995, 1996) argues that refugeeness is a “matter of becoming” that is 
learned by the refugees from the administrators that oversee refugees in exile. Malkki argues that 
for refugee administrators, including the media and sponsors, there is a preference to see a distant 
image of refugees (i.e. the physical display of them as a homeless, helpless, victimized, bodily ill, 
mass of bodies), rather than to hear their stories of displacement. Malkki argues that the physical 
display of refugees was what the administrators, media, and sponsors considered a better 
representation of refugeeness, rather than the real voices and stories conveyed by the refugees 
																																																								
75 The scholarship only speaks of the legal category of refugee, but since Tibetans are not 
considered legal refugees but have to seek asylum once they land in the U.S., I will call them 
immigrants. Besides the geo-political purposes, any Tibetan exiles could easily fall under the 
category of refugee or asylum-seeker.		
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themselves. Moreover, by creating an image of a “universal humanitarian subject,” humanitarian 
interventions can provide a “real refugee” to donors and evoke sympathy from sponsors. Marta 
Szcepanik (2016) references the recent Syrian refugee crisis in Europe to illustrate that politicians 
and media do play out the same stereotypes, first described by Malkki, of good versus bad 
refugees. Szcepanik also argues that material possessions, gender, travelling single or with 
family, places of origin, and reliance on social welfare are factors used for deciding between good 
versus bad refugees. Aihwa Ong’s (2003) research on Asian American immigrants in California 
argues that belonging to the U.S. has always had “unofficial social meanings and criteria,” which 
the government imbues when training new immigrant subjects via policies, and through welfare 
distribution. However, the government also has an orientalist tendency or bias when training 
Asian Americans to become “model minorities”76. For example, Ong argues that early Chinese 
immigrants in the 1920s were taught to be civilized by scientific management in factory settings 
and by training for moral conduct via refugee resettlement agencies.  
I agree with Malkki and Szcepanik that refugeeness can become a learned skill for 
displaced people and immigrants. While refugeeness can be used to define the conditions of 
exclusion and displacement (Novak 2013; Puscas 2009; Agier 2002; Chimni 2000; Gallagher 
1996; Keely 1996; Malkki 1995), it also can encompass the burden of resettlement and 
assimilation for immigrants in the host country (Marfleet 2007; Cernea 2000; Mortland 1987; 
Chambers 1986). In this light, refugeeness can define the burden for refugee/immigrant of 
becoming “ideal refugees” and “model minorities.”  Lissa Malkki (1995, 1996) argues that 
refugees have to adapt to refugee administrators’ expectations of a universal humanitarian subject 
to better evoke sympathy from donors and sponsors, and as Szcepanik (2016) and Ong (2003) 
explain, refugees/immigrants are also subjected to the host country’s ideal standard for 
																																																								
76 There has been much research conducted to understand the “model minority” construction in 
the case of Asians in North America. The “model minority” notion signifies individuals who are 
intelligent, industrious, enduring, obedient, academically resourceful, and highly successful. 
(Lee1996, Sue & Okazki 1991, Suzuki 1989, 2002, Min 2004, Li 2005)  
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citizenship. In the U.S., refugees/immigrants are expected to shed all foreign cultural tendencies 
and adapt American moral values, and, especially, learn to become independent of government 
welfare and humanitarian industry. From my observation of the refugee resettlement agency, 
refugees were pushed and bureaucratically controlled to have employment as soon as possible 
(within first 3 months of arrival) and, thus, to become financially self-sufficient. Refugee 
resettlement staff members rewarded an immigrant’s financial independence with government 
financial incentives and social praise77.  
One aspect of the U.S. government’s perspective that already put Tibetans in the “ideal 
refugee/immigrant” or “model minority” category was their recognition that most Tibetans do not 
rely on government welfare or humanitarian assistance. Because most Tibetans are not classified 
as refugees, Tibetan exiles cannot rely on humanitarian agencies to help them resettle in the U.S. 
(See Chap 6); they have to do it all by their own skills or contacts. Soon after applying for asylum 
from the U.S. government, most Tibetans are forced to seek out jobs because they cannot easily 
receive or rely on government welfare. Moreover, Tibetans who arrive in the United States 
sponsored by educational Institutions can finish their educations before having to seek a change 
in their immigration status. This is in contrast to officially resettled refugees who have to seek 
work immediately.  
All of these factors filter the Tibetan exile population down to a carefully selected, best-
of-the-best, Tibetans; those who could settle best in the U.S. (See Chap 6). As a result, most 
Tibetan interlocutors I spoke with were well educated, English speaking, highly skilled, and 
highly motivated to acquire good-paying jobs, hence, apparently confirming the stereotype of the 
“model minority” so often characterizing Asians in North America.  
A Tibetan woman I spoke with who came to the U.S. on a college full-scholarship 
explained to me, “As a migrant, we know we got very lucky, we have this opportunity that others 
																																																								
77 In Kentucky, the Wilson/Fish (W/F) program is a subset of government funding to increase 
refugee’s self-sufficiency. W//F awards refugees with bonus financial reward for acquiring job 
within the first three months of arrival.  
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back home really want. So, we feel like we have to prove ourselves, make something of 
ourselves” (Interview 2018). The combination of high-skill employment training, impressive 
educational background, and the grit to work hard for good employment in the U.S. have shone 
Tibetans from U.S. government perspective  “ideal refugees” or a “model minority.” Indeed, I 
have observed that, in a way, Tibetans do fit the description of the stereotypical model minority 
as defined by the U.S. government. What this characterization alone does not reveal is how the 
Tibetan exile community has built intricately designed religious and educational institutions, and 
hanging-out infrastructural spaces, to help educate and socialize Tibetan exiles before they come 
so they satisfy the criteria for U.S. resettlement. Thereafter, Tibetan exiles are further carefully 
selected by U.S. institutions (those sponsoring them for visas); and usually such institutions are 
aware of the Tibetan political cause, and already sympathize with the Tibetan exile community, 
which is why they are willing to help Tibetan immigrate to the U.S. in the first place.  
I argue that the effort from the Tibetan exile community to nurture Tibetan exiles to make 
them “fit” enough to pass through some U.S. institution’s selection process, and the U.S. 
embassy’s visa process, proudces best-of-the-best individuals (though education, language skills, 
religious degree, etc.) just so they will have an opportunity to come to the U.S. As a result, 
Tibetan exiles that had the opportunity to get sponsors and resettle in the U.S. display “model 
minority” traits in the U.S. It should be noted that I am not advocating, here, the selective criteria 
modeled by the U.S. government because they do not help the entire Tibetan diaspora, only a 
selected few. Regardless of this, I have noticed that the Tibetan exiles who make it to the U.S. 
already express their best model minority traits through their educational advances, financial 
independence, community service, and so on. These individuals had to nurture these skills just to 
be able to immigrate to the U.S. Hence, I argue, ultimately, that it is the combined force of the 
Dalai Lama’s charisma, the Tibetan exile community’s institutions designed to nurture Tibetans 
in exile, and the selective immigration of Tibetan diaspora in the U.S., that has allowed Tibetan 
diaspora to fit into the stereotype of the “ideal refugee/immigrant,” and “model minority.” Thus, I 
 
	 197	
agree with Malkki and Szcepanik that “refugeeness” and being an “ideal refugee” is an act of 
becoming.  
We can see with the case of the Tibetan diaspora that though they lack access to the 
category of refugee, and thus humanitarian assistance, they are still responding to external 
expectations for them to “act” according to the media’s expectations about good refugees. This is 
a reflection of flexible liminality working among Tibetan exiles. That is, when Tibetans are 
influenced by multiple geo-polities, they adjust their practices accordingly to match such external 
forces. As Ong has commented, there is a certain standard of expectation immigrants must meet 
to become citizens in the U.S., and Tibetan exiles are meeting those criteria because their 
resettlement process is already so highly shaped by external geo-politics. Thus, they are not 
learning to become a “model minority” after resettlement; rather, Tibetan exiles that have the 
potential to be “model minority” are being selected through the international Tibetan movement’s 
own bureaucratic filter to resettle in the U.S.    
 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter with an unusual story about regular Americans in Louisville bowing 
down to show respect to Tibetan monks in the middle of a road. The whole chapter is structured 
around trying to understand this behavior by regular Americans in a climate of anti-immigrant 
feeling in the U.S. In the last section, I asked if Tibetans in the U.S. have embodied the stereotype 
of the “ideal refugee” or of the “model minority.” I have ethnographically described the city of 
Louisville to better understand the models and values of its host residents. This led us to the 
knowledge that Louisville has a strong inter-faith tradition that is upheld both by the leadership of 
various religious institutions but also by the city’s Mayor as well. It is in the space created by this 
welcoming environment of inter-faith work in Louisville that the Tibetan monastery and Tibetan 
diaspora have found their way into the city. The Dalai Lama’s charismatic personality has 
distributed the good reputation of Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhism to Western audiences.  
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Additionally, I argue that the Louisville monastery upholds a balance between Western 
imaginaries of Tibet and actual Tibetan Buddhism, and reeducates its Western audience using 
true-Tibet and true-Tibetan Buddhism. I contend this too is a trait of a flexible liminality that 
delicately adjusts to external influences. All these reasons combined have left a powerful 
impression of Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhism on their Western audience, which, I argue, is the 
context within which the story of Americans bowing to Tibetan monk in Louisville, KY makes 
sense. Lastly, I also argue that Tibetans embody the stereotype of “model minority” and “ideal 
refugee/immigrant” only because they are nurtured by surrounding education, religious, social 
institutions to pass the rigorous vetting to immigrate to the U.S. prior to resettlement in the U.S. 
that helps them act like a model minority in the U.S. Hence, the Tibetan exile community has 
formed institutions to craft best Tibetans who can pass the extremely competitive process for 
resettlement in the U.S. ultimately creating them into American standard “model minority”. This 
tactic is, what I argue, part of Tibetan exile’s unique geo-politically crafted refugeeness.  
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Chapter 8: The Qualities of Liminality: Degree of Flexibility in Liminal Condition 
Introduction & Overview 
At a public event in the U.S., I met a Tibetan-Canadian woman, Choden. She was a middle-aged 
woman who had moved to Canada with her parents at around 10 years of age and grew up 
listening to her parent’s story of fleeing Tibet. Now Choden runs an NGO that helps Tibetans 
living in Tibet. Choden proudly stated,  
“We are so small and [yet] we are so loud; [playfully] added in fact all of my Kurdistani 
and Palestinian friends are jealous of the Tibetan [nationalist/political] campaign here 
[U.S. and Canada].” 
 
There is some truth in the above statement made by Choden. The Tibetan exile community has 
exhibited a proactive cultural practice that helps them adjust to local circumstances, Dharamsala, 
India or Louisville, KY, wherever their exile-hood has landed them. I argue that the Tibetan exile 
community uses this unique proactive cultural practice to layout opportunities for individual 
Tibetan exiles to enjoy better life chances. I call this unique cultural practice flexible liminality. 
Flexible liminality can be used to describe the cultural practice of the Tibetan exile community, 
and the reason for the Tibetan diaspora’s socio-economic and political success worldwide. 
Describing the revealing and advantageous use of flexible liminality by the Tibetan exile 
community has been my dissertation’s key goal. However, for this chapter, I would also like to 
highlight a practical theoretical use of flexible liminality. In order to find out why the Tibetan 
diaspora’s political plight and cultural preservation struggle has been so successful compared 
with other exile groups, we will have to look at exile groups more generally through the 
theoretical lenses of flexible liminality. 
Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that flexible liminality relies on two aspects – 
geo-political influences acting on the ethnic group, and the ethnic groups’ own ability to adjust 
their cultural practices to such external influences. In each chapter of this dissertation I have 
explained different aspects of the Tibetan exile’s flexible liminality – from multiple geo-political 
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influences that surround them to tactical uses of Tibetan exile formal and informal institutions to 
help guide the cultural practice of Tibetan individuals. It shows an active effort on the part of the 
Tibetan exile community to gain the most out of their liminal conditions. I will summarize the 
characteristics of flexible liminality as a cultural practice that I have learned from the Tibetan 
exile community and apply the flexible liminality theory to analyze what types of liminality 
different exile groups are experiencing.  
My objective in this chapter is to first describe the theoretical contribution of my theory 
of flexible liminality to refugee and liminality studies. I suggest that the theory of flexible 
liminality tests for the quality of the liminality being experienced, which is an important 
characteristic to know about a group or individual experiencing liminal conditions. Then, I will 
summarize four distinct attributes of the Tibetan exile community’s flexible liminality. Next, I 
will explain the different types of liminal characteristics visible for the Syrian exile community 
and Latino community in the U.S. I argue that these communities in the U.S. have liminality that 
historically changes back and forth between flexible and inflexible forms depending on U.S. 
politics. A new look at case studies from two liminal communities will help portray how to use 
the theory of flexible liminality in order to test for another exile group’s quality of liminality. 
After looking at these case studies of the Syrian and Latino communities, I will revisit Choden, 
the Tibetan-Canadian woman, and her statement about the success of the Tibetan exile 
community in comparison to other exile groups, to inquire why that has come to be so. Finally, I 
will argue that the theory of flexible liminality could be a useful analytical tool for government 
and refugee service agencies to use to help understand, and more fairly deal with, a marginalized 
group’s quality of liminality. Nonetheless, there is still more research to be done on liminality and 
refugee studies, and for that, I will talk about gaps in this study and recommend future scholarly 
work.  
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Theoretical Contribution to Anthropology 
Liminality and Refugee Studies 
Liminality is a common condition experienced by all exile populations in the world (van 
Gennep 1960).  However, I argue that not all who go through liminality have the same 
experience. In anthropology, the early scholars of liminality were mostly just concerned with 
distinguishing liminality as a standard structural condition (Turner 1967; Douglas 1966). Arnold 
van Gennep was the first to introduce the idea of liminality in his book The Rites of Passage 
(1960 [1909]), as a transitional rite marked as a period of transition. Victor Turner further 
developed and popularized the idea of liminality through his essay Betwixt and Between: The 
Liminal Period in Rites of Passage (1967), and later through the Ndembu ethnography in his 
book The Forest of Symbols (1969). For Turner, liminality is any situation, object, or subject, 
taking place in any space and time that is stuck in the “betwixt and between” (Thomassen 2009). 
In her book, Purity and Danger (1966), Mary Douglas takes the idea of liminality a little further 
by seeing liminality as a conceptual structure that is important to the wellbeing of a functioning 
society. Douglas takes a neo-functionalist approach to explain why well-organized societies need 
to include and exclude objects to maintain social categories and orders (Douglas 1966).  
I contend that surely there would be objects in categories other than inside or outside of 
society as described by early functionalist scholars. For example, just thinking of one case for 
now, the Hijra (transgender- male to female) population of North India (Nanda 1990). In North 
India, the hijra group are for the most part excluded, even looked down upon, from the point of 
view of conventionally patriarchal Indian family and society (Nanda 1990). Even I have observed 
the hostility hijras experience from the regular Indian population during my fieldwork in India. In 
Delhi I saw hijras, in dire conditions of health, begging by the jammed up traffic; and when they 
walked over to our taxi, the driver, yelling obscenities, just shooed them away. However, I also 
know that they are often happily accepted by the regular Indian community during religious 
ceremonies, and are deemed religiously important to society (Nanda 1990).  
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Later liminality scholars have recognized that there is more than one standard threshold 
of liminality, which created a need to explore the characteristics of liminality itself (Jackson 
1990, Garsten 1999, Dutton 2005, Yang 2000). Thus, we have studies that have imagined 
liminality on a scale that placed a subject closer to extreme liminality or farther away from the 
extreme experience of liminality (Jackson 1990, Garsten 1999, Dutton 2005, Yang 2000, 
Thomasen 2009, 2015). Thomasen’s analysis of Turner’s explanation of liminality states: 
 If the dimensions of subject/space/time each have three basic dimensions, one could 
bring in another variable, namely “scale,” referring to the “degree” to which liminality is 
experienced, or, in other words, the intensiveness of the liminal or period… it does seem 
meaningful to suggest that there are degrees of liminality, and that the degree depends on 
the extent to which the liminal experience can be weighted against persisting structures 
(Thomassen 2009:18) 
 
Similar to liminality scholars, early refugee study scholars have also homogenized the liminal 
conditions of refugees and immigrants.  Giorgio Agamben, in his book, Homo Sacer (1995), puts 
forward the idea of liminality in refugee studies through the theoretical concept of the “bare life.” 
Agamben uses this term to describe the crude form of a state’s control of an individual’s body 
shown in current day refugees residing in camps. The nature of “bare life” (as revealed by 
refugees) creates problems for the modern nation-state because refugees bring into question the 
taken-for-granted idea of a link between a birth-nation and individual-citizens (Agamben 1988). 
Liisa Malkki, in her book Purity and Exile (1995), draws ideas from the functionalist perspective 
of what nation-state’s need within the liminal or polluted category, and applies it to a refugee 
population. Malkki problematizes the universalized image of the ‘refugee’ and its association 
with bare humanity. Malkki argues that a refugee population threatens the “national order of 
things” by being “matter out of place.”  
The majority of current literature on refugees relies on various exclusion theories that 
speak of refugees as “bare-life,” liminal, and polluted beings (Chambers 1986; Harrell-Bond 
1986; Chavez 1992; Turner 2010; Owens 2009). Most critical refugee scholarship recognizes the 
influence that the geo-political and humanitarian organization’s refugee category has on 
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individuals’ social-political identities (Malkki 1995, Doty, 1996, Tambiah 1985, Bigo 2002, 
Turner 2010). While I agree it is important to understand the refugee experience in terms of geo-
political complexities surrounding the exile population, I contend there must be more than one 
type of liminality experience for refugee and immigrant life.  
 Similar to later liminality studies scholars, refugee study scholars have also distinguished 
between the characteristics of a variety of refugee experiences in terms of their degree of 
liminality. For example, in refugee studies, scholars have described those refugees living closer to 
the host community as having been assimilated and less liminal compared to refugees living in 
isolated camps (Malkki 1995, Turner 2010) – thus stating differences in socio-economic 
experience for refugees who live in more isolated camps versus refugees who live in town 
alongside the host community (Chambers 1986, Whitaker 1999, Cernea 2000, Malkki 1995, 
Marfleet 2007, Mortland 1987, Montclos and Kagwanja 2000, Turner 2010). I recognize the 
importance in understanding the degree of liminality for refugee and immigrant groups; however, 
there has not been a discussion on the quality of liminality experienced by refugee or immigrant 
groups. And the quality of liminality I particularly want to discuss here is flexibility or 
inflexibility. I argue that this quality of liminality is an important characteristic of liminality, and 
that, by considering this, my theory of flexible liminality can contribute towards both liminality 
and refugee studies. While the degree of liminality is a test for how close or far away a group or 
individual is from extreme liminal conditions, my theory of flexible liminality looks closely at the 
type of liminality, regardless of its degree, lived by the group or individual. The theory of flexible 
liminality tests for the quality of liminality for a group or individuals already within the liminal 
condition. In other words, I argue that the theory of flexible liminality contributes to our 
understanding by showing that while liminal conditions may vary by degree of liminality, they 
also do on a quality scale that ranges from inflexible to considerably flexible.  
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Characteristics of the Tibetan Exile Community’s Flexible Liminality 
1. Multiple Exclusions 
In summarizing my argument about multiple exclusions, I have argued that Tibetan exile groups 
attract interest from several, competing, geopolitically powerful states and power blocks: namely, 
China, India, and the West (U.S., Canada, Australia, France, Switzerland etc.). Tibetan exiles are 
excluded from each geo-political entity in different ways that best suit the entities involved given 
their international relationships with other competing states and powers. For example, India 
allows Tibetan exiles to stay in the country as foreign guests but has not legally issued them a 
UNCHR ‘refugee’ category because that would pit them directly against China, which claims that 
Tibetan exiles are not victimized population (Nowak 1984; HRLN 2007; Artiles 2009; 
McConnell 2011). On the other hand, western countries, like the U.S., have allowed Tibetan 
individuals to apply for resettlement in the West through individual applications from asylum-
seekers but without a continuous open resettlement program for the whole exile group (Hess 
2009; Yeshi 2012; TJC 2011). As a result, I argue that western countries like the U.S. have been 
able to maintain a delicate balance between obliquely recognizing Chinese behavior in Tibet 
without directly confronting them about Tibet’s status, something that would endanger their 
international relationship with China. Thus, the U.S. does not recognize Tibetans as members of a 
‘victimized population’ generally, but does, or did, grant selected Tibetans human rights-based 
asylum according to each individual Tibetan’s situation (Hess 2009). Hence, three different 
nation states show three different forms of exclusion. 
I argue that the Tibetan exile community has responded to each geo-political entity’s 
exclusion differently in order to best acquire opportunities from competing geo-polities. First, the 
Tibetan exile community is actively retaliating against the Chinese government’s (false) narrative 
that Tibet was never an independent state by creating a new sense of Tibetan nationalism, 
‘Tibetanness’, which included responsibility for members of the diaspora to speak out about  the 
Tibetan political plight to outsiders (See Chap 2 & 6). Moreover, the exile community is 
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renegotiating their Tibetan identity to include, or incorporate, a larger Buddhist population in 
India, Nepal, and Bhutan, as Tibetans (See Chap 2). The Tibetan exile community has found the 
political freedom to express their Tibetan nationalist identity, thus ensuring that larger numbers of 
Tibetans participate in Tibetan exile social-cultural-political welfare and activism (See Chap 2). 
Second, since most Tibetan exile social and political organizations are in India, the exile 
community has found a stronghold in India for political activism (See Chap 2). To maintain this 
stronghold, the Tibetan exile community discourages individual Tibetans from taking up Indian 
citizenship as a means of escaping their excluded and marginalized status in India (See Chap 2, 4 
&6).  
Lastly, Tibetan exile community is paving a path for individual Tibetans to resettle in the 
West and find their better life opportunities (See Chap 4&6). The Tibetan exile community, along 
with exile political leaders and the exile government, has been working slowly to build up a good 
reputation for Tibetans in the West through their marketing of Buddhist philosophy, liberal 
humanist values, and the charismatic appeal of the 14th Dalai Lama to the West (See Chap 6&7). 
These paved the way for Tibetan individuals to resettle in the western countries. However, 
Tibetan individuals were also attempting to align themselves to best suit the positions laid out by 
institutions and agents in the West so that they could be sponsored to resettle in the West (See 
Chap 4&6). These institutions and agents in the West were opening doors for Tibetan individuals 
out of empathy for Tibetan exiles in general, while also selecting the ‘best’ of Tibetans in terms 
of them having the appropriate skills needed by their own institutions (See Chap 6&7). Thus, in 
various ways, the effort of the Tibetan exile community slowly carved a way for individual 
Tibetans to resettle in the West and acquire better life chances.  
2. Cultural Practice of Tibetan Exile Community 
Flexible liminality is a cultural practice adopted by the Tibetan exile community. I argue that 
flexible liminality is not just an individual attitude, but a distinct set of cultural practices set up by 
formal and informal institutions over time. I observed these institutions manifested in the form of 
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the Tibetan government in exile, cafés and non-profits in Dharamsala, and as Tibetan community 
centers and monasteries in the U.S. (See Chap 4, 6&7). I also found other less tangible 
institutions guiding Tibetan exiles in the form of social-media platforms to maintain exile social 
networks that also spread and maintain the responsibility Tibetan exiles feel to externalize their 
political agenda and maintain their refugee ‘mark’ through the display of ‘Tibetan-ness’ (See 
Chap 6). I argue that these institutions built by the Tibetan exile community set guidelines for 
Tibetan individuals to follow in developing attitudes and behaviors that fit well within the 
customs of these institutions (See Chap 4, 6 &7). In this last sense, flexible liminality for Tibetans 
is also a form of habitus, as described by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977). 
 All this starts from a Tibetan government in exile that has laid down a path for Tibetans 
in exile to follow to find good life chances wherever their exile-hood may land them. In adopting 
liberal democratic governance and western liberal humanist philosophies, Tibetan exiles have 
created a sympathetic space within a foreign geo-political zone, the West that cannot completely 
either accept or reject Tibetans (See Chap 7). Of course, the Tibetan diaspora, living in various 
marginalized conditions, and spread throughout the Indian subcontinent (including Nepal and 
Bhutan), China (in the Tibetan Autonomous Area), and various western countries, must adjust to 
radically different conditions (See Chap 6).  
It is not enough for Tibetan exile leaders alone to uphold the cultural practice of flexible 
liminality to provide better life chances for their exile community; instead, I argue that there are 
institutions of various degrees of formality placed throughout the Tibetan exile community to 
ensure that Tibetan individuals are properly guided (See Chap 4, 5, 6&7). For example, the cafés 
and non-profits in Dharamsala, which create a relaxing ambiance in which Tibetan and foreign 
tourists can spend time socializing (See Chap 4). These infrastructures of hanging out – of cafés 
and non-profits ‘experiences’ -- enable diverse populations within the city to bond together, and 
for the most part, there were abundant Tibetans and foreign tourists or Indians who were 
interested in the welfare and plight of the Tibetan exile community (See Chap 4). These 
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infrastructures invited in participants for educational or social welfare purposes and promoted 
bonding in the form of teacher-student relationships, casual friendships, and connecting 
colleagues for scholarly and human rights campaigns (See Chap 4 &6).  
 Another type of institution is the political campaign of “Free Tibet” that has paved a path 
for Tibetan exiles to portray their political plight to the global media (See Chap 5). The “Free 
Tibet” campaign stretches out to encompass all directions of political opinion among its 
participants – whether human rights, Rangzen, or Umaylam. In this way the infrastructure of 
“Free Tibet” dissolves contradicting opinions to form one united front (See Chap 5). This is a 
very good example of the cultural practice of flexible liminality, wherein one can find 
maneuvering room even within dire, marginalized, conditions. For Tibetan individuals, “Free 
Tibet” has turned into a larger-than-life, or larger than their own small community’s life, political 
cry for the exile community and their supporters (See Chap 5).  Because of this, they are 
obligated to forgo the public expression of individual opinions and join the campaign to form a 
united voice against Chinese occupation. In this way, the “Free Tibet” infrastructure takes over to 
fulfill the purpose of the Tibetan exile community and to guides individual Tibetans to participate 
in the larger political campaign without the friction of openly expressed individual political 
differences (See Chap 5).  
3. Downside of Flexible Liminality  
There are two looming negative aspects of the Tibetan exile’s flexible liminality. First, the 
condition of liminality itself is not an easy space for any individual to occupy (See Chap 2&6). It 
is a marginalized situation wherein people experience intense socio-political-economic 
discrimination. Some of the problems experienced by the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala 
were social discrimination by certain Indian populations, youth who were highly educated but 
unemployed, and the continual insecurity of being stateless people (See Chap 2&6). Further, 
Tibetan flexible liminality does not cover or benefit all Tibetans in exile. Many Tibetans who, 
because of lack of resources or language skills, cannot become part of the infrastructure that 
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provides opportunities for success have to dwell in the world of legal insecurity, socio-economic 
deprivation, fear of persecution in various foreign host countries, and so on (See Chap 2&6). In 
the West, the largest problem expressed to me by the Tibetan exile community was that of 
maintaining their Tibetan identity and performing their Tibetan-ness by becoming politically 
active (See Chap 6). For young Tibetans growing up in the West its is difficult that exile 
government leaders, and the Tibetan community in general, are expecting them to resist too much 
assimilation in the west and adopt a large nationalist responsibility for a state that they have never 
seen (See Chap 6). Tibetan flexible liminality is a path paved for a liminal life; how will it fare 
among Tibetan youths who no longer feel quite so liminal?  However, regardless, flexible 
liminality is a tough practice along a difficult path in different ways for each Tibetan exile.  
The second negative aspect of flexible liminality in Tibetans is that Dharamsala has 
become a mecca for Tibetan exile socio-political activities but also a fertile ground for 
manifestations of flexible liminality. While it is good for the Tibetan exile community to receive 
global attention for their activities, for Tibetan individuals it can become overbearing to 
constantly receive this type of attention (See Chap 2). Dharamsala was filled with foreign tourists 
attracted by the Tibetan exile community and the type of activities in which they could participate 
with Tibetans (See Chap 4). However, one result of so many foreigners travelling to see 
Dharamsala’s Tibetans was what one might call visibility fatigue, as Tibetan individuals and 
organizations were prompted to answer, over and over again, deep political and identity questions 
on an everyday basis (See Chap 2). This transforms needed and wanted attention for Tibetans into 
an uncomfortable daily form of too-close scrutiny. I saw many Tibetans shying away from 
foreigners even before they asked any questions (See Chap 2). Many Tibetan individuals in 
Dharamsala even saw my polite requests for help with my research work as overbearing attention 
(See Chap 2).  And I often questioned whether my research was helpful or merely another 
intrusive burden for Tibetans in Dharamsala. Ultimately, my Tibetan research assistant in 
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Dharamsala was a great help to me when it came to understanding this invisible, yet overbearing, 
part of the lives of Dharamsala Tibetans (See Chap 2).  
4. Transforming Surrounding Geo-Politics  
The Tibetan exile community is influenced by multiple geo-political entities and their mutual 
competitions, but they are also active in transforming their host communities and anyone who is 
interested and listening to them (See Chap 6&7). I have learned to understand how a marginalized 
group could also actively transform the geo-politics that surround them through the Tibetan exile 
community. Most refugee scholarship explains the victimizing conditions of exile communities, 
and rightfully so, because most exile communities do not have the same scope for active agency 
as I found in the Tibetan exile community. When the Tibetan exile community first came face to 
face with outsiders, they were surprised by the western orientalist imaginaries already present for 
Tibetans (See Chap 7). Tibetan leadership, headed by the 14th Dalai Lama, used the same space 
crafted by such western imaginaries to access humanitarian aid and support for the resettlement of 
Tibetan exiles. Tibetan exiles in India and the West were surrounded by the mythology of 
Shangri-La and the shadows of Lamaism (See Chapter 7). I have observed that the Tibetan exile 
community is slowly re-educating their foreign audiences, and their supporters in general, about 
the real Tibet and Tibetan culture (See Chapter 7).   
 We can find the slow transformation of the foreign audience created by the Tibetan exile 
community in the popularity of Tibetan political activism, in the widening acceptance of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the West and India (Nepal and Bhutan), and the increasingly easy acceptance of the 
Tibetan population in various geo-politics (See Chapter 6&7). It should be noted that I am not 
claiming that Tibetan individuals have any powers of influence over larger geo-political entities 
such as states or the UN; rather, it is the Tibetan exile community’s cultural practices that have 
crafted a space for Tibetan individuals to find ways to assimilate in foreign host countries. These 
spaces are found in the form of educational, religious, and human-rights activist organizations, 
and so on (See Chapter 4,5,6&7). There are various political activist organizations dedicated to 
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promoting the Tibetan political cause, including the “Free Tibet” movement. A large number of 
supporters for the Tibetan political cause are non-Tibetans from India and from various western 
countries. The popularity of Tibetan political movements of the “Free Tibet” movement lead 
through activist organizations like the Students of Free Tibet, shows the dedication of the Tibetan 
community to educating other non-Tibetans about the Chinese occupation and human rights 
violations in Tibet (See Chap 5). Besides political activism, the Tibetan exile community has also 
found themselves being welcomed to various religious centers in India and the West (See Chapter 
7). The ideas of Tibetan Buddhism as either unintelligible Lamaism or as a new-age experiment 
with tantric Buddhism has been replaced by real Tibetan Lamas (Buddhism teachers, including 
the Dalai Lama), who are teaching true Tibetan-Buddhist philosophies guided within the realm of 
Tibetan religious customs, like the firewood puja, Tibetan deity worship, prayers, etc. (See Chap 
7).  
Lastly, Tibetans have found themselves resettling in various foreign countries and each 
Tibetan is expected to take-up the responsibility of upholding Tibetan-ness (See Chap 6). This 
Tibetan-ness requires one to identify with their liminal place in the world as a Tibetan exile 
recognizing the Tibetan refugee mark within them regardless of their citizenship (See Chap 6). 
They also must externalize their Tibetan political cause to outsiders as a nationalist duty towards 
the Tibetan state. The Tibetan exile community, government, and family members all expect 
Tibetan individuals to preserve Tibetan culture, values, and nationalist duty (See Chap 6).  As a 
result, the Tibetan political cause is popular and sympathized with by people within various 
nation states. At the same time, the Tibetan exile community also manages to re-educate and 
transform their geo-political interlocutors wherever their exile-hood has landed them (See 
Chapter 4,5,6&7).   
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Applying Flexible Liminality to other Exile Groups 
Analyzing the Quality of Liminality: the Case of a Syrian Exile Community 
It is important to note that the marginalized ethnic groups this dissertation seeks to 
understand are experiencing liminal conditions. The key contribution of this dissertation is to 
provide a way to test the characteristics of a group’s liminal condition. Previous scholars have 
talked about the ways to test for the degree of liminality of a marginalized group as stated above. 
However, I am not making the same argument. The quality that flexible liminality, as a 
theoretical concept, allows us to address is how flexible or inflexible an ethnic group’s liminal 
condition is. Thus, I am trying to understand the quality of a marginalized group’s liminality.  
It would be best to try to understand the quality of liminality as on a scale with one end 
being “flexible,” the other end “inflexible,” and the rest leaning towards either flexibility or 
inflexibility. As mentioned above, the Tibetan exile group is flexible in their liminality because of 
their ability to maneuver within their marginalized conditions, and transform, or at least have an 
effect on, the geo-politics influencing them. In Chapter 3, I applied the theory of flexible 
liminality to Dharamsala’s host communities, the Gaddi and the Gorkhali, to show why they 
couldn’t develop the same cultural practice of flexible liminality as Tibetans. I concluded that 
while both communities (Gaddi and Gorkhali) were willing to adjust their cultural practices, they 
just did not have enough geo-political entities interested in them to allow maneuver within their 
marginalized conditions. Thus, the Dharamsala host communities were fairly inflexible in their 
quality of liminality.  
On the far side of the scale, a relevant example of a very inflexible liminality is that of 
the Syrian exile community. As of December 2017, the estimated number of Syrian refugees 
living outside of Syria was 5,440,749 (UNHCR 2017). There are approximately forty-eight host 
countries where the Syrian refugee population is over 1000, and thirty-three host countries where 
the Syrian refugee population is over 10,000 (UNCHR 2017). Due to this mass resettlement of 
Syrian refugees, geo-polities from North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia (a selected 
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few countries) are highly interested in them. This upsurge, mass migration of Syrian exile 
population has been one of the most highly discussed topics in international politics since 201178 
– even leading to the formation of its own name, the “Syrian Refugee Crisis.” Thus, it is safe to 
assume, in analyzing their quality of liminalit,y that the Syrian refugee population has been of 
interest to multiple geo-polities. However, the question is, how much maneuvering room, or 
influencing ability, do Syrian refugee group have to influence the attitudes and practices of the 
multiple geo-political entities that are interested in them?  
To answer this, we will take a look at some of the stances taken by the geo-political 
entities interested in the “Syrian Refugee Crisis.” In North America, the United States President 
Donald Trump kept his 2016 election campaign promise and immediately placed a ban on 
selected immigrant populations; that included Syrian refugees. The 2017 Muslim travel ban, 
executed by the Trump administration in the U.S., dropped Syrian resettlement in the U.S. from 
15,479 in 2016 to 3,024 in 2017 and to only 11 by April 2018 (Refugee Processing Center, 
USCIS 2018). In European countries, immigrants crossing the border to escape their victimized 
conditions increased steadily. Starting in 2007-2014, Greece and Bulgaria constructed a fence to 
keep immigrants from the Middle East and Africa from entering the country illegally (BBC 
2014). Other European countries like Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have conducted 
international negotiations to dissuade immigrants from entering or remaining in host countries.  
Nonetheless, in 2015, it was estimated that 1.02 million immigrants had arrived safely 
past European borders by sea, while over 3,700 had died or went missing trying to reach to 
European shores; and almost half of this population was from Syria (UNHCR & IOM 2015). 
Following the 2015 European Migration Crisis, the European Union imposed restrictions on 
refugee entries, leading to a political divides on immigration policies between countries in the 
																																																								
78 The spring of 2011 marked the beginning of the conflict in Syria between government of 
Bashar al-Assad and the various opposing forces. Many Syrians started by fleeing to close 
neighboring countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey. See Manuel Castells (2012) 
“Networks of Outrage and Hope” Polity Press. U.K.  
 
	 213	
European Union and non-member European countries (Park 2015, Greenhill 2016). In the Middle 
East, the countries neighboring Syria (namely Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan) have received most 
of the Syrian refugees. There are over 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, over 1 million in 
Lebanon, and over 1.4 million in Jordan (UNCHR 2018, Human Rights Watch 2018, Relief Web 
2018). While these host countries are allowing Syrian refugees to assimilate in cities, 
overpopulation and crowded cities have caused tension with the host communities. The large 
infiltration of the Syrian refugee population is an easy target for some politicians to aim blame for 
poor economies, structural problems, and any deterioration of public life.    
This negative response to the Syrian exile community from various geo-political 
directions shows that they have not, in general, been well received by surrounding states. In fact, 
Syrian refugee groups have come to have negative stereotypes associated with them in most host 
countries that leave them little room to influence the either polities that surround them or the 
geopolitics that led to their situation. A simple search on the Internet about the “Syrian Refugee 
Crisis” shows that the key issue for host nation-states, scholars, and the news media is dealing 
with the sheer volume of the Syrian exile population. The large number of Syrian refugees 
created two types of concerned dialogues: first, a fear of invasion by a large foreign population; 
second, discussion about the best strategies for resettling Syrian refugees. The most common 
stance taken by the geo-political entities to deal with the fear of immigrants (especially Syrians) 
has been to block their entry or limit the number of Syrian refugees allowed in, as seen by the 
actions taken by the U.S., U.K., Greece, Germany, and many others (UNHCR 2017, Ostrand 
2015, Berti 2015). In response, scholars have critiqued the narrow identity and moral criteria used 
by western governments for deciding which Syrian refugees might be accepted for resettlement 
(Alhanaee and Csala 2015, Heisbourg 2015, Kallius et. al. 2016, Collins et.al. 2018).  
While host countries are trying to decide whether they should resettle Syrian refugees or 
not, voices from the Syrian exile community have been drowned out. The only time the Syrian 
exile community was heard loudly was in 2015 when the body of a three-year old Syrian boy, 
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Ayland Kurdi, was washed up on the shore of Turkey (NRP 2015). Since then, the motion for 
Syrian resettlement has been activated again, along with the argument that all refugees, no matter 
their identity, are a victimized population deserving of the world’s empathy (Bello 2015, Ostrand 
2015, Holmes and Castaneda 2016). Popular media also supported the refugee resettlement 
movement; a good example is a popular poem by Warsan Shires called “Home” (2015), where 
she speaks in sympathy for African refugees like herself, citing the incident of Aylan Kurdi. A 
well-known stanza states,  
No one leave home unless  
home is the mouth of a shark  
You only run for the border  
when you see the whole city running as well 
no one puts their children in a boat 
unless the water is safer than land.  
  
However, this small feat of the Syrian refugee community did not last very long. The 
increase in immigrant and refugee quotas for European countries after 2015 only stirred up the 
discussion of a correlation to an increase in the crime rate in various host countries (The Atlantic 
2016, PEW 2016, Reuters 2018). In international politics, anti-immigrant politicians were 
blaming a real or imagined rise in the crime rate (especially related to murder and rape) on 
immigrants. For example, U.S. President Trump announced to the press regarding the 2016 New 
Year’s mass sexual assault in Germany79: “… and you know what a disaster this massive 
immigration has been to Germany and the people of Germany” (Washington Post 2016). The 
largest number of immigrants in 2014-2015 was the Syrian refugee community in Germany; 
however, nowhere during the news about the mass sexual assault did people hear from the Syrian 
refugee community directly. Later, the media revealed that there was not enough evidence to say 
definitively that this mass sexual assault had occurred at all (Independent.com, 2017). Similar 
instances of Syrian refugee being spuriously blamed have occurred in numerous host countries 
																																																								
79 In 2016, the New Year’s Eve mass sexual assault in Cologne, Hamburg and other German 
cities, was based on a received complaint that more than 1200 women were sexually assaulted. 
The perpetrators involved were thought to be from foreign Arab-speaking countries, and over 
2000 men of North African descendent were suspected of the assault (Washington Post, 2016). 
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like Canada, Lebanon, Sweden, and Italy (Economist 2018, NewYork Post 2018, New Arab 
2018).  
Moreover, many interviews releasing the “real voices” of Syrian refugees have been 
tainted with political interests. In Scotland, the DailyMail Report in 2016 published a news article 
from a newly resettled Syrian family depicting them as depressed and feeling trapped in the 
Island of Bute. Later, it was revealed that the news editors eliminated the first part of the 
interview where the Syrian family expressed gratitude and spoke of their desire to be in a place 
where there was a larger Syrian community (The Guardian 2016). The Syrian family’s true 
interview was manipulated to make it seem as if their resettlement in Scotland was an undesired 
event, whereas, according to a new conversations with the Syrian family, they were actually 
simply expressing their initial thoughts on resettlement and the difficulties regarding assimilation 
in a new country (TheGuardian 2016).  
On observing the media reports and geo-politics surrounding the Syrian refugee 
community, I argue that the Syrian refugee community has an inflexible liminality. The Syrian 
refugee community has been of interest to international politics because of the sheer volume of 
exiles seeking refuge in various countries. Despite the multiple geo-political entities interested in 
the Syrians, the Syrian exile community does not have the voice or room to negotiate their 
position within the geo-politics that surround them. What small voice they do seem to have is 
spoken from the mouth of the media, who may have their own political agenda, or from the naked 
suffering of a victimized body like that of the three-year old boy. I recognize that more research 
will need to be done to completely understand the quality of liminality experienced by the Syrian 
exile community; however, in this dissertation, I have used the Syrian refugee’s example to 
contrast their liminal conditions to the Tibetan exile community’s liminal conditions. The Tibetan 
exile community, compared the Syrian exile community, is also in a liminal condition but bears 
their liminality in a flexible manner, wherein they can voice their opinions on international 
politics and attract outside supporters for their opinions. The Syrian exile community does not 
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have this flexibility – thus, I contend that the Syrian refugee community is experiencing the far 
end of inflexibility in the quality of their liminality.  
 
Flexibility changing overtime: the Case of Latino Immigrants in the U.S. 
In order to understand another characteristic of the quality of liminality, I will use the 
case of the undocumented Latino community in the United States and compare their liminality 
during the term of President Barack Obama (2009-2017) with their liminality during the term of 
President Donald Trump (2017-present). I argue that the quality of liminality that a group 
experiences can change over time with a change in sentiments from the geo-politics surrounding 
them. Undocumented Latino migrants are immigrants originating from Mexico, South America, 
and the Caribbean, living in the U.S. without authorization from the U.S. government. Despite the 
focus on undocumented Latino migrants, it is hard to overlook the overall “illegal alien” 
stereotype surrounding the Latino community. My key argument is that undocumented Latino 
migrants had some limited flexibility in their liminality under the term of President Obama.  
Furthermore, that that little amount of flexibility has completely disappeared under the term of 
President Trump. Additionally, it is clear that the Latino ethnic community in general has come 
under suspicion within the anti-immigrant environment established by the Trump administration. 
Hence, the liminality of the Latino ethnic community has also slowly become less flexible in the 
U.S. I will first talk about general impressions of the Latino community in the U.S. and then 
explain the difference in their experience of liminality from 2009 to 2018.   
Since World War II, there has been large flow of migrants crossing the Mexico-U.S. 
border, but since the 1970s, crossing the border without authorization has become difficult and 
costly. Hence, a previously temporary workforce population decided to remain in the U.S. rather 
than risk crossing the border at a future date (Massey and Pren 2012, Arbona 2010). In 2017, the 
Latino population in the U.S. constituted of 16.7% of the country’s population (PEW 2017). This 
Latino population traces their origin from Mexico (63.3%), South America (13%), Puerto Rico 
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(9%), and Cuba (4%) (PEW 2017). The latest estimate of the unauthorized population in the U.S. 
was 11 million, constituting about 3.4% of the U.S. population. Until 2009, unauthorized 
immigrants were mostly from Mexico, but by 2016, only about half (5.6 million) of unauthorized 
immigrants were from Mexico and about 5.7 million were from Asia and Central America (PEW 
2017). From the 1990s to 2001, fear of foreign terrorists and the anti-Latino and anti-immigrant 
stance of the U.S. has been exacerbated (Massey and Pren 2012). Thus, undocumented Latino 
migrants have come to be the most vulnerable population in the U.S.    
Leo Chavez, in his book, The Latino Threat (2008), helped me understand how and why 
Latino migrants have become a sensitive topic for the U.S. politics. Chavez argues that Latino 
immigrants are different from other immigrant groups in U.S. because they are assumed to be 
unwilling to assimilate within the Anglo white population, and are further fixed on destroying the 
American way of life. Chavez states: 
“Latinos have been in what is now the United States since the Late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, actually predating English colonies… Latinos are an alleged threat 
because of this history and social identity, which supposedly make their integration 
difficult and imbue them, particularly, Mexicans, with a desire to remain socially apart as 
they prepare for a reconquest of the U.S. Southwest (Chavez 2008:4)” 
 
I agree with Chavez that Latino migrants, especially Mexicans, regardless of their 
citizenship status, have been “plagued by the mark of illegality” (Chavez 2008). Regardless of 
whether these Mexican immigrants are ones who came decades ago or are the children of the 
immigrants who were born in the U.S., if they look Mexican, it is enough to justify the 
immigrants as illegal aliens. The strongest anti-Latino legislative change came on April 23rd, 2010 
when Arizona’s governor Jan Brewer signed the toughest immigration law to date – called SB 
1070 – a law that forced immigrants to carry identity documents to legitimize their presence in 
the U.S., and enforced the police force’s authority to ask for any Latino-looking individual’s legal 
paperwork (NY Times 2010). The same type of legislation was followed by other states, namely, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah (NYtimes 2011, Chavez 
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2008). The SB1070 legislation did not just exclude undocumented migrants but also put all 
Latino-looking people under one umbrella of suspicion – that of the “illegal alien.” This 
legislation gave police the authority to stop-check anybody based on their phenotype, whether a 
citizen or not, sending a clear message to the Latino community that all Latino people are 
negatively stereotyped and considered to be a threat to the nation. Following Chavez’s argument, 
the entire Latino community in Arizona’s 2012 legislation was “plagued by the mark of 
illegality.”  
Under President Obama’s term, undocumented immigrants got some breathing room 
from the pro-immigration policies from his administration. The legislative bill called the Dream 
Act (initially proposed in 2001) would have provided a pathway for undocumented migrants to 
gain U.S. citizenship, but it failed to pass senate approval (NY Times 2007, Politico 2010). In 
2012, the Obama Administration proposed an alternative program called Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) that would allow undocumented migrants who came as children to 
the U.S. temporary legal residence in the U.S., and to obtain work authorization for four-years 
total (Dept. Homeland Security 2012, CNN 2012). The result of the implementation of DACA 
has shown a positive economic outcome because it has allowed approximately 800,000 DACA 
recipients the ability to pursue higher education, start entrepreneurial careers, enter the legal 
workforce, and buy homes and cars (Wong et. al. 2016). The DACA program initiated legal 
security and freedom from living in fear for deportation for the undocumented migrants living the 
U.S. I argue that support from the Obama Administration and the initiation of pro-immigrant 
legislature from the executive branch of the U.S. government brought a little more flexibility to 
the lives of undocumented immigrants, especially those of Latino origin since, according to the 
PEW study (Sept 2017), they were the majority of DACA recipients.  
Undocumented migrants have been fighting the battle for legitimacy in the U.S. since the 
early 1970s (Massey and Pren 2012, Chavez 2008) but failed to win any legal recognition until 
the Obama Administration. The repeated failure to pass the Dream Act bill in 2001, 2007, and 
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2010 showed that the majority of political representatives were not ready to show empathy 
towards undocumented migrants (NILC 2007, CNN 2010, Ojeda and Takash 2011). 
Undocumented migrants were a stateless population stranded between two countries – the country 
of origin and the U.S. Undocumented migrants could not go back to their country of origin 
because they had spent the majority of their lives in the U.S., but they also could not live a normal 
life, which would include pursuing higher education, legal employment, entrepreneurship, the 
ownership assets etc., in the U.S. Moreover, the plea from the community of undocumented 
migrants to the U.S. government, via the Dream Act bill, was rejected and the undocumented 
community’s voice was quieted. Thus, I argue that undocumented migrants in the U.S. had 
inflexible liminality until the 2012 DACA program. The DACA program provided the legal 
recognition and temporary flexibility within the liminal condition of undocumented migrants. 
However, I argue that the temporary flexibility gained with DACA has been revoked under the 
Trump Administration. Hence, I argue that this is one of the characteristics of the quality of 
liminality; that the flexibility or inflexibility experienced by a liminal group can change over 
time.  
President Trump’s harsh stance against immigrants in the U.S. has brought a decreased 
flexibility of liminality to undocumented migrants in the U.S. as well as spread negative 
stereotypes about the Latinos to the U.S. population. Under the Trump Administration, the 
DACA program has been brought to a halt since September 2017 – since this time, the 
Department of Homeland Security has stopped accepting and renewing undocumented migrant’s 
applications (Dept. Homeland Security 2017, NPR 2017). Moreover, President Trump has used 
aggressive language against Latino and general immigrant populations in the U.S. During a 
meeting about the Dream Act in January 2018, President Trump reportedly said, “Why are we 
having all these people from shithole countries come here?” (PolitiFact 2018). President Trump 
has been strongly presenting anti-immigrant Executive Orders, like the revocation of Temporary 
Protection Status, the halting of DACA, issuing Muslim Travel bans, the cutting of the number of 
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refugee entries, and so on (See Chapter 7). President Trump has been especially against Mexican 
immigrants, blaming them for crimes in the U.S. and promising U.S. citizens that he would 
protect them all by the building of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border (Time 2016). I argue that 
these are similar types of fears to those that Leo Chavez argued that many U.S. politicians hold 
against the Latino population; i.e., the notion that Mexican immigrants only destroy the lives 
created by the Anglo-white Americans. President Trump started his presidential campaign in 
2015 by promoting a negative stereotype of Mexican immigrants, stating,  
“They are not our friends, believe me. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. 
They’re rapists. And some, I assume are good people.” (President Donald Trump, June 
16th, 2015) 
 
The negative stereotype of Latino migrants created by the Trump Administration has 
caused the flexibility of undocumented immigrants to decline, especially that of undocumented 
Latino immigrants. The border patrol along the U.S.-Mexico border has been tightened, and the 
number of undocumented immigrants arrested has grown to its highest number since 2014, 
among whom many are children separated from their families (See Chapter 7). Within the U.S., 
verbal abuse and discrimination against the Latino community has increased in the anti-
immigrant environment fostered by the Trump Administration (Almeida et. al. 2016, Latino 
National Survey 2016). The undocumented migrant’s decline in legislative rights and in support 
from U.S. policy makers has led to a decrease in their ability to maneuver or voice their opinions 
as unauthorized people in the U.S.  
I argue that undocumented migrants in the U.S. are once again the most vulnerable 
population. Only the DACA program helps a small percent of the population while the rest are on 
the way to deportation. Despite legal residency in the U.S., I contend that Latino people are still 
not thought to be part of the U.S. melting pot by many Americans; instead, they are looked upon 
with contempt and feared as a threat to the American way of life, as argued by Chavez. I argue 
that anti-Latino propaganda in U.S. politics has decreased the flexibility for the quality of 
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liminality experiencing by the Latino community in the U.S. Moreover, anti-immigrant policies 
have made the quality of liminality of undocumented migrants, especially Latino undocumented 
migrants, incredibly inflexible.   
 The case of Latino immigrants in the U.S. shows that the quality of liminality, whether 
flexible or inflexible, can change over time. Changes in the host country’s policies and attitudes 
towards the liminal group of concern can have a large influence on the quality of liminality 
experienced by the group. The Latino community in the U.S. had a preconceived stereotype that 
they were an ethnic group different from other immigrants and the Anglo-white community in the 
U.S. The fear portrayed by U.S. politicians depicted them as an ethnic group determined to 
destroy the majority white-American way of life. Thus, despite the citizenship status of the Latino 
community, they were rendered a liminal group that could not completely be accepted within the 
U.S. population yet also did not have a legal place to return to in their country of origin.  
Additionally, the rise in undocumented immigrants from Mexico placed another hurdle 
before the Latino community in the U.S. The SB-1070 legislation passed by the Arizona state 
embodied the stereotypical fear of Latino community. It forced all Latinos, regardless of their 
citizenship, under the one umbrella of “illegal alien” until individual Latinos could prove their 
legal status in the U.S. The undocumented Latino community in the U.S. was already a liminal 
group, in fear due to their unauthorized status, but the attitude of U.S. politicians and the host 
community worsened their liminal conditions. Thus, undocumented Latinos in the U.S. 
experienced very inflexible liminality. The undocumented Latino community in the U.S. felt a 
sense of relief when the Obama Administration supported them. The approval of DACA as 
proposed by the Obama Administration allowed undocumented migrants to have legal protection 
and the freedom to live like a legal resident. Pro-immigrant policies under the Obama 
Administration brought some flexibility to the liminal conditions of undocumented immigrants, 
especially for the groups originating from Latino countries.  
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However, this little bit of flexibility was drastically taken away when the Trump 
Administration replaced the Obama Administration. The anti-immigrant policies passed directly 
on from Presidential Executive orders to cut down the flexibility of undocumented immigrants. 
Moreover, President Trump’s obvious dislike for the Latino community, seen both from several 
of his speeches and his direct attack on Mexican immigrants by pushing for building a wall on 
U.S.-Mexico border has again tainted the entire Latino community in U.S. with negative 
stereotypes. Once again, what little room for flexibility in the liminal conditions of both 
undocumented immigrants and the Latino community in U.S. is being taken away. Thus, under 
the Trump Administration today, the Latino community and undocumented immigrants are 
experiencing inflexible liminality. The Latino community in the U.S., including undocumented 
immigrants, had experienced inflexible liminality, which changed to a more flexible form under 
Obama Administration, and then changed back to inflexibility under Trump Administration. This 
trend experienced by the Latino community, and the undocumented immigrant group in the U.S., 
shows an important characteristic of the quality of liminality; i.e., it can change over time for 
better or for worse.  
 
Comparing Different Qualities of Liminalities  
As I mentioned early in the chapter, we have to compare the Tibetan exile community to 
other exile groups in order to understand why the cultural practice of flexible liminality seems to 
work for the Tibetan exile community. Now that we have analyzed two different liminal 
communities, the Syrian exile group and the Latino community in the U.S., we can see that 
different groups have different liminal experiences. The Tibetan exile community has proved to 
be successful in using flexible liminality as a cultural practice because the exile community has 
control over the way they are othered by the geo-politics that surround them. The Tibetan exile 
community has complete flexibility in their liminal condition. In comparison, the Syrian exile 
community has little control over the way they are othered by the geo-politics surrounding them; 
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therefore, they have inflexible liminality. The Latino community and the undocumented 
immigrant group in the U.S., by contrast, go through times where these groups have more 
flexibility and other times of less flexibility or even complete inflexibility. Hence, the Latino 
community’s quality of liminality shows that the kind of liminality experienced by a group can 
change over time.  
I argue that the same use of flexible liminality theory might increase our understanding of 
other liminal groups that have to adjust to policies, governments, and institutions. The flexible 
liminality of any liminal group has a spectrum to maneuver upon within the geopolitical 
conditions surrounding them. If scholars, refugee service organizations, and governments 
working with liminal groups look where on the spectrum these groups fit in, it could help them 
understand the quality of liminality experienced by the such groups. However, it should be noted 
that the quality of liminality, whether flexible or inflexible, is not a fixed standard for any group. 
Instead, if groups over time develop more flexibility in their liminal conditions, they can reach 
out to the geo-polities surrounding them and try to adjust perceptions of themselves over time, 
just like in the case of the Tibetan exile community.  
 
Study Gaps and Recommendations for Future Research Work  
This dissertation has only started recognizing characteristics of the quality of liminality 
and the unique way the Tibetan exile community is using liminality to achieve better life chances. 
There is still more work to be done regarding liminality theory, and the ethnography of the 
Tibetan exile community’s own specific liminality. Just as I have used the theory of flexible 
liminality above to look at the Syrian refugee group and Latinos in the U.S., I recommend using 
the theory of flexible liminality for future research work to understand the quality of liminality 
for other marginalized populations. I highly recommend that refugee resettlement agencies and 
other organizations, like the one I worked for, that are providing services to refugee groups, apply 
the theory of flexible liminality themselves to better understand each refugee population’s quality 
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of liminality. By understanding each refugee group’s form of liminality, such agencies could 
provide better care and services according to each group’s needs.  
 I have touched on various aspects of the Tibetan exile community’s conditions that 
express their liminal experiences, but each of these could obviously use more research to better 
unpack the cultural values of the Tibetan exile community. I have touched on topics like the ‘Free 
Tibet’ politics, the Tibetan exile government’s well-rounded public services, the Tibetan leader’s 
tactical supervision of the exile community, Tibetan institutions formed to nurture individuals 
towards better life chances, and on how a Tibetan individual’s exile identity is linked with 
nationalist values, cultural pride, and with calling out for human-rights activism. Future research 
could focus on just one of these topics within the Tibetan exile community; for example, on the 
topic of Tibetan nationalist values (Tibetan-ness), a researcher could explore how the community 
is motivating individual Tibetans to have such strong patriotic feelings, even when the Tibetan 
diaspora is spread all around the world. Lastly, I benefited from relying on social media (like 
Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, Skype etc.) to connect with Tibetan exiles living in 
Nepal, India, and the U.S. I highly suggest, in future, that researchers focus on the topic of how 
the Tibetan exile community uses digital technology to keep up with each other in diaspora, and 
to increase their communal value.   
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